JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.
Sara Sternberg Greene* & Kristen M. Renberg**
One of the most basic assumptions of our legal system is that when
two parties face oﬀ in court, the case will be adjudicated before a judge
who is trained in the law. This Essay begins by showing that, empirically,
the assumption that most judges have legal training does not hold true
for many low-level state courts. Using data we compiled from all fifty
states and the District of Columbia, we find that thirty-two states allow
at least some low-level state court judges to adjudicate without a law
degree, and seventeen states do not require judges who adjudicate
eviction cases to have law degrees. Since most poor litigants are
unrepresented in civil legal cases, this sets up an almost Kafkaesque scene
in courtrooms across the country: Legal cases that have a profound eﬀect
on poor families, such as whether they will lose their home to eviction, are
argued in courtrooms where either no one knows the law or only one
party—the attorney for the more powerful party—does.
Considering data collected from a case study of North Carolina,
where over 80% of magistrates do not have J.D.s, this Essay argues that
allowing a system of nonlawyer judges perpetuates long-standing
inequalities in our courts. It further argues that the phenomenon of lay
judges is a symptom of a much larger problem in our justice system: the
devaluation of the legal problems of the poor, who are disproportionately
Black and Latinx. This devaluation stems in part from an enduring
cultural history in the United States of blaming the poor for their poverty
and its associated problems. A change is in order, one that intentionally
considers the expertise of judges and adopts creative solutions to
incentivize specially qualified adjudicators to serve as low-level state court
judges.
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INTRODUCTION
Maya, a single mother of two, spent hours preparing for her court
date in a rural county of North Carolina.1 Even before court, Maya knew
the stakes were high—she would find out whether she would be evicted
from the apartment she had lived in for six years, the apartment her
children called home. She did not have an attorney, but, after conducting
online research, she felt relatively confident that her landlord had violated
the “implied warranty of habitability” he owed her family, and thus, she
believed she would prevail and avoid eviction.
1. In order to protect the identity of respondents, Maya’s experience is based on a
combination of experiences. Greene conducted both a qualitative research project in the
summer of 2019 that studied the Eviction Diversion Program in Durham, North Carolina
and a case study of North Carolina magistrate courts in 2020 and 2021 for this project. The
first study included one-to-two-hour interviews with fifty respondents who had been evicted
or were at risk of eviction and had either inquired about or received help from the Eviction
Diversion Program. The second study, a case study of North Carolina magistrate-run courts,
involved interviews with a diverse panel of key informants on the North Carolina magistrate
court system. For further explanation and details about these key informant interviews, see
infra Part III.
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Maya lost her case. About two weeks later, her possessions were
removed from the apartment, and she was evicted. Maya was confused
after court and wondered if she had not quite understood the law. What
Maya assumed, of course, was that she was the one who was confused about
the law. What Maya did not know was that the magistrate judge she had
just appeared before might also have been confused about the law. In fact,
the judge was in his first six months on the job and had received exactly
zero hours of legal training of any kind: no webinar, no training session,
nothing.
Low-level state court judges like the one Maya appeared before wield
substantial power over the lives of millions of people, people who are
disproportionately poor and disproportionately Black and Latinx.2
Indeed, these judges, often called magistrate judges or justices of the
peace (depending on the state), decide critical issues such as whether
families are evicted, whether someone owes a debt collector thousands of
dollars, and whether someone’s car is repossessed. These judges make
profoundly important decisions that alter the life courses of millions of
Americans each year.3 Yet a little recognized fact is that the judge’s lack of
2. See Tonya L. Brito, Producing Justice in Poor People’s Courts: Four Models of State
Legal Actors, 24 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 145, 147 (2020) (noting that state civil court cases include
a disproportionate number of socioeconomically disadvantaged litigants); Anna E. Carpenter,
Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K. Steinberg & Alyx Mark, Judges in Lawyerless Courts, 110 Geo.
L.J. 509, 512 (2022) [hereinafter Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts] (noting that issues
in state civil trial courts are typically “deeply connected to fundamental human needs such as
safety, intimate relationships, housing, and financial security” and that “[m]any people . . . pulled
into civil court . . . are already suffering the consequences of America’s frayed”—or
nonexistent—“social and economic safety nets”); Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg,
Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 257–
59 [hereinafter Carpenter et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges] (detailing how legally
sophisticated individuals and corporations generally bypass the civil justice system, rendering the
docket of these courtrooms to be primarily concerned with “low-value” contract disputes and
family law disputes); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s
Courts, 22 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 473, 493–94 (2015) (discussing how Black men and
women are disproportionately represented in “poor people’s courts” and how they are
disadvantaged in these courts); Lauren Sudeall & Darcy Meals, Every Year, Millions Try to
Navigate US Courts Without a Lawyer, The Conversation (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://theconversation.com/every-year-millions-try-to-navigate-us-courts-without-a-lawyer84159 [https://perma.cc/6DMM-KF8G] (detailing how millions of litigants, often
unrepresented, interact with the civil justice system each year).
3. In 2018, there were 16.4 million nontraffic related civil cases filed in state civil courts.
Ct. Stats. Project, State Ct. Adm’rs & Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., State Court Caseload Digest: 2018
Data, at 7 (2020), https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018Digest.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXH-VVTJ]. Many studies have noted the importance of lowlevel state court issues in the lives of people who have low incomes. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Am.
Bar
Found.,
Accessing
Justice
in
the
Contemporary
USA:
Findings
From
the
Community
Needs
and
Services
Study
9–10
(2014),
https://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justic
e_in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMY6-A85D] (discussing
findings regarding civil justice’s impact on social inequality); Carpenter et al., Judges in
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credentials in Maya’s case is not unusual.4 In well over half of the states,
judges are making at least some of these decisions without a law degree
and sometimes with no legal training at all.5
This fact is counter to one of the most basic assumptions of our legal
system—when two parties go to court, the case will be adjudicated before
a judge who is trained in the law. Legal scholars have long been interested
in whether specific characteristics of judges—such as political views,
implicit biases, gender, or religion, among others—might aﬀect
Lawyerless Courts, supra note 2, at 512–13 (noting the importance of the issues at stake in state
civil courts for lower-income Americans); Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil
Justice, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1263, 1271 (2016) (“Investigations into access-to-justice issues for
different groups can provide a lens into how our civil legal institutions may aid in the
perpetuation of inequality and how different groups are integrated into—and excluded from—
public institutions.”).
4. A few recent articles have noted the phenomenon of judges without J.D.s in
passing, but the analysis of the issue of nonlawyer judges in much of this scholarship is very
limited since the articles focus on other important topics. See Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Criminal
Municipal Courts, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 964, 979 (2021) (oﬀering the first comprehensive
analysis of the municipal court phenomenon and noting that the majority of states with
municipal courts do not require municipal judges to hold law degrees and that the training
requirements for such judges vary significantly); Lauren Sudeall & Daniel Pasciuti, Praxis
and Paradox: Inside the Black Box of Eviction Court, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 1365, 1385 n.93
(2021) (studying rural and urban eviction courts in Georgia—showing that law is highly
localized—and noting that Georgia law does not require magistrate judges to have law
degrees and some of the judges in the study did not have law degrees); Justin WeinsteinTull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1031, 1053–55 (2020) (examining the
relationship between local court systems and administrative bodies within state judicial
branches, reevaluating theories of judicial federalism in light of local courts, and noting that
“a surprising number of states and jurisdictions permit people with no legal training to serve
as local-court judges”). Professor Weinstein-Tull’s article uses data collected by the National
Center on State Courts to find that twenty-six states allow nonlawyer judges in low-level state
courts. Id. at 1053 n.95. However, our more recently collected data after an exhaustive
search of state statutes and websites finds that thirty-two states allow nonlawyer judges at
some level of court, including some diﬀerences (both inclusions and exclusions) with
Weinstein-Tull’s data. See infra Appendix. A 2018 student note by Jason Neal focuses on
nonlawyer magistrate judges. It is the only recent article or note we know of to focus on this
topic, but it does not take a national perspective and instead focuses only on West Virginia.
See Jason Neal, Note, Who Decides Justice: The Case for Legally Trained Magistrate Judges
in West Virginia, 121 W. Va. L. Rev. 727, 729–30 (2018). Further, he focuses on the
constitutional issues surrounding nonlawyer judges in West Virginia, analyzing both West
Virginia’s constitution and federal cases on the issue. Id. In contrast to Neal’s note, our Essay
takes empirical, national, and access-to-judge lenses when analyzing the issue. Additionally,
Professor Cathy Lesser Mansfield has written a comprehensive article that focuses on lay
judges. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People’s Court: Rethinking the Role of NonLawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil Cases, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 119, 133–34 (1999).
However, Mansfield’s piece is over twenty years old and focuses only on civil jurisdiction for
lay judges. Finally, thirty-five years ago, in 1986, Professor Doris Marie Provine took up the
issue of nonlawyer judges in the book Judging Credentials, arguing against requiring judges
to have law degrees. Doris Marie Provine, Judging Credentials: Nonlawyer Judges and the
Politics of Professionalism 168–70, 177–81 (1986). Our study of course considers more
contemporary access to justice and inequality issues and provides recent data on the issue
of nonlawyer judges.
5. See infra section II.B.
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outcomes.6 Indeed, numerous articles consider whether judges
consistently (and fairly) apply the law.7 But the underlying assumption is
that judges know the law—the question is usually how they interpret and
apply it and why.8
This Essay begins by showing that empirically, the assumption that
most judges have legal training does not hold true for low-level state courts
in many states. Using data compiled from all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, this survey finds that thirty-two states allow at least some lowlevel state court judges to adjudicate without a law degree, and indeed,
there are hundreds of magistrates and justices of the peace in these states
wielding substantial legal authority who have never been trained in the
law.9 In seventeen states, judges with no law degree are permitted to
adjudicate eviction cases.10
At first glance, it may appear that this system of noncredentialed
judges is eﬃcient, or even necessary, given the limited resources of the
judiciary. But allowing a system of nonlawyer judges perpetuates longstanding inequalities in how litigants experience courts. This Essay rejects
eﬃciency justifications and argues that the phenomenon of judges without
J.D.s is a symptom of a much larger problem in our justice system: the
devaluation of the legal problems of the poor, who are disproportionately

6. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg, The Paradoxical Impact of
Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 1023, 1027 (2020)
(analyzing the role that political party and timing of judicial nomination played in circuit
judges’ use of legislative history); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind
Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1117, 1141
(2009) (finding that, even after controlling for political aﬃliations, federal judges of
diﬀerent races rule on racial harassment cases diﬀerently—and these diﬀerences are
statistically meaningful); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging
Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 63, 68 (2017)
(detailing a series of empirical tests that demonstrate how negative implicit biases manifest
in both state and federal judges); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender
and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. 1759, 1776–79
(2005) (detailing empirical findings on the direct and indirect impact a judge’s gender has
on their decisionmaking and collegial behavior on appellate panels).
7. Chew & Kelley, supra note 6; Levinson et al., supra note 6; Peresie, supra note 6.
8. See supra note 7. One interesting consideration for further study is the
comparative perspective. Lay judging is common in several countries around the world, with
diﬀerent countries employing very diﬀerent systems and configurations of judges. Sanja
Kutnjak Ivković, Shari Seidman Diamond, Valerie P. Hans & Nancy S. Marder, Introduction
in Juries, Lay Judges, and Mixed Courts: A Global Perspective 2–11 (Sanja Kutnjak Ivković,
Shari Seidman Diamond, Valerie P. Hans & Nancy S. Marder eds., 2021). In future work, we
hope to compare and contrast these diﬀerent systems to that in the United States in order
to better understand how culture and history contribute to diﬀerent judicial structures
concerning lay judges.
9. See infra Appendix, tbls.1 & 2.
10. Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Washington are not
included in this count, even though they technically allow lay judges in certain
circumstances. See infra note 146 and accompanying text and Appendix.
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Black and Latinx.11 We argue that this devaluation stems in part from an
enduring cultural history of blaming the poor for their poverty and the
associated problems of poverty.12 Many of the legal problems of the poor
that end up in low-level courts are problems of poverty (such as eviction
and debt collection), and inadequate resources are devoted to courts that
address them. The implication is that these problems of poverty do not
deserve access to well-run and well-resourced institutions. In other words,
an overriding response to the problems of the poor throughout American
history—whether legal problems or otherwise—has been that the State
should not, and cannot, devote substantial resources to these problems
and the institutions meant to address them, in part due to a cultural
narrative around the “undeserving poor” that implicates those who are
poor in the problems of poverty.13
Consider the message that is sent to both poor litigants and those who
bring them to low-level state courts, such as landlords and debt collectors.
The types of cases state courts hear have obvious gravity on the lives of
millions of poor Americans each year; indeed, a litigant can lose their
home in an eviction case or be subject to wage garnishment in a debt
collection case. Despite the weight of these cases on the lives of poor
litigants, however, the State has deemed such cases unworthy of the
necessity of a legally trained adjudicator. This reality is experienced by
thousands of poor Americans each day, as well as by thousands of powerful
landlords and debt collectors. The symbolic nature of such a
determination by the State should not be lost. Allowing judges to
adjudicate without J.D.s illustrates the degree to which low-level state
courts do not even pretend to engage with the legal rights of the poor, let
alone enforce such rights. Instead, these institutions are in fact designed
so that those with power and resources can, and do, prevail.14
11. John Creamer, Inequalities Persist Despite Decline in Poverty for All Major Race
and Hispanic Origin Groups, U.S. Census Bureau (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanicsreached-historic-lows-in-2019.html [https://perma.cc/V43J-5AP2] (last updated Dec. 9,
2021) (“Blacks and Hispanics continue to be over-represented in the population in poverty
relative to their representation in the overall population.”).
12. See, e.g., Maia Szalavitz, Why Do We Think Poor People Are Poor Because of Their
Own Bad Choices?, Guardian (July 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jul/05/us-inequality-poor-people-bad-choices-wealthy-bias (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing how perceptions and cultural phenomena intersect and
lead to the belief that the poor deserve what they get).
13. See Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Blame Welfare, Ignore Poverty and
Inequality 151–52 (2007) (detailing the long history in America of blaming the poor for
their condition and conceiving of poverty as a “moral fault”).
14. See Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Punishment Without Crime: How Our Massive
Misdemeanor System Traps the Innocent and Makes America More Unequal 4–5 (2018)
(noting that the misdemeanor system in the United States “often violates basic legal
principles of justice and fairness,” leaving those without resources particularly vulnerable);
Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
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This situation is even more concerning when considered in light of a
related critical issue that Professors Anna Carpenter, Alyx Mark, Colleen
Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg, and others have identified: Low-level state
courts are essentially pro se courts, where the vast majority of litigants
appear before the court with no attorney to represent them because there
is no right to counsel in civil cases.15 These scholars and others have
explored, sometimes empirically, the dynamic between judges and
unrepresented litigants in state courts, studying judges’ behavior in pro se
courts, noting important problems, and suggesting blueprints for
reform.16 They have found that the phenomenon of pro se courts leads to
Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 97–101 (1974) (detailing how “repeat players” (those who
have resources and anticipate engaging in repeat litigation of the same type in the legal
system) are able to shape the development of law in their favor, as opposed to “one-shotters”
(those who have infrequent dealings with the legal system and less resources)); Nicole
Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev.
145, 190–91 (2019) (finding that the majority of tenants with a meritorious warranty of
habitability claim do not prevail in court).
15. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011) (finding that the Due Process
Clause does not automatically guarantee a right to counsel in a civil contempt hearing, even
if the individual is ultimately imprisoned); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–
25 (1981) (finding that a “presumption” of the right to appointed counsel exists only in
cases where litigants may lose their physical liberty as a result of losing the litigation). Because of a lack of resources, legal aid and other such organizations do not have the capacity
to provide a lawyer to all (or even close to all) litigants who want or need one. Legal Servs.
Corp. (LSC), The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income
Americans 13 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGapFullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/B55X-4YWZ] (“In 2017, low-income Americans will
approach LSC-funded legal aid organizations for help with an estimated 1.7 million civil
legal problems . . . but are expected to receive enough help to fully address their legal needs
for only 28% to 38% of them.”). Of the problems low-income Americans bring to LSC
grantees, “[m]ore than half (53% to 70%) . . . will receive limited legal help or no legal help
at all.” Id.
16. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 2, at 512–13. Several
other scholars have also examined diﬀerent dimensions of the importance of lawyers in lowlevel state court proceedings, though few have specifically focused on the role of judges. See
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Am. Const. Soc’y, Deconstructing the Right to Counsel 2 (2014),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Lucas__Deconstructing_the_Right_to_Counsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/43SF-QP8L] (introducing
“an organizational framework for evaluating the proposals emerging from the access to civil
justice debate” in order to examine the right to counsel and explore why it is needed in
both criminal and civil contexts); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak,
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Diﬀerence Does Representation (Oﬀer
and Actual Use) Make?, 121 Yale L.J. 2118, 2121–22 (2012) (studying the diﬀerence that an
oﬀer, and actual use, of legal representation made to low-income clients in civil cases); Peter
A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 179, 182, 185–87 (2014) (examining litigation outcomes for junk
debt plaintiﬀs and finding that defendants represented by a lawyer achieved far better
outcomes than those without representation); Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, D. James
Greiner & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized
Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 901,
906–07 (2013) (examining “whether limited legal assistance is suﬃcient to approximate a
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an “ethically ambiguous” role for judges.17 Judges are faced with two
diﬀerent paths: They can either maintain their traditionally passive and
neutral role while leaving unrepresented litigants to figure things out for
themselves, which is often very diﬃcult for them to do; or, they can take a
much more active role in cases, such as “simplifying courtroom
procedures, filling information gaps for unrepresented people, actively
developing the factual record in trials, [and] identifying legal issues.”18 In
their recent work studying domestic violence courts, where the judges
were all legally trained, Carpenter, Mark, Shanahan, and Steinberg found
that judges almost universally lean toward the first path—“judges
exercised process control and wielded legal jargon in ways that maintained
legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms.”19
We build on this existing work but consider a diﬀerent set of related
problems: those that arise in courts where judges themselves are not legally
trained, yet preside over cases with mostly unrepresented litigants. In such
cases, the judge is often unable to “fill[] information gaps for
unrepresented people, actively develop[] the factual record in trials, [and]
identify[] legal issues,”20 or “maintain[] legal and procedural complexity
in their courtrooms”21 because the judge does not know the law or legal
procedures.
The situation is Kafkaesque: In such courtrooms, sometimes no one
has in-depth knowledge of the law or, often even more problematic,
sometimes only one attorney for one party, the more powerful and

traditional attorney-client relationship in summary eviction proceedings”); Kathryn A.
Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 287, 288–89 (arguing that seeking to simplify
proceedings to obviate the need for legal representation can carry potential downsides and
unintended consequences); Sudeall & Pasciuti, supra note 4, at 1368 (studying suburban
and rural eviction courts in Georgia and finding that applying and enforcing laws is a highly
localized process).
17. See Carpenter et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges, supra note 2, at 279–82.
18. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 2, at 513. Several
scholars have focused reform suggestions on the role of judges in pro se courts, most
arguing that judges should take a more active role in proceedings to ensure fairness. See
Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 647, 653,
686–87 (2017) (discussing findings regarding variation in active judging and exploring why
and when judges use active judging); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham
L. Rev. 1987, 2029–31 (1999) (arguing judges should take an active role in helping
unrepresented litigants develop a factual record and with matters of procedural and
substantive law); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will
Help, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 969, 970, 977–78 (2004) (arguing that judges should be required
to play an active role in ensuring justice in cases with unrepresented litigants).
19. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 2, at 513.
20. Id. at 513.
21. Id. at 516, 539.
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resourced party, has such knowledge.22 This attorney, of course, is ready
to school the (untrained) judge on why his client should prevail. The
inequality of the situation is glaring. There is no real illusion of a fair legal
process, as those who experience courts with these dynamics know all too
well.23
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I traces the history of lay judging
in the United States back to the colonial era, when it was common for
nonlawyer justices of the peace to preside over legal cases.24 Following state
law and practice changes over time, including challenges to the
constitutionality of nonlawyer judges, we note key moments of potential
reform and why they failed. We also trace the long history of this country’s
neglect of the poor and the institutions that serve them, providing a
roadmap to understanding how a similar trajectory has played out in the
court system. In Part II, we define the scope of judging without a J.D. based
on our data, describing our data-gathering process and sharing details of
our survey findings. In Part III, we consider the prognosis of nonlegally
trained judges, in part by exploring a case study of North Carolina and key
informant interviews that we gathered. This part discusses some of the
arguments for lay judging but also explores the pitfalls of the practice and
how these problems play out for litigants involved in the courts. We also
show how the practice is consistent with U.S. historical patterns of
devaluing the problems of the poor and underresourcing institutions that
serve them, ultimately perpetuating inequalities in our justice system.
Finally, this Essay concludes by oﬀering thoughts about a potential
roadmap to begin the process of reform while being mindful of economic
pressures on state court systems.

22. See Heidi Schultheis & Caitlin Rooney, Ctr. for Am. Progress, A Right to Counsel
Is a Right to a Fighting Chance: The Importance of Legal Representation in Eviction Proceedings 1 (2019), https://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RightTo-Counsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEZ6-WE9G] (“When it comes to evictions, tenants are
set up to fail. In eviction lawsuits nationwide, an estimated 90 percent of landlords have legal
representation, while only 10 percent of tenants do.”); Editorial Board, Opinion: In Our
System, Landlords Have Lawyers. Tenants Often Don’t. So Tenants Lose., Wash. Post (Apr.
22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/22/tenants-evictioncases-lawyers-cleveland-euclid/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. See Barbara Bezdeck, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 534–35 (1992) (illustrating
that Baltimore’s rent court systematically excludes litigants who are members of socially
subordinated groups from legal protections); Summers, supra note 14, at 205
(demonstrating through empirical research that tenants with meritorious warranty of
habitability claims and representation were at least nine times more likely to prevail than
unrepresented tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims).
24. Alexis de Tocqueville observed the trend of nonlawyer judges in colonial America
and defended the practice, remarking: “A justice of the peace is a well-informed citizen,
though he is not necessarily versed in the knowledge of the laws. His oﬃce simply obliges
him to execute the police regulations of a society, a task in which good sense and integrity
are of more avail than legal science.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 93
(1898).
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I. HISTORY OF NONLAWYER JUDGES
There is an extensive history of lay adjudicators in the United States.25
This Part summarizes this history, focusing specifically on the aspects that
are important to the current lay-judge scheme in the United States. Thus,
we devote particular attention to lower-level state court judges. In addition,
we provide an overview of how our country has long neglected to invest in
the poor and the institutions that serve them, and we begin to connect this
history to the court system.
A.

Seventeenth-Century Colonial America

There were few lawyers in seventeenth-century colonial New
England.26 The court system of the colonies mirrored those in England,
relying almost entirely on laymen. In the early-to-mid-1600s, courts that
functioned in the same manner as English justice of the peace courts
developed in many colonies, though the specifics varied from colony to
colony. The Colony of Virginia, for example, was divided into counties in
1634, and the local government was administered by a board of
commissioners who functioned almost identically to justices of the peace
in England. By 1661, these commissioners were oﬃcially given the title
“justice of peace” and broad jurisdiction to hear all civil cases with no
monetary restrictions and all but capital criminal cases.27 Similarly, in
Massachusetts, “Inferior Quarter Courts” were held in various towns by
magistrates and assistants, and by 1648 were being called “county courts”
and hearing all civil cases and most criminal cases.28
Throughout all of the colonies, religion dominated and Puritan
clergy and magistrates held significant power over the colonists. Not
surprisingly, this religious influence infiltrated the courts.29 Magistrates in
Massachusetts were directed to adjudicate cases “as neere the law of God
[or of Moses] as they can.”30 Citations to scripture were common in legal
arguments, to the point where “it was said that the early Massachusetts
courts occasionally resembled a heated theological disputation where an
opinion allegedly voiced by Moses or the Prophets counted infinitely more
than a decision of the Lord High Chancellor.”31 Magistrates saw
themselves as accountable to God, and thus believed that their actions
25. See Larry M. Boyer, The Justice of the Peace in England and America From 1506
to 1776: A Bibliographic History, 34 Q.J. Libr. Cong. 315, 322 (1977).
26. Id. at 323 (“In the new land lawyers were scarce, and the few that were available
were largely mistrusted.”).
27. Id. at 322.
28. Id.
29. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America 7 (1965)
(explaining how in colonial America Puritan clergy and magistrates held considerable
power and colonists believed that religious principles should dominate how magistrates
decided cases).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 8.
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needed to have Biblical authority.32 Those who worked in courts as judges
or other court personnel were typically “wealthy merchants, clergymen,
governors or governor’s deputies, politicians, favorites,” and, more
generally, influential people.33
There is certainly some debate among historians as to just how much
influence religion versus the laws of England had on legal outcomes in
early colonial America.34 There is no doubt that there was some influence
from the laws of England, but overall the Puritans did not see the English
common law as binding on the colonial courts, even though it may have
influenced some of their procedures and laws.35 Indeed, there were many
settlers who wanted relief from the strict and formal laws (and courts) of
England, which were “profoundly distrusted” by the settlers who had been
dissenters punished by such laws and courts.36 The colonies were seen as a
fresh start—a new society that needed its own laws and procedures.37
This anti-English law sentiment was relatively easy for colonial courts
to carry out during the early colonial era because there was little direction
from England, who governed the colonies with a “light hand.”38 For the
most part, England stayed out of colonial legal arrangements, and
whatever similarities were present, such as a reliance on lay justices of the
peace and magistrates, occurred simply because colonists borrowed those
aspects of the English legal system as they created their new colonial
system.39
Part of the fervor of colonists to distinguish themselves from England
and establish a new start included a suspicion and, indeed, sometimes outright hostility toward lawyers.40 In his history of colonial America, Professor
and historian Daniel Boorstin noted that the “[d]istrust of lawyers became
an institution.”41 In Massachusetts, Thomas Lechford arrived in Boston in
1638 and practiced law in the colony as a courtroom attorney and
documents draftsman. His “attempts to practice law won him no friends
among the magistrates,” and he “was made quite uncomfortable in the
colony, and eventually went back to England.”42 About fifteen years later,
Article 26 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 explicitly

32. Id.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 10–11.
36. Id. at 11–12.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Provine, supra note 4, at 4.
39. Id.
40. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 81 (1973) (noting that
“[t]he first years of the colonial experience were not friendly years for lawyers” and
documenting various actions taken against lawyers in the colonies).
41. Id. (quoting Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 197
(1958)).
42. Id. at 82.
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prohibited anyone from accepting a fee to assist another person in court.43
And in 1663, the legislature enacted a provision prohibiting anyone from
joining the legislature who “is an usual and Common Attorney in any
Inferior Court.”44 Several other colonies also explicitly prohibited lawyers
from their courts, like Virginia in 1645 and Connecticut soon after.45 The
Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas, dated 1669, stated that it was
“a base and vile thing to plead for money or reward.”46 Overall, lay judges
with a strong religious backing prevailed, particularly because lawyers were
scorned.
B.

Early Eighteenth Century—A Time of Transition

After many years of being hands-oﬀ, England became more interested
in colonial legal proceedings in the 1700s as the economy in the colonies
grew.47 England’s new interest in the colonial legal system included
judicial appointments, and some judges began serving “upon the pleasure
of the crown.”48 However, similar to Justices of the Peace in England,
English-appointed judges in the colonies were not generally lawyers. In
fact, in several respects colonial courts (both those controlled by England
and those not) leaned more in the direction of lay justice than even
English courts. First, in England, lay justices of the peace established the
practice of hiring law-trained clerks to assist them, but this did not happen
in the colonies.49 Additionally, lay judges in the colonies ultimately heard
both criminal and civil cases, whereas in England they heard only criminal
cases.50
Courts in the colonies remained lay-judge-based throughout the early
1700s, but during that time lawyers practicing law became more common.
This change was due in part to the fact that emerging legal questions and
procedures were increasingly complex as the colonies began to prosper in
the 1700s and the economy grew. This meant the need for lawyers became
more urgent despite some remaining opposition.51 Trained lawyers from
England began moving to the Northeast colonies to take advantage of the
increased economic opportunities for lawyers.52 At the same time, colonial
men began to consider legal careers in higher numbers, either traveling
to Europe for training or becoming an apprentice with an already
43. John M. Murrin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of EighteenthCentury Massachusetts, in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development 415,
417 (Stanley Katz ed., 1971).
44. Id.
45. Friedman, supra note 40, at 81.
46. Id.
47. Provine, supra note 4, at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 28.
51. In two New Jersey counties, mobs rioted against lawyers in 1769 and 1770.
Friedman, supra note 40, at 83.
52. Provine, supra note 4, at 5.
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successful colonial lawyer.53 Lawyers began gaining wealth and social
power, and the bar as an institution began to develop as well.54
A combination of English policies and this newfound influence of
lawyers led to protective policies in certain colonies meant to safeguard
lawyers and restrict legal practice to “trained” lawyers.55 During this time,
as lawyers began to defend their own profession, there was also a new
movement to restrict judging only to trained lawyers. James Otis Jr., a
member of the Massachusetts Provincial Assembly and a practicing lawyer
in Boston, said that one could take “all the Superior Judges and every
Inferior Judge in the Province, and put them all together, and they would
not make one half of a Common Lawyer.”56
Prior to the Revolution, despite some urging toward lawyer-judges,
most judges (at all levels of courts) remained laymen. For example, of the
eleven men who served as justices of the superior court of Massachusetts
between 1760 and 1774, nine had never practiced law and six had never
studied law.57 All eleven justices were, however, prominent and wealthy.58
Lower court judges were even more likely to be laymen, and their
backgrounds varied considerably.
C.

Post-Revolution and the Nineteenth Century

Contempt for lawyers resurfaced after the Revolution in part because
many lawyers had been loyalists.59 Ultimately, however, the Revolution
brought more opportunities for lawyers and over time their status rose
exponentially in early America. Lawyers, like other high-status and highwealth occupations such as doctors, were disproportionately represented
in the Continental Congress, the Federal Constitutional Convention, the
First Congress, and state Legislatures.60
As the status of lawyers continued to rise, they used their influence to
professionalize the judiciary. State by state, lawyers began attempting to
push nonlawyer judges out of the judiciary with varying degrees of
success.61 Massachusetts enacted education requirements for judges as
early as 1782, and the legislature also raised judicial salaries in order to
encourage lawyers to become judges.62 Other states followed, but states
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Friedman, supra note 40, at 109–10.
58. Id. at 110.
59. Id. at 265.
60. Provine, supra note 4, at 9.
61. Id. at 11–12. For an interesting history of how the Framers initially determined
state versus federal jurisdiction, see Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay
of State Courts, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2101, 2113–16 (2019) (“The Framers instead placed the
burden of judicial work in the new nation on state courts, expecting they would hear most
state and federal claims.”).
62. Provine, supra note 4, at 10–11.
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with small bars were holdouts, keeping laymen as judges for longer, even
in higher courts.63
Throughout the early 1800s, there was an emerging consensus that
only lawyers should hold high judicial oﬃces. Even reformers attempting
to curtail judicial power by advocating for judicial elections and less
judicial power did not challenge the idea of a legally qualified judiciary.64
This transition came in part due to arguments for an independent
judiciary and the separation of powers, as a legally trained judiciary
provided a rationale for independent judicial power.65
Higher court judicial positions became increasingly reserved for
lawyers only, but it took longer for lower courts to transition, and many
did not transition at all, particularly in rural areas where “a more traditionbased vision of the role of courts and law continued to prevail.”66 In many
of these rural areas, the idea of community justice was appealing. There
was a sense that nonlawyer, community-member judges were better than
schooled lawyers because community judges understood the dynamics,
customs, and culture of their community and were less constrained by
formal law.67
Indeed, there was great tension in many states between traditionalists
wanting to preserve this community justice model and those wanting to
move forward. In post-Revolution Virginia, for example, historian A.G.
Roeber noted that “in many respects, not much had changed since the old
days of the Court-Country battle, when country justices resented
Williamsburg Lawyers and General Court orders that integrated with the
running of country life.”68 He continued:
Part of the burden that fell on republican lawyers had been to
argue that more professional law would actually help the moral
tenor of society by expediting debt causes and securing
predictable, rational, scientific procedures to deal with the
chaotic disorder of the 1780s. They had succeeded in establishing
a streamlined court system, and the luster of the superior court
bench bar had attracted large numbers of young Virginians to
seek their fortunes in the practice of law. But the lawyers had not
quite succeeded in convincing Virginia farmers and planters that
the older, moral vision of law rooted in concepts of natural justice
had survived the rise of the legal profession.69

63. Id. at 11–12 (“The political prominence of lawyers in post-Revolutionary politics
was not suﬃcient to win over judicial oﬃces in every state . . . . Especially where the bar was
small, as in New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island, nonlawyers continued to be
appointed to top judicial posts into the early 1800s.”).
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id.
67. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 142.
68. A.G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers 252 (1981).
69. Id. at 255.
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The question was whether “a modern judicial system could be easily
reconciled with the Country traditions of the past.”70 Ultimately, federal
courts and high-level state courts took the form of a more modern and
formal judicial system where judges were lawyers.71 In contrast, lower-level
state and local courts, particularly those in rural areas, remained less formal and controlled by laymen. In many ways. the architecture of these
courts continued to mirror the English justice of the peace courts which
they were originally modeled after, although their names evolved and they
were called many diﬀerent things (including, for example, magistrate
court, orphan court, and common pleas court).72 Borrowed from England,
many of these courts continued to maintain a fee system, where the judge
position was not salaried, but instead the judge was paid based on fees he
collected via cases before him.73 This fee system became a point of
contention in the twentieth century and indeed was ultimately found
unconstitutional in 1927 by the Supreme Court in Tumey v. State of Ohio.74
D. Twentieth Century Court Reform Movement
Eﬀorts to reform and study nonlawyer courts in the twentieth century
have been well-documented by others.75 This section summarizes the key
voices and arguments for reform. One of the earliest twentieth-century
calls for reform was from Professor Simeon Baldwin, who called nonlawyer
justices of the peace “the weakest point in this system of judicial
organization” in his 1906 book on the American judiciary.76 In the same
year, Professor Roscoe Pound, who eventually became dean of Harvard
Law School, argued in a speech to the American Bar Association that “the
notion that anyone is competent to adjudicate the intricate controversies

70. Id. at 257.
71. It was during this transition that jurisdictional tensions between state and federal
courts grew. Before this era, state courts dominated and federal courts were allowed only
very limited jurisdiction. See Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2113–16. But beginning in 1875,
when the Reconstruction Congress granted federal courts the plenary power to hear all
cases involving federal law, tensions mounted between those supporting state court power
and “Republican disenchantment with state courts” due to the belief that “local judges were
trying to thwart national policy.” Id. at 2116–17 (citing William M. Wiecek, The
Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863–75, 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 333, 333 (1969)).
For further details about the fight for federal verses state jurisdiction from 1875 to 1980, see
id. at 2116–24.
72. Provine, supra note 4, at 25.
73. Id. at 33–34.
74. 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (finding Ohio’s fee system to support its limited
jurisdiction courts, where judges received “costs” only if they found defendants guilty, a
violation of the Due Process Clause and thus unconstitutional).
75. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 136–41; Provine, supra note 4, at 24–26, 30–60.
76. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 136 (citing Simeon Baldwin, The American
Judiciary 129 (1906)).
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of a modern community contributes to the unsatisfactory administration
of justice in many parts of the United States.”77
Throughout the early 1900s, there were further calls from academics
to reform the justice of the peace and magistrate systems. Most of these
arguments were for the abolition of nonlawyer judges.78 The arguments
were strikingly similar, recognizing the class implications of the court
system that had developed as it was reformed in the 1800s. Recall that
higher-level state courts and federal courts were ultimately dominated
almost entirely by judges who were lawyers, while many lower-level state
courts and municipal courts continued to rely on lay judges.79 As the
judicial system developed, amount-in-controversy rules along with diversity
jurisdiction requirements in federal courts (currently set at $75,000)
meant that federal courts and high-level state courts ended up primarily
with cases involving businesses and people with higher incomes, while the
legal problems of the poor were primarily allocated to low-level state
courts.80 This system persists today, but it was well-formed by the 1900s,
and reformers began highlighting the inequalities of the system. For
example, in his well-known 1929 book Principles of Judicial Administration,
W.F. Willoughby argued that lay judges were “moved in the performance
of their duties by political and other improper considerations” and that by
allowing such a system to persist, the government was discriminating
against the poor, who were entitled to the same level of adjudication as
“those better provided with the goods of this world.”81
Reformers’ calls for change also revolved around the notion that most
of the early justifications for nonlawyer judges were moot given new
technology and infrastructure such as roads and automobiles.82 Some
reformers noted that these arguments held in all but “the remotest rural
communities.”83 Chicago was the first city to heed the suggestion for
change, and in 1906 it replaced more than two hundred justice of the
peace and specialized courts with a united metropolitan court system that
employed full-time lawyer-judges.84
77. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of
Justice, Address at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug.
29, 1906), reprinted in 46 J. Am. Judicature Soc’y 55, 58 (1964).
78. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 136; see also Austin W. Scott, Small Causes and Poor
Litigants, 9 ABA J. 457, 457–58 (1923); Reginald Heber Smith, Denial of Justice, 3 J. Am.
Judicature Soc’y 112, 112 (1919); Milton Strasburger, A Plea for the Reform of the Inferior
Court, 22 Case & Comment 20 (1915).
79. Provine, supra note 4, at 21.
80. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, The L. & Pol. Econ. Project
(July
21,
2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development/
[https://perma.cc/5UQ8-BRZT] [hereinafter Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development].
81. Provine, supra note 4, at 32 (quoting W.F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration 304 (1929)).
82. Chester H. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Calif. L.
Rev. 118, 118 (1927).
83. Id.
84. Provine, supra note 4, at 30.
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By the 1930s, organizations and commissions such as the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, the American Bar
Association, and later the American Judicature Society called for the
abolition of nonlawyer judges, and indeed several major cities began to
eliminate nonlawyer judges from their municipal courts.85 At the state
level, it was harder to entirely eliminate nonlawyer judges in part because
most states listed justices of the peace in their state constitutions, so a
constitutional amendment, rather than simply a statute, would be
necessary to eliminate the position.86 Overall, change was uneven, with
some states eliminating nonlawyer judges completely and others adopting
a mix of rules depending on the amount in controversy or the subject
matter at hand, or in some cases the population of a given district.87
Throughout the twentieth century, the issue of the constitutionality
of lay judges came before courts numerous times. The 1960s saw a
particular surge of such cases.88 Some have theorized this surge came
because of the Warren Court’s general concern with due process in a
variety of contexts.89 All of the legal cases challenging lay judges involved
criminal issues, rather than civil issues, and courts at all levels almost
uniformly upheld the constitutionality of lay judges.90 The most notable
case, and one that ultimately came before the Supreme Court, was North
v. Russell.91
North v. Russell was a Kentucky case. At that time, Kentucky had a twotier court system, where the police courts (first tier) heard misdemeanor
cases, but a defendant had a right to appeal a police judge’s decision to
the circuit court (second tier), where a trial de novo would take place.92
Kentucky law stated that in cities of less than a certain population, police
court judges need not be lawyers, but in larger cities (and all circuit
courts), judges must be lawyers.93
In North, the defendant, Lonnie North, was arrested and charged with
driving while intoxicated in a city that did not require lawyer-judges due
to population size.94 North appeared before a police court judge who was
not a lawyer and pleaded not guilty. North requested a jury trial, and the
judge denied this request, even though North was entitled to a jury trial
upon request under Kentucky law. North was found guilty and sentenced
to thirty days in jail, a fine of $150, and revocation of his driver’s license.95
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34–36.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 65–71.
427 U.S. 328, 329 (1976).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330.
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North did not appeal the police court decision, but instead brought a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the fact that his judge was not a lawyer
was unconstitutional.96 After a series of lower court opinions and remands,
the case ended up before the Supreme Court, where the issues were: (1)
whether an “accused, subject to possibly imprisonment, is denied due
process when tried before a nonlawyer police court judge with a later trial
de novo available under a State’s two-tier court system”; and (2) whether
“a State denies equal protection by providing law-trained judges for some
police courts and lay judges for others, depending upon the State
Constitution’s classification of cities according to population.”97
In its analysis of the due process claim, the Court said it recognized
the “wide gap between the functions of a judge of a court of general
jurisdiction, dealing with complex litigation, and the functions of a local
police court judge trying a typical ‘drunk’ driver case or other traﬃc
violations.”98 The Court noted, however, that when jail time is involved,
the process deserves a review with scrutiny.99
On the due process claim, North had argued that the right to counsel
established in other Court cases was essentially meaningless if one did not
have a lawyer-judge to understand the arguments of counsel, and he also
argued that the complexity of substantive and procedural criminal law
requires lawyer-judges so that they could “rule correctly on the intricate
issues lurking even in some simple misdemeanor cases.”100 The Court
rejected both claims.101 The Court discussed the various justifications for
nonlawyer-led tribunals, including the “interest of both the defendant and
the State, to provide speedier and less costly adjudications” than those
provided in courts “where the full range of constitutional guarantees is
available.”102 The Court also noted that “state policy takes into account
that it is a convenience to those charged to be tried in or near their own
community, rather than travel to a distant court where a law-trained judge
is provided, and to have the option, as here, of a trial after regular business
hours.”103
Ultimately, the Court was persuaded that there were no due process
violations because defendants are guaranteed a de novo trial before a
lawyer-judge if they so desire. The Court said it “assumed[d] that police
court judges in Kentucky recognize their obligation” to inform defendants
of this right.104 The Court further noted that if a defendant really wants to
96. Id. at 331–32.
97. Id. at 329.
98. Id. at 334.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 339.
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 335 (“The appellee judge testified that informing defendants of a right to
counsel was ‘the standard procedure.’”).
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bypass a lay judge and have an initial trial before a lawyer-judge, he can
“plead[] guilty in the police court, thus bypassing that court and seeking
the de novo trial, ‘erasing . . . any consequence that would otherwise follow
from tendering the [guilty] plea.’”105
The Court also rejected North’s equal protection claim involving the
issue that based on population only some cities are required to have
lawyer-judges.106 The Court noted that “all people within a given city and
within cities of the same size are treated equally.”107 The Court further
explained that the State’s reasons for requiring lawyer-judges in certain
cities with larger populations but not those with smaller populations
appropriately justified the statute.108 These reasons included that: (1) the
greater volume of court business in larger cities meant a need for lawyerjudges who could enable courts to run more eﬃciently and expeditiously
(though not necessarily with more fairness and impartiality); (2) larger
cities would have more access to lawyers to staﬀ judge positions; and (3)
larger cities would have more economic resources to draw upon in order
to pay personnel, including lawyer-judges.109
Even after North, calls for reform by lawyer organizations, academics,
and politicians continued into the 1980s, when Professor and political
scientist Doris Provine wrote a book about nonlawyer judges providing a
detailed history of their existence and a study of such judges in New
York.110 Provine argued in favor of maintaining nonlawyer judging.111
Since Provine’s book, there have been a small number of articles taking
up the issue of nonlawyer judges,112 but overall, attention to the matter has
significantly waned over the last forty years as the legal academy and bar
associations have focused more on federal courts and, to a lesser degree,
105. Id. at 337.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 338.
108. Id. at 338–39 (referencing Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972), appeal
dismissed, 414 U.S. 885 (1973), a Kentucky Court of Appeals case that articulated the
reasons for diﬀering qualifications of judges).
109. Id. at 328–29. Lisa Pruitt has written extensively about how courts consider the
rural—urban justice division and justify diﬀerent resource allocations among such courts.
See Lisa R. Pruitt, The Rural Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space, in The Expanding
Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography 190, 206 (Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley,
David Delaney & Alexandre Kedar eds., 2014) (“Courts have lamented the practical limits
of rural justice systems, but they have rarely shown sensitivity to equal protection arguments
based on county-to-county variations of either funding levels or justice system amenities.”);
Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of
Indigent Defense, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 219, 230–31 (2010) (describing disparities in funding and
delivery of indigent defense in Arizona based on population and noting more generally that
“[c]ourts have typically been deferential to state and local governments by holding that
diﬀerences between rural and urban places justify diﬀerent justice systems”).
110. Provine, supra note 4.
111. See id. at 190 (“To eliminate nonlawyer judges, however, is to institutionalize the
very self-doubts that rob the laity of political power, for the elimination of nonlawyer judges
suggests the incapacity of lay persons to comprehend the rules they must live by.”).
112. See supra note 4.
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high-level state courts.113 In the next Part, we describe our study, a survey
that provides an up-to-date profile of lay judging in the United States. But
first, in the next section, we detail why the issue of nonlawyer judges has
been relatively dormant for the last forty years.
E.

Disregard for the Problems of the Poor

As detailed above, lay judging emerged and persisted because there
was a belief that to have a professional legal class was to introduce an
inherently corrupting force into the body politic, an organized group
whose self-interest lay in obscurity, and that local custom and piousness
should pervade the law. The current reality, however, relies on no such
true Protestant faith in the power of the citizenry to interpret the sacred
text themselves, but rather on a long history of blaming the poor for their
problems and then underresourcing institutions that serve people who are
poor and disproportionately Black and Latinx.114
Going all the way back to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Poor
Laws of England that many of the American colonies adopted,115
“[p]overty was perceived not as a social or economic problem but as an
individual problem.”116 In colonial America, blaming the poor and denying them material relief prevailed. As Professors Joel Handler and
Yeheskel Hasenfeld note: “During the Colonial period, several themes are
noted that will endure throughout welfare history. Despite significant
113. See Carpenter et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges, supra note 4, at 251 (“The
state court knowledge deficit is no secret; a smattering of scholars have identified and
bemoaned it over the past thirty years. Yet legal scholarship continues to focus almost
exclusively on federal courts, federal judges, and a particular judicial function in those
courts: decision making in appellate cases.” (citations omitted)); Annie Decker, A Theory
of Local Common Law, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 1939, 1943–44 (2014) (citing the lack of
empirical studies about local courts); Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. 897, 898–99 (2013) (“[L]egal scholars have almost universally ignored the law
in local courts, favoring the study of federal courts and state appellate courts.”); WeinsteinTull, supra note 4, at 1034 (“Despite these massive stakes, despite the place of local courts
at the heart of the justice system . . . we know very little about them.”).
114. Roughly half of all Americans believe that people who are poor are poor because
they do not work hard enough. Pew Rsch. Ctr., Emerging and Developing Economies Much
More Optimistic Than Rich Countries About the Future 5 (2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economiesmuch-more-optimistic-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/
[https://perma.cc/WK6MC7HS] (“Fifty-seven percent of Americans disagree with the statement ‘Success in life is pretty
much determined by forces outside our control,’ a considerably higher percentage than the
global median of 38%.”); Roberto A. Ferdman, One in Four Americans Think Poor People
Don’t
Work
Hard
Enough,
Wash.
Post
(Oct.
9,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/10/09/one-in-four-americansthink-poor-people-dont-work-hard-enough/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. Juliet M. Brodie, Clare Pastore, Ezra Rosser & Jeﬀrey Selbin, Poverty Law, Policy,
and Practice 63 (2d ed. 2021).
116. William P. Quigley, Backwards Into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the
Millennium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 101, 103
(1998).

2022]

JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.

1307

adverse structural conditions—wars, depression, accidents, disease,
sickness—the poor were judged as morally blameworthy.”117 While some
relief was granted to widowed women with children, people of color were
excluded from relief and deemed the “undeserving” poor—women of
color “were not deserving of relief; it was denied or they were expelled
from the community.”118
Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries, notions of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor persisted.
By the late nineteenth century “welfare work had become more of a
private or voluntary matter than a public one.”119 Assistance that was
available to the poor was provided through localities, and it was doled out
based on notions of “deserving” versus “underserving” recipients.120 And
similar to the colonial period, with few exceptions “African Americans
were simply excluded from welfare. They were the most underserving of
the undeserving poor.”121
The Great Depression and the New Deal that followed was a time of
some degree of transition. As the Great Depression persisted, the federal
government increased investment in programs and institutions for the
poor through the Social Security Act of 1935,122 largely because localities
ran out of money to support aid programs and called on the federal
government for help.123 The Social Security Act created a national pension
system and a national unemployment system (partnered with states).124 It
also created a federal program, then called Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC), that provided aid to poor mothers and their children.125 The goal
was to provide for children whose fathers were deceased, absent, or unable
to work.126
An array of other federal welfare programs was passed as part of the
New Deal, and for some poor Americans, there was significant (though

117. Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 13, at 154.
118. Id. at 154–55.
119. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in
America 214 (1998).
120. Ezra Rosser, Holes in the Safety Net 2 (2019) (“Until the New Deal, assistance to
the poor was traditionally a local matter. . . . [T]he colonies, and later the states,
distinguished between the deserving and undeserving poor and provided diﬀerent forms of
relief depending on that classification.”).
121. Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”: The Interpretation of
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 899,
913 (1990).
122. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620.
123. Kathryn J. Edin & H. Luke Shaefer, $2.00 a Day: Living on Almost Nothing in
America 11 (2015).
124. Social Security Act §§ 1–2, 201, 301–303; Rosser, supra note 120, at 2.
125. Social Security Act §§ 401–402; Rosser, supra note 120, at 2.
126. Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of Work Expectations for
Welfare Mothers, 7 Future Child. 28, 29 (1997).
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temporary) improvement in their situation.127 Similar to earlier aid
programs, however, some states—in this case, Southern states—carved out
exceptions that excluded Black people from coverage.128 As Professor Ezra
Rosser notes, these states were “concerned that generous socioeconomic
rights would undermine the Jim Crow economic structure of the South,”
thus while “[t]he New Deal might have created federal welfare rights,” the
“benefited population largely did not include poor African Americans,
Latinos, or Native Americans.”129
The American appetite for serious investment in the poor was shortlived, particularly for targeted aid programs such as ADC. Backlash soon
emerged, particularly as welfare numbers grew.130 President Ronald
Reagan popularized the infamous, though disproven, concept of the
“welfare queen” into the American consciousness. Welfare queens were
portrayed primarily as single Black women who took advantage of the
welfare system, bringing in a large amount of money to buy luxury goods
without working.131 During this time, support for programs that aided the
poor and the institutions they frequented waned. ADC (renamed Aid to
Families and Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1968) was ultimately
reformed in 1996.132 The heart of the new program, Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF), was an emphasis on “personal responsibility”
and “self-suﬃciency.”133 Cash welfare was no longer an entitlement for
poor families, and time limits and other barriers were put into place to
exclude families from aid.134
Just as the United States has limited aid programs for the poor, it also
has limited support for the institutions that serve the poor. The
government has, in fact, allowed such institutions to struggle with
127. Rosser, supra note 120, at 2 (listing various New Deal programs and noting that
“[t]he New Deal changed things, to a point”).
128. Id. (“Southern states . . . were allowed—through carve outs for agricultural and
domestic workers, as well as through deference to state administration—to exclude blacks
from coverage.”).
129. Id. In the early years of the ADC program, for example, states had significant
discretion to determine eligibility, and they would decide that only children living in
“suitable homes” would receive benefits. Some states used this discretion to exclude families
deemed “undesirable,” such as Black families and children of never-married women. Blank
& Blum, supra note 129, at 30.
130. ADC numbers grew from only a few hundred cases in the late 1930s to 3.6 million
cases by 1962. Edin & Shaefer, supra note 123, at 11.
131. Id. at 15; Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the
Politics of Antipoverty Policy 1–32 (2000) (detailing how the media contributed to the
negative public perception of welfare).
132. Linda Gordon & Felice Batlan, Aid to Dependent Children: The Legal History,
VCU Librs. Soc. Welfare Hist. Project, https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/publicwelfare/aid-to-dependent-children-the-legal-history/
[https://perma.cc/TV3F-CHTP]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
133. Remarks on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 and an Exchange With Reporters, 2 Pub. Papers 1328 (Aug. 22,
1996).
134. Edin & Shaefer, supra note 124, at 15.
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inadequate funding, contributing to poverty and inequality. Consider the
trajectory of funding for the Legal Services Corporation. The Legal
Services Corporation grew out of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “war on
poverty” and the creation of the Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
in 1964.135 The OEO worked on establishing local legal services oﬃces
around the country to serve the legal needs of the poor for free, and by
1966 federal funding for this program hit $25 million.136 In 1974, President
Richard Nixon signed a law creating the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC), which formalized funding for these neighborhood legal service
organizations.137
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, funding for LSC was almost
constantly under fire, and LSC suﬀered significant budget cuts several
times.138 At some points the entire budget for LSC was threatened, most
recently under President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019.139 Even though
LSC was ultimately funded in 2019, its funding levels are well below where
they were when LSC was started. The 2021 appropriation for LSC was 55%
below its 1979 level (accounting for inflation).140
Governmental disregard and neglect of institutions that serve the
poor is widespread. This phenomenon has been well studied and documented as it relates to institutions such as housing and neighborhoods141

135. Our History, Legal Servs. Corp., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are/ourhistory [https://perma.cc/4ZWB-JAAR] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
136. Alan Houseman & Linda E. Perle, Ctr. for L. & Soc. Pol’y, Securing Equal Justice
for All: A Brief History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States 14 (2018),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/05/2018_securingequaljusti
ce.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DH9-HXEN].
137. See Legal Servs. Corp., supra note 135.
138. See Houseman & Perle, supra note 136, at 29–30.
139. Id. at 50–51.
140. David Reich, Additional Funding Needed for Legal Service Corporation, Ctr. on
Budget & Pol’y Priorities (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/additional-fundingneeded-for-legal-service-corporation [https://perma.cc/62G3-UHUC] (“[T]he LSC is
chronically underfunded. . . . [T]he LSC’s budget peaked in 1979 . . . . Later years brought
several rounds of big budget cuts, followed by only a partial rebuilding of funding. In
inflation-adjusted terms, the 2021 appropriation is 55 percent below its 1979 level.”).
141. See Matthew Desmond, Evicted 301–03 (2016) (discussing how American social
policy and a lack of investment in aﬀordable housing has led to mass evictions and instability
for poor families); Eva Rosen, The Voucher Promise 236–37 (2020) (noting that “[t]he
federal government—unable (or unwilling) to fund public housing at a level suﬃcient to
maintain its upkeep—outsourced the problem of housing the poor to private landlords
through housing vouchers” and discussing the pitfalls of such a policy); Patrick Sharkey,
Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial Equality 117–
18 (2013) (discussing how both political decisions and social policies have led to
disinvestment from Black neighborhoods, which in turn led to persistent segregation and
declining opportunities for Black families, and showing how these political decisions have
resulted in multigenerational inequality for Black families); William Julius Wilson, The
Truly Disadvantaged (1987) (detailing how American social policy on poverty led to
deteriorating conditions and a lack of employment and other opportunities in American
inner-city ghettos, ultimately resulting in persistent poverty in these neighborhoods).
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and schools.142 Yet we are much further behind when it comes to understanding the specific ways in which the government has financially
neglected courts143—and specifically the very courts that primarily serve
poor people, who are disproportionately people of color.144 Despite the
calls for change beginning in the early 1900s as our stratified system of
judging became apparent, following in the footsteps of so many other calls
for investment and change when it comes to the poor, there was only
minimum movement and the stratified system of judging for the most part
persisted. In the next two Parts, we document this aspect of neglect of
courts that serve the poor, showing where the system currently stands.
II. SURVEY STUDY METHODS, SCOPE, AND FINDINGS
A.

Survey Methods and Scope

We conducted a comprehensive survey of low-level courts in each
state. We sought to answer the following questions through our survey:
1. Does the state allow any level of judge to adjudicate without legal
credentials?
2. If the state allows some, but not all, judges to adjudicate without
legal credentials, which judges fall into each category, and what types of
cases do they hear?
3. Which court in each state adjudicates eviction cases, and does that
court require legal credentials?
In order to answer these questions, we engaged a variety of sources,
including state statutes, state judicial webpages, and other sources (that
varied for each state) that provided information on judge credentials for
the particular state.

142. See Bruce D. Baker, Educational Inequality and School Finance: Why Money
Matters for America’s Students 3–4 (2021) (noting the historical and persistent relationship
between school funding and inequality in schools across the United States); Ivy Morgan
& Ary Amerikaner, The Educ. Tr., Funding Gaps: An Analysis of School Funding Equity
Across the U.S. and Within Each State 2018, at 2, 6, 10 (2018), https://edtrust.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/FundingGapReport_2018_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN49-45NX] (finding that in twenty-seven states, districts with the
highest poverty rates do not receive more funding to account for that increased need and
in fourteen states, districts with the most students of color get less funding than districts with
the lowest percentage of students of color); Barbara T. Bowman, James P. Comer & David
J. Johns, Addressing the African American Achievement Gap: Three Leading Educators
Issue a Call to Action, 73 Young Child. 14, 15 (2018) (presenting several findings on the
relationship between educational opportunities and school performance with future
opportunities).
143. Some scholars have certainly begun to study low-level courts and the lack of
government investment in them. See generally Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development,
supra note 80 (detailing the variable funding within court systems and its impact on the
development of law and equitable outcomes).
144. See supra notes 2–3.
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We of course found significant variation in the judicial systems of each
state, particularly in their lowest-level courts. When statutes and other
information did not clearly answer our questions, we supplemented our
searches with emails to legal aid organizations in order to clarify state
practices. We decided to contact legal aid organizations because their
attorneys disproportionately practice in low-level state courts.
B.

State Survey Findings

The upper-level courts of each state are fairly consistent, at least in
name (most states have district courts, for example), but particularly
among low-level courts, each state integrates its own unique court system
with diﬀerent names, jurisdictions, and procedures. The first question we
sought to answer was how many states allow any level of judge to adjudicate
without a J.D. Overall, thirty-two states allow lay judges at some level of
court.145 Five states, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, and Washington,
passed statutes requiring all judges to be lawyers, but lay judges who were
judges at the time of the statutory change were allowed to continue in their
jobs until they resigned or lost a judicial election.146 Further, New
Hampshire technically allows lay judges at any level of judgeship in the
state, but in practice, due to the nomination and appointment process for
judges, all judges in the state are members of the bar.147 Thus, we did not
145. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For a chart detailing the requirements for each
state, see infra Appendix, tbl.1.
146. In Connecticut, as of January 5, 2011, all probate judges elected must be attorneys
admitted to practice law in Connecticut. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-18(e) (2021). In Idaho, as
of July 1, 2019, magistrates were required to be active or judicial members of the bar and be
a lawyer or hold judicial oﬃce for the five years preceding appointment. Idaho Code § 12206 (2021). Lay magistrates who did not meet these requirements at the time the statute
was changed, however, have been allowed to continue in their magistrate positions. Id. In
2015, a state law in Indiana was passed requiring all judges in the state to be licensed
attorneys. Ind. Code § 33-35-5-7 (2021). However, town and city judges who were serving in
2015 but were not attorneys were allowed to continue in their jobs. They are allowed to serve
until they resign or lose an election for their post. Id. § 33-35-5-7.5. As of April 1, 2009, all
judges in Iowa were required to be attorneys licensed to practice law in the state. Iowa Code
§ 602.6404 (2021). Those who were lay judges currently sitting as of that date, however, were
allowed to be reappointed for subsequent successive terms. Id. Washington State previously
allowed lay judges to serve as district judges for districts with populations under 5,000 people
if the judges took qualifying examinations with the state supreme court. 2002 Wash. Sess.
Laws 552. In 2002, however, that rule was phased out (beginning in 2003), but existing lay
judges were grandfathered in and allowed to continue in their jobs. Id.
147. Paul J. Kline, Judges, John W. King N.H. L. Libr. (June 1, 2020), https://courtsstate-nh-us.libguides.com/c.php?g=1045296 [https://perma.cc/YLE7-YCND] (noting that
the New Hampshire Judicial Selection Commission compiles a list of qualified candidates
and that although judges in New Hampshire need not have a law degree nor be a member
of the New Hampshire Bar Association, in current practice, all judges are members of the
Bar Association).
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include Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Washington, or New
Hampshire in our count.
Among the states that do not require a J.D. degree or admission to
the bar, there is significant variation in the requirements for judges. In
Alaska, for example, the only requirements for magistrate judges are that
they need to be at least twenty-one years of age, citizens of the United
States and the State of Alaska, and residents of Alaska for at least six
months immediately preceding the appointment.148 Thus, in Alaska,
magistrate judges are not even required to have a high school diploma.
Delaware has similar requirements for its justices of the peace, only
requiring that they be twenty-five years of age or older and a resident of
Delaware.149 Several other states have only age (usually twenty-one) and
residency requirements.150 A few of these states put additional restrictions
on the type of jobs magistrates can have. In Virginia, for example, there
are restrictions on jobs not only for magistrate candidates themselves but
also for the parents, children, spouse, and siblings of the candidates (these
restrictions focus on aﬃliations with courts).151
Georgia has a few more requirements for their magistrates: They must
be twenty-five years of age and must have earned a high school diploma or
a general educational development (GED) diploma.152 In addition, they
must be registered to vote, have been a resident of the county where they
are going to serve for two years preceding the term and remain a resident
of that county throughout their service, and finally be a citizen of the
United States.153
148. Alaska Stat. § 22.15.160(b) (2021). The statute notes that additional requirements
may be imposed by the State Supreme Court, but we did not find any additional
requirements imposed, and a current job announcement for State Magistrates does not list
any additional requirements. See, e.g., Magistrate Judge II (Alaska Court System 41-8401),
Workplace
Alaska:
State
of
Alaska
Online
Recruitment
Sys.,
https://agency.governmentjobs.com/alaska/default.cfm?action=jobbulletin&JobID=6928
61 [https://perma.cc/7WD6-TXYV] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
149. Magistrate
Screening
Committee,
Del.
Cts.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/jpcourt/screening.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6XXD-D3ZW]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
150. See infra Appendix, tbl.1.
151. Va. Code § 19.2-37(C) (2021). A person is ineligible for appointment as a
magistrate judge:
(a) [I]f such person is a law-enforcement oﬃcer; (b) if such person or his
spouse is a clerk, deputy or assistant clerk, or employee of any such clerk
of a district or circuit court, provided that the Committee on District
Courts may authorize a magistrate to assist in the district court clerk’s
oﬃce on a part-time basis; (c) if the parent, child, spouse, or sibling of
such person is a district or circuit court judge in the magisterial region
where he will serve; or (d) if such person is the chief executive oﬃcer, or
a member of the board of supervisors, town or city council, or other
governing body for any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.
Id.
152. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-10-22(a) (2021).
153. Id.
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Some states, such as West Virginia, restrict people with criminal backgrounds from being magistrates: Magistrates must never have been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving “moral turpitude.”154
The requirements in West Virginia are not otherwise high. Magistrate
candidates must be at least twenty-one years of age, must have a high
school education or its equivalent, must reside in the county of their
election, and must not be an immediate family member of another
magistrate in the county.155 Notably, West Virginia’s state constitution
prohibits requiring magistrates to be attorneys, stating:
[T]he Legislature shall not have the power to require that a
magistrate be a person licensed to practice the profession of law,
nor shall any justice or judge of any higher court establish any
rules which by their nature would dictate or mandate that a
magistrate be a person licensed to practice the process of law.156
In a few states, lay people are allowed to be magistrate judges, but the
requirements for the job are otherwise quite high. In Massachusetts, for
example, magistrates are not required to have a J.D., but they must have
an undergraduate education or at least fifteen years of experience.157
Further, non-bar magistrate candidates are required to demonstrate at
least five years of experience in the court applied for, five years of
experience in a court of comparable jurisdiction, or five years of relevant
experience.158
There are at least five states (Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Utah) that determine legal training requirements for
judges based on the population size of specific counties within the state.
In higher population areas of these states, judges are required to have
J.D.s, but in lower population areas, J.D.s are not required. The exact
population requirements vary significantly by state. In Colorado, for
example, qualifications for county court judges depend on what “class” is
assigned to the county where the judge serves.159 Counties can be assigned
to a class ranging from A to D. All counties with a population of less than
30,000 people are either Class C or D counties. In Class A or B counties,
county court judges must be admitted to the practice of law in the state. In
Class C or D counties, county court judges do not need to have J.D.s and
in fact only need to have a high school diploma or equivalent.160 There is,

154. W. Va. Code Ann. § 50-1-4 (LexisNexis 2021).
155. Id.
156. W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 10.
157. Mass. Exec. Order No. 558, § 2.2 (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.mass.gov/executiveorders/no-558-reconstituting-the-judicial-nominating-commission-and-establishing-a-codeof-conduct-for-commission-members-and-nominees-to-judicial-oﬃce
[https://perma.cc/2AK5-93RJ] (amending the Judicial Nominating Commission and
establishing a Code of Conduct for Commission members and nominees to judicial oﬃce).
158. Id.
159. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-203 (2021).
160. Id.
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however, a requirement of attendance at a training institute for nonlawyer
Class C and D county judges.161
In Nevada, the system for determining whether a county has a J.D.
requirement is a bit diﬀerent—a population of 100,000 is the cutoﬀ, where
justices of the peace are not required to have J.D.s in counties with a
population over 100,000,162 however, justices of the peace must be licensed
attorneys admitted to practice law for not less than five years preceding
their ascension to the bench.163 In New Mexico, the cutoﬀ is even higher.
Lay judges are allowed to serve in judicial districts (also referred to as
magistrate districts) with a population below 200,000.164 But in districts
with a population over 200,000, a magistrate must be a member of the New
Mexico Bar and licensed to practice law.165 These population-based
schemes are significant in the context of historical concerns about the
ability of rural areas to staﬀ judgeships if a law degree is required, as
discussed further in Part III.
All states have some kind of training requirement for lay judges, but
these vary considerably. In Georgia, for example, magistrate judges who
are not members of the bar must complete eighty hours of training during
their first two years after becoming a magistrate.166 Further, all nonlawyer
magistrates must complete “orientation activities” conducted under the
supervision of someone experienced, such as a mentor magistrate or
judge.167 The statute also notes that additional training hours may be
required each year.168 Nebraska, on the other hand, requires only eight
hours of training annually,169 and Tennessee requires only three hours of
training annually.170 And in Colorado, whenever an individual who is not
licensed to practice law in the state becomes a county court judge, they
must attend “an institute on the duties and functioning of the county court
to be held under the supervision of the supreme court, unless such
attendance is waived by the supreme court.”171 As we discuss further below
in Part III, the timing of training programs for magistrates can result in
magistrates adjudicating cases for half a year or more with no legal or
administrative training at all.172

161. Id.
162. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 4.010 (2021).
163. Id. § 4.010(3).
164. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-2-1 (West 2021).
165. Id. § 35-2-1(C)–(D).
166. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-10-137 (2021).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Neb. Sup. Ct. R. § 1-503; see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-508(3) (2021) (“A clerk
magistrate shall comply with the Supreme Court judicial branch education requirements as
required by the Supreme Court.”).
170. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-309 (2021).
171. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-203(5) (2021).
172. See infra Part III.
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There is also significant variation in the types of cases states allow lay
judges to adjudicate. As part of our survey, we collected data specifically
on which states allow lay judges to adjudicate landlord–tenant disputes
(including eviction cases). Of the thirty-two states that allow non-J.D.
judges, seventeen allow such judges to adjudicate eviction cases.173 In most
of these states, the power to hear eviction cases stems from a statutory
allowance for magistrate judges to hear civil cases that involve amounts in
controversy below a certain amount of money. Appendix Tables One and
Two detail the requirements for each state that allow lay judges to
adjudicate eviction cases. Other common civil matters handled by lay
judges involve contract disputes and debt collection cases.
As evidenced in the Appendix, most states that allow lay judges allow
them to handle limited criminal matters such as issuing search warrants,
issuing arrest warrants, handling simple misdemeanors, handling traﬃcrelated violations, and setting bail. In some states, such as Mississippi, lay
judges (there called county judges) can handle preliminary hearings in
felony criminal cases.174
III. DISCUSSION AND NORTH CAROLINA CASE STUDY
This Part discusses the implications of a lay-justice system—a system
the survey results show is alive and well in many lower-level state courts in
the United States. It begins by painting a picture of key diﬀerences
between federal court and high-level state court judgeships on the one
hand, and low-level state court judgeships on the other hand. With these
factors at the ready, it then considers some of the main arguments for lay
judging and also provides a discussion of existing scholarship relevant to
assessing the potential upsides, as well as the pitfalls, of lay judging.
Weaved into these discussions are findings from a case study of North
Carolina, which is taken up in depth at the end of this Part. The case study
provides a lens into how a system that relies heavily upon lay judging
functions and identifies some of the problems of such a system. North
Carolina was an ideal case study because it is a state that employs a large
number of lay magistrates to adjudicate both civil and criminal issues:
Currently, over 80% of magistrate judges in North Carolina do not have

173. These states include Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, and Washington also
allow lay judges to oversee eviction cases if they were already judges when the state passed
legislation requiring all judges to be lawyers. Further, New Hampshire technically allows lay
judges to oversee eviction cases, but in practice all judges in the state are admitted to the
bar. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
174. About
the
Courts,
State
of
Miss.
Judiciary,
https://courts.ms.gov/aboutcourts/aboutthecourts.php [https://perma.cc/WY7E-VE7H]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022); see, e.g., Justice Court, Adams Cnty. Miss., https://www.adamscountyms.net/justice-court [https://perma.cc/MA2B-X6VV] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
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law degrees,175 and up until January 2022, the only requirement for
magistrate judges was that by the six-month mark of their judgeship they
receive forty hours of training.176 As of January 2022, they must also complete twelve hours of continuing education each year after their first year
of service.177 As discussed in section III.E.1, we interviewed several key
informants, attended meetings about the low-level court system in North
Carolina, and visited two diﬀerent courthouses, one with primarily lay
judges and one with primarily lawyer-judges.
A.

What Does It Mean to Be a “Judge” in the United States?

In order to frame the discussion around arguments for and against
lay judging in the United States, it is useful to consider the contrast
between higher-level state courts and federal courts, on the one hand, and
lower-level state courts on the other hand. To begin, consider the
credentials required for diﬀerent types of judges. As discussed in Part II,
several states that allow lay judges require only a high school diploma and
state citizenship to serve.178
Contrast this with what it takes to get appointed to a federal judgeship
or elected or appointed (depending on the state) to a high-level state
judgeship. Serving as such a judge is considered an honor generally reserved for only the highest-credentialed lawyers in the country. When
presidents nominate people to serve as federal judges, the credentials of
those nominated are considered newsworthy by the media.179 Competition
is fierce, and the rewards are high. Federal judges generally command
much respect, are well-compensated, and are provided many resources to
do their jobs well, such as law clerks, who are some of the top recent law
school graduates in the country.180 Judgeships for top state court positions
175. E-mail from Lori Cole, Ct. Mgmt. Specialist, N.C. Jud. Branch, to Charles Holton,
Supervising Att’y, Civ. Just. Clinic at Duke Univ. Sch. of L. (June 3, 2020) (on file with
authors) (noting that only 120 of the 669 (18%) North Carolina magistrates in the 2019–
2020 fiscal year have law degrees and only 105 of the 120 with J.D.s are licensed to practice
law).
176. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-177 (2021).
177. Id. § 7A-171.2(c).
178. See infra Appendix, tbl.1.
179. See, e.g., Ariane de Vouge & Betsy Klein, Biden Unveils First Slate of Judicial
Nominees Featuring Diverse and History-Making Selections, CNN (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/30/politics/joe-biden-judicial-nominees/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8UY9-NKRF] (“‘This trailblazing slate of nominees draws from the very
best and brightest minds of the American legal profession,’ Biden said in a statement.”).
180. See Mark C. Miller, Law Clerks and Their Influence at the US Supreme Court:
Comments on Recent Works by Peppers and Ward, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 741, 742 (2014)
(reviewing In Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices (Todd C.
Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012)(“Today, the clerks at the Supreme Court are almost
always recent law school graduates from the best law schools in the country who have already
spent a year clerking, usually on one of the US Courts of Appeals.”); see also Todd C.
Peppers, Couriers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law
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(usually state supreme courts and the courts of appeals immediately below
the state supreme court) are also coveted positions that usually enjoy many
of the perks of high-level federal judgeships, though many of these
judgeships are elected, rather than appointed.181
B.

Judging Financials

Connected with the discussion above about diﬀerences in the
credentials required for judges of diﬀerent levels, it is also important to
consider the financial aspects of judging in diﬀerent types of courts in the
United States. This consideration helps to paint a fuller picture of the
contrast between low-level state courts and other courts in the United
States. For the past several decades, all court systems in the United States
have been under financial pressure during a time of increasingly high
caseloads.182 Indeed, Supreme Court Justices have testified before
Clerk 1–2 (2006) (noting that “the best and brightest law school students” are given the
opportunity to serve as Supreme Court law clerks); Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden,
Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court 55
(2006) (describing “a portrait of Supreme Court law clerks as a relatively homogeneous
legal elite who matriculate at top law schools, secure prestigious clerkships with prominent
judges and justices, and embark on careers of power and reward”).
181. See Kristen M. Renberg, The Impact of Retention Systems on Judicial Behavior: A
Synthetic Controls Analysis of State Supreme Courts, 41 Just. Sys. J. 292, 295–96 (2020);
Choosing
State
Court
Judges,
Brennan
Ctr.
for
Just.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/strengthen-our-courts/promote-faircourts/choosing-state-court-judges [https://perma.cc/R5XM-NWHC] (last visited Feb. 25,
2022) (reporting that thirty-eight states select their supreme court justices through a public
election). Even between federal and state courts (generally), there is a well-documented
perception, since at least 1980, that state courts are inferior to federal courts. See Zambrano,
supra note 61, at 2145–46 (documenting scholarly articles that suggest that federal courts
had higher competence due to “higher caliber judges and a better institutional setting” and
also that litigant surveys show that “litigants consider federal courts to be more competent
than state courts”).
182. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that the “impact of the sequester was more
significant on the courts than elsewhere in the government, because virtually all of their
core functions are constitutionally and statutorily required . . . . Unlike most Executive
Branch agencies, the courts do not have discretionary programs they can eliminate or
postpone in response to budget cuts.” Tal Kopan, Roberts: More Money for Courts, Politico
(Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/roberts-calls-for-more-money-forcourts-101656 [https://perma.cc/MT3V-SD3R] (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Tal Kopan, At Sequestration Hearing, Breyer, Kennedy Say Cameras in the Courtroom
Too Risky, Politico (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-theradar/2013/03/at-sequestration-hearing-breyer-kennedy-say-cameras-in-the-courtroomtoo-risky-159328 [https://perma.cc/A3UK-Z9EC] (“[T]he 0.2 percent of the federal
budget for the . . . third branch of the federal government is more than reasonable. What’s
at stake here is the eﬃciency of the courts, and they are . . . not only part of the
constitutional structure, they are part of the economic structure of the country . . . .”); Tal
Kopan, 87 Federal Judges Write Congress on ‘Devastating’ Sequester Cuts, Politico (Aug.
15, 2013), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/08/87-federal-judgeswrite-congress-on-devastating-sequester-cuts-170617 [https://perma.cc/3FZS-5EA4] (“In a
rare appearance before Congress[,] . . . Supreme Court Justices Anthony Kennedy and
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Congress requesting more funds for federal courts, and federal judges
have banded together to write to Congress warning of the dire
consequences of budget cuts for the federal judiciary.183 But the
diﬀerences between what qualifies as true budgetary constraints for federal
versus state courts are stark.184 While the federal judiciary certainly has
budget needs, state courts have been described as “mired in relative
decay”185 and “financially bankrupt,”186 experiencing “layoﬀs, hiring
freezes and cutbacks in services.”187 In a few states, courts were even
consolidated or closed due to budget issues.188
Perhaps the most useful metric to consider for this Essay is judicial
salary (and benefits), as salary is, of course, an important recruiting
measure for any job. All federal judges are paid salaries above $200,000.189
In 2021, district court judges made $218,600, circuit court judges made
$231,800, Associate Justices on the Supreme Court made $268,300, and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court made $280,500.190 Of course these

Stephen Breyer made a similar plea for the judicial branch, saying courts operate on a
minimal budget and consume a small fraction of overall federal spending.”).
183. See supra note 182.
184. In an essay for the Boston Review, Professor Daniel Wilf-Townsend describes how
the state civil court system has suﬀered significant budgetary struggles, particularly since the
2008 recession. He explains:
The Los Angeles Superior Court system alone faced annual shortfalls
between $80 million and $140 million; in Florida, court budget
shortfalls amounted to more than $100 million, and almost 300 court staﬀ
positions were lost. Waiting times and case backlogs increased; in New
York, caseloads grew to an average of 3,500 per judge.
Daniel Wilf-Townsend, The Urgent Need for Civil Justice Reform, Bos. Rev. (Apr. 21, 2020),
http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/daniel-wilf-townsend-urgent-need-civil-justice-reform
[https://perma.cc/5JDW-EXX5]. The National Center for State Courts has documented
the cost-cutting measures state courts have taken since March 2020. Twenty-nine states have
instituted hiring freezes, thirteen states have instituted salary freezes, eight states enacted
furloughs, seven states oﬀered early retirements, four states reduced the hours of their
courts, and a few states even closed and consolidated courts and instituted layoﬀs. Budget
Resource Center, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., https://www.ncsc.org/information-andresources/budget-resource-center [https://perma.cc/GVY8-PCGP] (last updated Nov. 30,
2020).
185. Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2103.
186. Id. (quoting Don J. Debenedictis, Struggling Toward Recovery: Courts Hope that
Belt-Tightening Lessons From the Recession Will Help Them Make It Through the ‘90s, 80
ABA J. 50, 51 (1994)).
187. Id. (quoting Don J. Debendictis, Struggling Toward Recovery: Courts Hope that
Belt-Tightening Lessons From the Recession Will Help Them Make It Through the ‘90s, 80
ABA J. 50, 50 (1994)). See also supra note 184.
188. Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2103.
189. Judicial
Compensation,
U.S.
Cts.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-compensation [https://perma.cc/XGJ7-MUVR] (last visited Feb. 25,
2022).
190. Id.
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judges often have other opportunities to make money that stem from their
prestigious judgeships, such as book deals.191
State court judge salaries vary significantly by state, but the mean and
median salaries for (higher-level) state court judges of general jurisdiction
courts, intermediate appellate courts, and courts of last resort are all over
$150,000.192 In 2021, the median salary for general jurisdiction judges was
$161,829, for intermediate appellate court judges it was $178,763, and
$183,653 for courts of last resort.193 The diﬀerence between these salaries
and the salaries of magistrate judges (or their equivalents) is significant.194
Take North Carolina, for example, which pays higher-level state court
judges a bit below the median for all states.195 In 2021, higher-level North
Carolina state court judges all made over $100,000, a generally
comfortable salary, even for someone encumbered by significant student
loan debt.196 Specifically in 2021, North Carolina superior court judges
made $142,082, appellate court judges made $150,184, and supreme court
judges made $156,664.197
In contrast, North Carolina magistrate judges, whose salaries are set
by statute, all make well below $100,000, no matter how many years they
are on the job and whether or not they are lawyers.198 The entry rate salary
for a full-time magistrate (someone who works at least forty hours per
week) is $42,630; step one is $45,777; step two is $49,171; step three is
$52,764; step four is $57,072; step five is $62,259; and step six is $68,072.199
Nonlawyer magistrates enter at the entry-level salary, no matter their past
job, and their salaries increase to the next step every two years from steps
191. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Authority of the Court and the Peril of Politics
(2021); Daniel Lippman, William Barr, Amy Coney Barrett Land Book Deals, Politico (Apr.
19, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/19/bill-barr-amy-coney-barrett-bookdeals-483028 [https://perma.cc/XY4G-5V62] (reporting on Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s $2
million book deal).
192. Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Survey of Judicial Salaries 1–2 (2021),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/66307/Survey-of-Judicial-Salaries-July2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4KD-6BNV] [hereinafter Survey of Judicial Salaries].
193. Id.; see also Jeﬀ Welty, Compensation of North Carolina Judges, N.C. Crim. L.: A
UNC Sch. of Gov’t Blog (Mar. 4, 2019), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/compensationof-north-carolina-judges/ [https://perma.cc/567N-9X44].
194. See, e.g., Welty, supra note 195 (noting the significant diﬀerences in judicial and
magistrate salaries).
195. Survey of Judicial Salaries, supra note 192, at 1–2.
196. See, e.g., Steven Chung, Public Interest Organizations Must Use Their Surge in
Donations to Pay Their Lawyers a Living Wage, Above the L. (Jan. 8,
2020), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/public-interest-organizations-must-use-theirsurge-in-donations-to-pay-their-lawyers-a-living-wage/ [https://perma.cc/M2SH-Y2YP]
(noting how the salary of public interest lawyers, which is similar to the salary of magistrates
in North Carolina, is usually not enough to cover basic living expenses and other student
loan repayment plans).
197. Survey of Judicial Salaries, supra note 192, at 1–2.
198. See Welty, supra note 193.
199. 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 522 (to be codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-171.1
(2021)).
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one through three, and then every four years (from date of appointment)
for increases from steps four through six.200 Lawyers who start as
magistrates start at a step four salary, $57,072, but their opportunity for
growth is no more than a non-J.D. magistrate (capped at step six).201 One
magistrate said of the starting magistrate salary, “[Y]ou can go . . . work
[as] . . . a manager of most, any fast food restaurant and make more than
that.”202
Not only are North Carolina magistrates paid significantly less than
other state court judges (and, of course, federal court judges), but they
also do not accrue paid vacation time or get retirement benefits,
something most professionals have come to expect. Magistrates only get
vacation time if the resident superior judge they work under gives it to
them.203 As the same magistrate interviewee said when describing
magistrate salaries and benefits, “[W]e’re the lowest . . . person on the
totem pole.”204 In addition, the hours magistrates are expected to work are
nontraditional and vary, with all magistrates on the criminal side having to
take overnight shifts of “night court” at the local jail.205 Magistrates also
often have to work weekends, holidays, and evenings.206 In section III.C
below, we discuss why these diﬀering salaries and benefits matter.
C.

Considerations in Support of Lay Judging

So why are these pay and benefit diﬀerences relevant to the
conversation about lay judges? The answer lies in arguments in support of
lay judging: One of the key historical arguments that persisted throughout
much of the twentieth century against requiring magistrate judges to have
a law degree (particularly in rural areas) is that states would not be able to
fill the positions. Indeed, this is why some states have diﬀerent credential
requirements for magistrates depending on county population, as
discussed in Part II.207
But what the salary and benefits diﬀerentials show is states’ lack of
willingness to invest in making magistrate positions (or their equivalent)
attractive to lawyers as a career path. High-level judgeships come not only
with prestige but also with a sizable salary and benefits package that is
lacking for magistrates. It is no wonder, then, that those with law degrees
might not be attracted to the magistrate job and might not be willing to
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C (Nov. 23, 2021).
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with Magistrate A (Nov. 2, 2021).
206. See Job Listing: Magistrate, State of N.C., https://agency.governmentjobs.com/northcarolina/job_bulletin.cfm?jobID=1008793&sharedWindow=0
[https://perma.cc/GXG6-H3BN] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) (“Must be able to work
irregular hours including nights, weekends, and holidays.”).
207. See supra section II.B.
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move to rural areas for the job. Indeed, a starting salary in the mid$50,000s with a growth opportunity only up to the mid-$60,000s might be
very diﬃcult for a lawyer with significant law school student loan debt to
comfortably take on.208 This lack of investment by states in making
magistrate jobs appealing, in contrast to higher-level judgeships, is a
commentary on how states value the people and the types of cases that go
through their lowest-level courts. These salaries put a price tag on these
courts, and the lack of high valuation is evident. Of course, budgets are
tight, but how governments allocate budgets largely showcases the degree
to which governments value (or don’t value) certain institutions and
programs.
Some may argue that there is no need to raise salaries and make
magistrate judgeships more attractive because it is in fact preferable for
cases in these low-level courts to be adjudicated by connected and known
(nonlawyer) community members, rather than by trained lawyers. As
Professor Cathy Lesser Mansfield wrote in her 1999 article, “One of the
images that underlies much of the non-lawyer judge discourse is that of
the wise and experienced member of the community, unrestrained by the
formality of court rules, and informed by his knowledge of local custom,
and perhaps even the knowledge of individuals before him.”209
There are two problems, however, with this argument. First, while this
is a romantic notion of what community justice might look like, a notion
that might have some historical truth,210 the notion of a “community” is
complex on the ground in 2021. In North Carolina, for example, one of
the most common careers prior to a magistrate judgeship is law
enforcement.211 Indeed, in the rural county where the magistrates we
interviewed worked, all of the sitting magistrates (roughly fifteen total)
with the exception of one were former probation oﬃcers (at the time of
the interviews).212
Police and probation oﬃcers have unique positions in the community, but they do not necessarily fill the romantic notions of wise and
trusted community members. There are significant power diﬀerentials
between citizens and these oﬃcers, and the notion that it is in fact a plus
that a former police or probation oﬃcer might even have “knowledge of
individuals before him”213 is problematic, delegitimizing, and likely
harmful for some community members. Given recent empirical research
208. See Chung, supra note 196 (noting how the salary of public interest lawyers, which
is similar to the salary of magistrates in North Carolina, is usually not enough to cover basic
living expenses).
209. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 142.
210. See id. (“James A. Gazell commented that ‘[t]he persons elected as justices of the
peace, however, were usually the most trusted members in frontier communities.’” (citation
omitted)).
211. Telephone Interview with Key Informant 3 (June 4, 2021).
212. Id.
213. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 142.
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about law enforcement and Black communities, a judge with a background
as a police or probation oﬃcer is unlikely to be perceived as a reassuring
presence or an impartial adjudicator who understands and appreciates the
local community and culture.214 Such research has shown that law enforcement personnel engage in racial profiling and stereotyping215 and
disproportionately subject Black and low-income communities to
proactive policing practices, including heightened criminal surveillance,
stop-and-frisks, and traﬃc stops.216 These practices, combined with a slow
response to Black neighborhoods when assistance via 911 is called,217
fosters a common belief in Black communities that law enforcement
merely “operates to protect the advantaged.”218 Further, “feelings of
distrust and fear of the police . . . have become cultural norms” in Black
communities.219
The second problem with the community ties argument for lay judges
is the assumptions such an argument makes about the legal issues that
come before magistrate judges. For a community-based system to work, it
must be that the matters of law adjudicated are simple enough that a lay
judge could eﬀectively and eﬃciently understand and work through these
214. See infra notes 215–219 and accompanying text.
215. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 80 n.477 (2019) (citing numerous empirical sources showing that Black men are more
likely than white men to be stopped or killed by police).
216. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2060–61 (2017) [hereinafter Bell, Legal Estrangement] (highlighting
scholarship that shows stop-and-frisk tactics led to higher incarceration of Black men even
though there was not necessarily an increase in actual crime); Monica C. Bell, Situational
Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive Legal Cynicism, 50 Law & Soc’y Rev. 314,
318 (2016) (“In the early and mid-twentieth century, widely accepted, disproportionate
police harshness in predominantly black communities contributed to blacks’ greater
likelihood of being arrested, charged, and sentenced more severely for crimes than whites.”
(citing Chicago Commission on Race Relations (1922))); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences
of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 Minn.
L. Rev. 2397, 2413–14 (2017) (showing that advocates of stop-and-frisks openly recognize
that minority communities will be aﬀected disproportionately by the policy’s
implementation); Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young AfricanAmerican Men, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 651, 654 (2009) (“No one is surprised to learn that black
men have long faced a higher arrest probability than white men.”); L. Song Richardson,
Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 73, 87 (2017) (“Empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that Black
individuals bear the brunt of stops and frisks and other similar investigatory proactive
policing practices.”).
217. See Huq, supra note 216, at 2425 (“In Chicago, for example, African-American and
Hispanic neighborhoods are subject to [stop-and-frisk] on the one hand, but on the other
hand experience substantially longer delays than non-minority neighborhoods when
seeking police aid via 911 calls.”).
218. Bell, Legal Estrangement, supra note 216, at 2071 (quoting Tom R. Tyler & Yuen
J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation With the Police and Courts 108–
09 (2002)).
219. Mikah K. Thompson, A Culture of Silence: Exploring the Impact of the Historically
Contentious Relationship Between African-Americans and the Police, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 697,
698 (2017).
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legal issues.220 Consider eviction as an example. The most common basis
for eviction in North Carolina is “nonpayment of rent.”221 The legal
requirements for failure to pay rent are fairly simple—demand plus a tenday waiting period before a landlord can file suit.222 However, there are
several defenses to nonpayment of rent, such as insuﬃcient demand,
retaliatory eviction, and habitability claims.223 Each of these defenses
require the interpretation of language and legal principles.
For example, under insuﬃcient demand, a landlord must make a
“clear, unequivocal statement, either oral or written” for rent—an indirect
expression of a desire to have a tenant catch up on rent is insuﬃcient.224
Another example is a landlord’s duty to deliver and maintain “fit and
habitable” premises.225 This duty involves complying with applicable
building codes, and thus a magistrate must interpret such codes. Further,
there is a statute protecting tenants from retaliatory evictions.226 There are
several “good faith” actions on the part of a tenant that are protected, such
as a request for repairs or a complaint to a government agency about a
landlord’s violation of any health or safety law, building code, or any other
applicable regulation.227 Interpretations of each of these clauses are
complex and may involve case and statutory interpretation—something
trained lawyers learn during their three years in law school.
Ultimately, the very notion that the types of cases heard before lowlevel state courts are somehow conducive to community judging is more
of a value judgment about the types of issues that come before low-level
courts than a true assessment of the complexity of the legal issues at hand.
Many, if not most, of these issues stem from consequences of poverty, and
thus are largely legal problems of the poor (eviction,228 debt collection,229

220. As discussed in supra section I.C, there has long been advocacy for the idea of
community justice in the United States.
221. North Carolina Eviction Process, Nat’l Evictions, https://nationalevictions.com/home/welcome/states-eviction-process/north-carolina-eviction-process/
[https://perma.cc/3682-TP25] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
222. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-3 (2021).
223. See, e.g., id. § 42-37.1 (providing an aﬃrmative defense against retaliatory
evictions).
224. Snipes v. Snipes, 286 S.E.2d 591, 595 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), aﬀ’d per curiam, 293
S.E.2d 187 (N.C. 1982).
225. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-42.
226. Id. § 42-37.1(a)(1)–(2).
227. Id.
228. Desmond, supra note 141, at 296 (explaining that eviction is commonplace among
people in poverty and also one of the most significant drivers in perpetuating poverty).
229. Debt Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse the Legal System to Prey on Lower-Income
New Yorkers, The Legal Aid Soc’y, MFY Legal Servs., Neighborhood Econ. Dev. Advoc. Project
& Urb. Just. Ctr., Cmty. Dev. Project 1 (2010), http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/reports/DEBT-DECEPTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT4S-9ETC] (“Virtually
all (95%) of people with default judgments entered against them by debt buyers resided in lowor moderate-income neighborhoods . . . .”).
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child abuse and neglect cases,230 and many criminal justice matters231 that
come before magistrates).232 As the data in the Appendix shows, many
states base the civil jurisdiction of magistrates on the amount in
controversy in a case. Magistrates in these states have jurisdiction if the
amount in controversy of the case is below a certain amount. This amount
varies but is often somewhere between $5,000 and $10,000.233 This means
that if a contract dispute, for example, falls below this amount of money,
the matter is adjudicated before a nonlawyer judge, but if the matter
involves a multi-million-dollar deal between two companies, it will most
certainly be heard by a legally credentialed judge.
The key issue is the amount of money involved, rather than the
complexity of the legal issue. There is an inherent value judgment in this
way of doling out legal expertise: Contracts between two companies
generally should not be subjected to nonlawyer magistrates because
matters that involve a lot of money are somehow more worthy of legal
expertise than matters involving smaller dollar amounts.
Should the importance of legal issues come down to the money
involved? Consider the implications of a landlord–tenant contract dispute
resulting in an eviction for the life course of an individual.234 The stakes,
230. Maren K. Dale, Addressing the Underlying Issue of Poverty in Child-Neglect Cases,
A.B.A. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2014/addressing-underlying-issue-poverty-child-neglect-cases/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“While poverty can lead to increased rates of actual maltreatment, poverty
itself is often mistaken for neglect, resulting in increased rates of child-maltreatment reports.”).
231. Poverty and Debt, Prison Pol’y Initiative, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/ELK2-ZJUG] (last visited Feb. 25, 2022) (“Far from offering people a ‘second
chance,’ our criminal justice system frequently punishes those who never had a first chance:
people in poverty. By focusing law enforcement on low-level offenses and subjecting criminal
defendants to money bail and other fees, our country effectively punishes people for being
poor.”).
232. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing
Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 37, 40–41 (2015)
(exploring the unmet legal needs of the poor and noting that many of such unmet needs
involve housing, family, and consumer issues); MacDowell, supra note 2, at 475 (defining
“poor people’s courts” as state civil courts that serve large numbers of poor people, such as
“family, housing, and small claims and other consumer courts”); see also infra Appendix,
tbl.1.
233. See infra Appendix, tbl.1 (reporting that the “Amount in Controversy Cutoﬀ?” can
range between $3,000 and $25,000).
234. See
Robert
Collinson
&
Davin
Reed,
The
Eﬀects
of
Evictions on Low-Income Households 3 (2018), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/evictions_collinson_reed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8L7F4UB] (finding that those who are evicted are more likely to become homeless); see also
Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and
Health, 94 Soc. Forces 295, 295–96, 299 (2015) (noting that prolonged periods of
homelessness can follow eviction, that there is a correlation between housing uncertainty
and depression along with other negative health outcomes, and that “the blemish of an
eviction can significantly influence one’s experiences on the housing market”); Barbara
Kiviat & Sara Sternberg Greene, Opinion, Losing a Home Because of the Pandemic Is Hard
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in many ways, could not be higher. Evictions uproot families, causing them
to lose most of their possessions. Children who are evicted often must
change schools and sleep in unstable and even unsafe conditions.235
Further, being evicted has been shown to cause long-term health
problems.236
Yet in many states, North Carolina included, evictions are heard in
small claims courts. Evictions are deemed “small claims,” and they are
treated as such—unimportant and incidental. The symbolic nature of this
term should not be lost. The term “small claims” inherently implies a
small, relatively unimportant matter. Being evicted, however, is anything
but small for the families involved. The decision to evict someone is not
inherently less important than a seven-figure contract deal between two
companies. Instead, by using amount in controversy as a proxy for
determining importance, our legal system has embedded judgments about
importance within it, valuing money over health, safety, and children’s life
courses.
Another justification often made in favor of lay judging, including in
North v. Russell (discussed in Part II), is that litigants usually have the right
to a de novo trial or appeal before a lawyer-judge. Indeed, in North v.
Russell, the majority relied in part on the fact that the defendant had a
right to a de novo appeal of the decision by the nonlawyer judge to rule
that lay judging is constitutional.237 At first glance, this argument appears
to have validity, particularly given the volume of cases lower-level state
courts hear (roughly sixteen million filings annually).238 Perhaps relying
on a litigant to appeal if she wants her case heard before a legally
credentialed judge is prudent. In theory, such a process is eﬃcient,
economical for strapped state judicial budgets, and potentially fair. In
practice, however, such a system is anything but fair. To start, recall that
the vast majority of litigants in low-level state courts are unrepresented.239
Now, consider the example of evictions in North Carolina again. Once a
magistrate rules against a tenant, the tenant can appeal to the district court
for a trial de novo if the notice of appeal is filed within ten days of the
magistrate’s judgment.240 The tenant must post a rent bond if they wish to
Enough. How Long Should It Haunt You?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/opinion/eviction-records-crisis.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
235. See Desmond, supra note 141, at 299 (noting several health and developmental
challenges for young children experiencing eviction); supra note 234 and accompanying
text.
236. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 234, at 300–01 (noting the correlation
between housing uncertainty and depression along with other negative health outcomes).
237. See 427 U.S. 328, 329 (1976).
238. Ct. Stats. Project, supra note 3.
239. See Schultheis & Rooney, supra note 22.
240. Landlord/Tenant Issues, N.C. Jud. Branch, https://www.nccourts.gov/helptopics/housing/landlordtenant-issues [https://perma.cc/Z8JF-7SJ2] (last visited Feb. 3,
2022).

1326

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1287

remain in the property during the appeal process unless they file a form
to be found indigent.241
First, the appeals process assumes that tenants know they have the
right to appeal. While magistrates are supposed to inform tenants of this
right, our interviews with attorneys suggest that not all magistrates do. The
attorneys we interviewed noted that in their experience, magistrates who
are not lawyers are generally less familiar with the appeals procedure and
thus are less likely to advise litigants of their appellate rights.242 Since the
majority of tenants before magistrates do not have an attorney, without a
magistrate informing them of their right to appeal, they may never know.
Even if all magistrates always inform tenants of their right to appeal,
the unrepresented tenant faces an upward, almost impossible, battle on
the appeal. A ten-day window to file an appeal is quite short, particularly
for someone who concurrently has to prepare to be kicked out of their
home, potentially left homeless. During the ten-day process, the tenant
must file the appropriate paperwork for appeal, including providing the
other party with notice of the appeal. These steps require time, literacy,
and procedural knowledge.
There are also fees associated with filing an appeal, though tenants
may file an additional form to be found “indigent,” and thus unable to pay
the appeals fee (and back rent due).243 However, in order to remain in
their home during the appeals process, they still must sign and file an
undertaking “Bond to Stay Eviction,” “agreeing to pay the tenant’s share
of contract rent as it becomes due.”244 Further, “in actions based upon
alleged nonpayment of rent where the magistrate’s judgment is entered
more than five business days before the next rent due date, a tenant is also
required to pay prorated rent under the terms of the undertaking.”245 If a
tenant fails to pay prorated rent during the appeals process, the tenant can
be evicted before the appeal is even heard.246
Most tenants brought to court for an eviction proceeding are in crisis,
where money is short, and they need time to potentially plan for a new
living arrangement, increase work hours to try to cover rent, and more.
Even if the tenant manages to successfully file all needed paperwork to
appeal, to obtain bonds and other necessary money to stay in their home
during the appeals process, and to provide notice of appeal to the other
party, the tenant will need to be able to take time oﬀ from work or
potentially find childcare for the new trial at the district court. And the
tenant has no say in when this trial will be held. The tenant will simply be
mailed a notice of when that trial is and then must appear ready to litigate
241. Id.
242. Videoconference Interview with North Carolina Attorneys (June 2, 2020). The
interview was conducted with both attorneys present.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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in front of the district court judge at the assigned time.247 This can be
diﬃcult for low-income litigants, since low-wage service sector jobs are
notorious for diﬃcult and last-minute work schedules and provide few
opportunities for employees to adjust their schedules.248
Given these procedural and practical hurdles with an appeal, it is not
surprising that the rate of appeals for eviction cases is extremely low.249
The right to a de novo trial is theoretically important, but in practice is
futile in promoting equity.
D. Existing Research and the Consequences of Judging Without a J.D.
Scholars have only just begun to document the consequences of the
unequal state and local court systems, making important headway on the
consequences of fines and fees in low-level courts250 as well as the conse247. N.C. Super. & Dist. Cts. R. 2.
248. See
Maria
E.
Enchautegui,
Nonstandard
Work
Schedules
and
the
Well-Being
of
Low-Income
Families
6
(2013),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32696/412877-Nonstandard-Work-Schedules-and-theWell-being-of-Low-Income-Families.PDF [https://perma.cc/H8MK-22BQ] (discussing the
commonality of nonstandard hours in the U.S. workforce, particularly among low-wage workers);
Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low Wage Work, 50 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2015) (discussing the prevalence of nonstandard hours in the workforce,
especially in the service industry); Julia R. Henly, H. Luke Schaefer & Elaine Waxman,
Nonstandard Work Schedules: Employer- and Employee-Driven Flexibility in Retail Jobs, 80 Soc.
Serv. Rev. 609, 610 (2006) (“The growth of the U.S. service economy has fueled an increasing
demand for evening, weekend, and variable-hour workers . . . .”). See generally Sara S. Greene,
Working to Fail, 27 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 167 (2020) (detailing how low-wage jobs often
require nonstandard work hours and make it difficult for workers to adjust their schedules).
249. See, e.g., Riley B. Foster, Eviction Diversion: A Community-Based Approach to
Addressing High Rates of Eviction in Durham County, North Carolina 56–58 (Apr. 2018)
(B.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that the number of evictions in Durham County averaged about 460 per
month between 2015 to 2017, and, on average, about seventeen of these evictions were
appealed each month, implying that less than 5% of evictions are appealed).
250. One area of the state court system that contributes to inequality and has been
recently studied is that of fines and fees. The imposition of mandatory fines and fees on the
indigent, regardless of an individual’s ability to pay, has become a subject of mounting
judicial, legislative, and public concern. Brandon L. Garrett, Sara S. Greene & Marin K.
Levy, Fees, Fines, Bail, and the Destitution Pipeline, 69 Duke L.J. 1463, 1464 (2020). The
Ferguson Report, released by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2015, sparked national
attention for these issues through its documentation of a particular county courthouse’s
unreasonable methods of criminalizing poverty through fines and fees. See, e.g., William E.
Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License
Suspension in North Carolina, 69 Duke L.J. 1585, 1589–90 (2020) (“What makes these
findings particularly relevant, however, is not just the scale of the driver’s license
suspensions, but that they are disparately imposed on minorities and poorer
communities.”). Over time, court-imposed fines and fees can multiply, resulting in
intensifying debt. In turn, individuals may lose their employment, driver’s license, housing,
and public assistance. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction:
Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 509, 516 (2011) (“It
thus appears that tens of millions of U.S. residents have been assessed financial penalties by
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quences of having primarily pro se litigants.251 Further, Professor Kathryn
Sabbeth’s recent essay on lower-level courts and the civil justice system
made an important point: The lack of investment in state lower courts has
resulted in what she calls the “underdevelopment of poor people’s law.”252
The idea is that because resources are not spent on poor people’s legal
issues, justified by a notion that these issues are not legal in nature or are
simple, the legal doctrine related to these issues is not well-developed. She
argues that “[w]ithout lawyers to support them, time to prepare, or the
opportunity to participate in defining the scope of issues before the
court,” poor litigants are denied the “benefits of law development.”253
Ultimately, her larger argument is that “[a]ssumptions about whose cases

the courts and other criminal justice agencies.”); Garrett et al., supra, at 1464; Sandra G.
Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 Duke L.J. 1643, 1645 (2019) (noting how
unaﬀordable
bail
functionally
detains
thousands
each
year); Megan
T.
Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Aﬀects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 511, 534–35 (2018) (detailing empirical findings suggesting that required
pretrial detention and fees lead to an increased overall length of incarceration and nonbail
fees owed); see also Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a
Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 Duke L.J. 1473, 1475–76 (2019) (describing substantive
policy implications underlying the criminalization of poverty).
251. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 2, at 512–13 (detailing
how a lack of social and economic safety nets leaves many pro se litigants vulnerable under
current civil justice systems and leads to unequitable access to justice); Colleen F. Shanahan,
The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 Wis.
L. Rev. 215, 217–18 (detailing the role of judges in low-level courts and their relationship
with pro se litigants while identifying ways that judges may facilitate access to justice); Jessica
K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 741, 749
(2015) (finding that in some states 80 to 90% of those who appear in the “people’s court”
are unrepresented and challenged with navigating a complex legal system in order to
successfully access the courts); Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan
& Alyx Marks, Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly, 89 Fordham L. Rev.
1315, 1315–16 (2020) (identifying how courts have come to rely on a ”shadow network of
nonlawyer professionals” as a substitute for traditional legal counsel and discussing how this
impacts the substantive and procedural information provided to many pro se litigants);
Sudeall & Meals, supra note 2 (describing how millions of unrepresented litigants interact
with the civil justice system each year).
252. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, supra note 80. Others have also long
voiced the concern about state courts losing their ability to shape law, although courts are
not necessarily focused on shaping law for low-income individuals specifically. See Myriam
Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev.
371, 413 (“Put simply: law cannot grow in the darkness with which arbitration shrouds its
activities, and when law ceases to grow, it stagnates and eventually ceases to be (or be
relevant).”); Samuel Issacharoﬀ & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1419–20 (2006) (describing how the CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act)
will cease nonfederal courts from shaping substantive law); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against
Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (describing how increases in settlements have
detracted from courts’ ability to shape the law); see also Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2176–
80 (“Federal Monopolization of state claims also removes the ability of state courts to shape
the common law.”).
253. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, supra note 80.
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are worthy of attention legitimize the simplification of entire bodies of law
and de-legalization of lower status courts.”254
Sabbeth focuses on the development of doctrine, and it seems likely
that the issue we focus on in this Essay, nonlawyer judges, further
perpetuates the underdevelopment of doctrine for poor people’s law. But
this Essay suggests, in addition to Sabbeth’s point, that the existing
doctrine is already quite complicated—to the extent that allowing lay
judges to adjudicate cases involving the existing doctrine delegitimizes the
legal process and, as discussed below, potentially leads to unjust outcomes.
Past research about procedural justice is also important to the
problem of nonlawyer judging. Procedural justice scholars have found that
when people perceive a lack of procedural justice, they are less likely to
view the law as legitimate and as something that should be obeyed.255 On
the flip side, when people experience procedural justice and are treated
with respect, they view the law and legal authorities as more legitimate and
entitled to be obeyed.256 In turn, people increase their self-regulation,
taking on personal responsibility to follow social rules.257
Research suggests that diﬀerent factors are important in shaping
procedural justice judgments: perceptions of justice in the quality of the
decisionmaking procedures (neutrality) and perceptions of justice in the
treatment people receive in the process (status recognition).258 Professors
Tom Tyler, Steven Blader, and Yuen Huo have argued that when people
believe they have experienced these forms of justice, they tend to accept
social rules and voluntarily engage in self-regulatory behavior.259
There is no doubt that many litigants who appear before lay judges
may be unaware their judge is not a lawyer, and thus the experience may
not feel inherently unjust. But regardless of whether poor litigants are
aware of the credentials of the judge they appear before, there are
important reasons procedural justice concerns still come into play. First,
as we discuss below, both magistrates and attorneys who practice in their
courts in North Carolina told us of clear procedural errors in magistrate
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public
Cooperation With the Police and Courts 49–51 (2002); Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Bies,
Beyond Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural Justice, in Applied
Soc. Psych. & Organizational Settings 77, 78 (John S. Carroll ed., 1990).
256. See Tyler & Bies, supra note 255, at 78.
257. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Eﬀective Rule of Law, 30
Crime & Just. 283, 283–84 (2003).
258. See Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader, Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement 8–10 (2000) (detailing how procedural justice
causes people to evaluate their statuses and values which, in turn, leads to self-regulatory
behavior); Tyler & Huo, supra note 255, at 52 (describing a model to help evaluate how
procedural justice correlates to self-regulation of behavior).
259. Tyler & Huo, supra note 255, at 175–76; see also Tyler & Blader, supra note 258, at
8–10 (discussing the role of the perception of fair outcomes and fair processes in selfregulation).
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courts, errors that litigants would feel and experience and may aﬀect their
perceptions of the justice system.260 These errors, among others, include
failing to tell litigants of their right to appeal, failing to consider legal
issues in eviction cases, incorrectly revoking a litigant’s driver’s license,
setting inappropriate bail, and incorrectly issuing warrants.261 A case study
of South Carolina magistrates found similar (and even more substantial)
procedural problems, as did an older study of lay judges in New York
State.262 Second, putting aside noticeable procedural problems, the
inherent underlying message of a system of nonlawyer judges for the poor
is one of disregard, unimportance, and blame. Even if poor people are
unaware of the injustices they are experiencing or only have some sense
of injustice rather than concrete knowledge of the injustice, this does not
justify an inequitable system.
It is also important to note that in some cases, those coming before
magistrates may very much know their judge is not a lawyer. For example,
in North Carolina, those coming before magistrates on the criminal side
may, in fact, recognize the magistrates as former police oﬃcers or even
probation oﬃcers the community member may have interacted with. In
such cases, it is diﬃcult to imagine litigants would feel the process is fair,
neutral, and legitimate, though further research on this point is needed.
E.

North Carolina Case Study and the Problems of Judging Without a J.D.

1. Case Study Methods. — North Carolina was an ideal case study
because it is a state that relies heavily on lay magistrate judging. Thus,
studying North Carolina provided a window into better understanding the
workings of a low-level judicial system where the majority of the
adjudicators are not legally trained but also allowed for some degree of
comparison since it has some lawyer-judges. As previously noted, North
Carolina has a large percentage of lay magistrates—over 80% of current
sitting magistrates (civil and criminal combined) do not have law
degrees,263 and up until January 2022, the only requirement for magistrate
judges was that by the six-month mark of their judgeship they receive forty
hours of training.264 As of January 2022, they must also complete twelve
hours of continuing education each year after their first year of service.265

260. See infra section III.E.
261. See infra section III.E.
262. See infra section III.F and note 331.
263. E-mail from Lori Cole to Charles Holton, supra note 175 (noting that only 120 of
the 669 (18%) North Carolina magistrates in the 2019–2020 fiscal year have law degrees and
only 105 of the 120 with J.D.s are licensed to practice law).
264. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-177 (2021).
265. Id. § 7A-171.2(c).
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As part of our case study, we attended meetings and conferences
about the eviction system in North Carolina,266 we reviewed and conducted
a content analysis of statutes, websites, and blogs geared toward magistrate
judges in the state,267 and we visited the courthouses of two diﬀerent
counties in North Carolina—one where the majority of magistrates have a
J.D. (Durham County) and the other where few of the magistrates have a
J.D. (Alamance County). We randomly sampled (and then photocopied)
recent eviction case files at each courthouse, which allowed us to compare
orders of lawyer and nonlawyer magistrates.268
We also interviewed a variety of informants involved in the low-level
court system in North Carolina. Because we were not trying to study a
particular group of people, but rather an institutional system, constructing
a representational sample did not make sense.269 Instead, we created a
“panel of informants” by conducting interviews with key informants who
could bring forth diﬀerent perspectives on the lower-level court system in
North Carolina, providing us with an overview of the factual and practical
ways the system works.270
A key informant can be “a knowledgeable insider willing to serve as
an informant on informants[,] . . . a retiree, a person who has a career’s
experience with the system and now has time to reminisce,” or an
“informed insider.”271 In order to get key informants to “comfortably be
candid” with an interviewer, it is often useful for the interviewer to be
“vouched for by a mutual acquaintance.”272
With these methodological considerations in mind, we sought out
interviews using our networks based on past research Greene has done on
eviction in North Carolina. We interviewed the Executive Director of Legal
Aid of North Carolina, who supplied us with important factual and
observational information about lower-level courts in North Carolina. We
266. Greene attended the Statewide Summary Ejectment Roundtable on June 14, 2019
at the North Carolina Judicial Center. She also attended several other informal meetings
with key eviction stakeholders across the state.
267. See, e.g., Archive of Blog Posts by Dona Lewandowski, On the Civil Side: A UNC
Sch. of Gov’t Blog, https://civil.sog.unc.edu/contributors/ [https://perma.cc/QG6623UJ] (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
268. Renberg visited the Alamance County Courthouse on October 12, 2021 and the
Durham County Courthouse on November 12, 2021.
269. Robert S. Weiss, Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative
Interview Studies 20 (1994) (describing representational samples as useful when “we want
to interview not a panel of people in peculiarly good positions to know but, rather, a sample
of people who together can adequately represent the experiences of a larger group”). Our
research was also additionally informed by a diﬀerent study Greene conducted in the
summer of 2019, which involved interviewing fifty respondents who had been evicted or
were at risk of eviction in North Carolina. For a further description of this project, see supra
note 1.
270. For a further description of the interviewing methods used to construct the sample
panel of informants, see Weiss, supra note 269, at 18–20.
271. Id. at 20.
272. Id.
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also connected with a magistrate judge in a rural county in North
Carolina.273 We then used snowball sampling to interview two more
magistrate judges (one who was currently a judge and one who had
recently left a judgeship) from the same county.274 Further, using our
contacts, we interviewed two attorneys who were able to provide a broad
perspective, having both practiced in low-level courts across the state and
also both having been involved in state-wide access to justice and court and
law reform eﬀorts. For further background and perspective, we also
interviewed a former chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
those involved with the training of magistrate judges in North Carolina,
and individuals who are part of access to justice eﬀorts across the state.275
Overall, combining all of the information our key informants provided
along with the additional research conducted, we were able to develop a
deep understanding of the magistrate system in North Carolina (and also
determine areas ripe for further study).
2. Case Study Findings. — Our case study of North Carolina provides
insight into how the system works through the eyes of personnel who work
within it. We found that those we interviewed who work in the system and
are legally trained believe that procedural justice is disrupted by nonlawyer
judges. One of the attorneys we interviewed emphasized that his
experiences with nonlawyer judges were diﬀerent from his experiences
273. To protect the identity of our magistrate respondents, we use gender-neutral
pronouns when referring to them and only provide general information about the county
where they served as judges. In the county where these three magistrates served, there are
currently about fifteen magistrate judges and the vast majority of the magistrates do not
have law degrees. Most are former police or probation oﬃcers. See Telephone Interview
with Magistrate A, supra note 205.
274. By using snowball sampling, a standard qualitative research technique, we gained
the trust of our participants and access to further magistrate interviews. See Michèle Lamont
& Patricia White, Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative
Research
10
(2005),
https://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YEF6-WTTZ]. Professor Michèle Lamont and sociologist Patricia White
explain:
Since the purpose of a qualitative study is to acquire new, more detailed
knowledge on a topic, selection methods and interviewing styles need to
be suited to that purpose. Snowball sampling allows the researcher to
enter into networks of individuals and identify respondents that they
might not otherwise be able to identify. However, participants tend to be
more honest and willing to divulge personal information to researchers
who have been validated by someone they know, enabling the researcher
both to gather more accurate data and speak to individuals who otherwise
may have declined to participate in research with a complete stranger.
Furthermore, particularly in the case of expert and elite interviews,
referrals can help the researcher pinpoint those participants who are most
appropriate for the study at hand.
Id.
275. We interviewed these individuals in their professional capacities and designed
questions to glean factual information about how the North Carolina lower-level court
system works.
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with lawyer-judges.276 He noted that in his experience, magistrates without
law degrees frequently fail to inform tenants of their rights and also that
nonlawyer magistrates are less comfortable applying appropriate legal
remedies, such as rent abatement (which requires legal analysis).277 In a
similar vein, both attorneys noted that in their experience nonlawyer
magistrates are less likely to rule in favor of tenants on implied warranty of
habitability claims, again because legal analysis is required.278 Further, the
attorneys said that because there are more magistrates without law degrees
in rural areas, it tends to be in those areas specifically that tenants have the
most diﬃculty succeeding with legal claims.279 The attorneys said they
believe these diﬀerences are due to untrained magistrates simply not
understanding legal claims and assuming the legal argument can be
hashed out on appeal, if the tenant so desires.280 Yet the attorneys noted
that lay magistrates also appear to be less familiar with appellate procedure
and often do not advise litigants of their right to appeal.281
The views of these two attorneys were, of course, based only on their
experiences and perceptions, but they were consistent with what we heard
from magistrates themselves as well as others involved in magistrate-led
courts in North Carolina. One nonlawyer magistrate we interviewed, Lay
Magistrate C, began their282 term in August of one year and did not have
any training until February of the next year, since the trainings run only
every six months.283 In North Carolina, magistrates are required to attend
what is called “Basic School” within the first six months of their
appointment. Basic School is “a course of basic training of at least forty
hours in the civil and criminal duties of a magistrate.”284
What this means is that the magistrate we interviewed, and many other
magistrates, began adjudicating with no training at all. In fact, magistrates
may adjudicate for over five months with no training. As one key informant
involved in magistrate training said, “[T]here’s no training. It’s just onthe-job training . . . until they come to basic school.”285 They called the
training situation “scarily insuﬃcient” and said, “My metaphor really is,
it’s like asking someone to decorate a tree when they don’t have a tree.
And you’re lobbing ornaments at them. And they don’t know where to put
them. So, they’re just trying to hold ‘em while they figure [it] out.”286

276. Videoconference Interview with North Carolina Attorneys, supra note 242.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. As noted previously, we use gender-neutral pronouns when discussing the
magistrates we interviewed in order to protect their identity. See supra note 273.
283. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C, supra note 202.
284. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-177 (2021).
285. Telephone Interview with Key Informant 3, supra note 211.
286. Id.
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Aside from the potential goodwill of fellow magistrates to informally
help, guide, and advise, new magistrates are given only two resources when
they start their jobs: one book for civil cases and one for criminal cases.
Attorney Magistrate B described these books:
[T]here’s a big book that’s nicknamed the Crimes Book, the NC
Crimes Book. It’s about 4 or 500 pages long and it breaks down
crimes by element and issues . . . . There’s a book called North
Carolina Small Claims Law that’s written by the Institute of
Government and that’s available as well [for civil issues].287
Once magistrates finally attend Basic School, they do have to pass a
test, which is open book and untimed.288 We were told that the objective is
for magistrates to pass and that it is not a particularly hard test.289
Magistrates are allowed to take the test multiple times, and they are even
allowed to repeat Basic School classes in order to try to pass the test.290
What we learned through our key informant interviews is that during
training, trainers emphasize to magistrates that their lack of legal training
is not a problem, in part because it is possible to correct almost anything
they do. Lay Magistrate C said that “the best thing they tell magistrates
when you begin, is that most nine times out of ten, there’s nothing you
can do to screw up that can’t be corrected at the courthouse.”291 This
magistrate further noted, “[Y]ou’re gonna make mistakes, and I’ve sure
made some mistakes. But there’s not a mistake that’s gonna cost anybody
their life or anything, so . . . (laughs).”292
The stakes of mistakes, however, are of course very high in both civil
and criminal cases. Civil cases such as evictions can result in homelessness,
job loss, instability for children, and health problems.293 In criminal cases,
an extra night in jail can mean being fired from one’s job, having one’s
children taken into state custody, and a host of other issues. Lay Magistrate
C gave an example of a mistake a magistrate might make—inappropriately
revoking someone’s driver’s license due to a lack of understanding of the
laws that govern driver’s license revocation. Lay Magistrate C did not deem
this mistake important because it could later be cleared up. They said,
“[W]hen you take . . . somebody’s license for a civil revocation for thirty
days . . . and in fact, they shouldn’t have had their license taken, um, you
know, you can make that mistake. But then, the Clerk’s Oﬃce will give it
back to them . . . at the courthouse.”294

287. Telephone Interview with Magistrate B (Nov. 22, 2021).
288. Telephone Interview with Key Informant 3, supra note 211.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C, supra note 202.
292. Id.
293. See generally supra note 234 and accompanying text (describing the relationship
between eviction and homelessness).
294. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C, supra note 202.
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While Lay Magistrate C is correct that this mistake could eventually be
cleared up, they underestimate the eﬀects such a mistake could have on
someone. As a person waits to “clear up” the mistake, there are a myriad
of potential collateral consequences of losing her license: She may not be
able to get to work (which sometimes results in job loss); she may not be
able to pick her children up from school or bring them to daycare; and
she may not be able to go to the store to get food. Thus, the collateral
consequences of these seemingly small mistakes are in fact quite
significant.
Our interviews also revealed another hidden consequence of lay
judges for defendants, one that we did not anticipate but came up
organically in our interviews: the inappropriate influence of district
attorneys (DAs) and law enforcement. How this plays out is somewhat
diﬀerent for DAs than for law enforcement. Regarding DAs, we learned
that some magistrates view DAs as a resource for times when they are
confused. Indeed, one of the questions in our interview guide for
magistrates asked what they do when a tricky case or issue comes up. Lay
Magistrate C responded without any hesitation saying, “I’ll call the district
attorney.”295 But of course the DA is the attorney for the state—not the
defendant—and the judge is seeking advice from him. In fact, this
magistrate notes that another magistrate was related to a DA, and, “[s]o, I
won’t hesitate to call [that DA].”296
While this lay magistrate did not seem to view law enforcement as a
resource for complex legal problems, several of the magistrates suggested
that police oﬃcers have close relationships with nonlawyer magistrates and
often try to take advantage of these relationships. Attorney Magistrate B
said that in “some of the areas . . . law enforcement are very much
accustomed to just telling magistrates what . . . they want us to do.”297 They
went on to explain, “[I]f you don’t do what they want to do they will, they
will find a way to complain and to make your life diﬃcult.”298
The magistrate then gave an example of a situation where police were
clearly engaging in illegal conduct to avoid being subpoenaed.299 Attorney
Magistrate B, in their capacity as an attorney, went to the Chief District
Court Judge to complain about the practice, saying it was “not lawful” and
that “we really shouldn’t be doing this as the favor of people who just don’t
want to be subpoenaed.”300 Eventually, the practice was stopped, but as
Attorney Magistrate B said, “[We] also, in smaller or more rural counties,
have a lot of magistrates who are former policeman or probation oﬃcers.
And I think sometimes they have a hard time separating their positions

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Magistrate B, supra note 287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from one another, what they used to do from what they currently do.”301
Attorney Magistrate A, from the same rural county said, “I would say that
the majority, if not the vast majority [of their colleagues], were some kind
of law enforcement.”302 Following up on that point, they said, “I would say
that, without hesitation, I would say that . . . they’re far too willing to
believe the police . . . . Um, far too unwilling to believe anything someone
who . . . is wearing handcuﬀs has to say.”303 Further, Attorney Magistrate A
noted that “[v]ery few questions were asked of the police and they didn’t
like it when you did ask questions.”304
On the civil side, Attorney Magistrate A said, “[W]hen it came to sort
of the inequities of a case . . . they were almost always gonna land on the
landlord’s side . . . . I think a lot of that just comes down to a relationship.
They see the landlords every day.”305 Another key informant was quite
direct about how nonlawyer magistrates can disadvantage tenants in small
claims court. They noted that “landlords, in particular, tend to be . . .
locally influential . . . and have political power . . . Chief District Court
Judges and clerks are both elected locally.”306 The implication is that the
Chief District Court Judge and the clerks are incentivized to keep
landlords happy. This key informant noted that they have heard that “the
high volume landlord attorneys are extremely and, I believe, very
deliberately intimidating.”307 They went on to explain the problem with
this dynamic in the context of lay judges: “And that is a place . . . where
not being a lawyer does matter because magistrates are acutely aware
that . . . they’re not attorneys. So, if they have an attorney who is aggressive
about . . . ‘I know the law, and you don’t[,]’ [m]any of them will back
down.”308
This informant described a situation where a magistrate did not rule
in the attorney’s favor, and “[t]he attorney left the courtroom, went
directly to chief district court judge . . . with a complaint about how the
magistrate was conducting court . . . . She wasn’t reappointed the next
time.”309 Further, they noted that “if landlords are filing complaints
against [magistrates], um, . . . It’s not true in all counties, but in a lot of
counties, they’re not gonna get reappointed.”310 Magistrates are well aware
of this dynamic, and as Key Informant 3 noted, magistrates are sometimes
“summoned to the chief district court judge’s oﬃce to explain their ruling
against a landlord.”311
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Telephone Interview with Magistrate A, supra note 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Key Informant 3, supra note 211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The magistrates and key informants we interviewed are of course not
the first to recognize that repeat players in courts are often influential and
disproportionately likely to succeed in their local state court.312 Others
have also suggested that judges are subject to political influence and “can
be seen as laborers who seek to maximize their popularity, prestige, and
reputation.”313 None of these other considerations of influence on judges
have yet to contemplate the additional dimension of the degree to which
powerful repeat players may particularly be able to influence nonlawyer
judges.
A particularly troubling aspect about the commentary on complaints
and the power of landlords and their attorneys is that we were told of at
least one chief district court judge who intentionally creates barriers meant
to prevent less powerful parties from complaining about magistrate
judges. Lay Magistrate C told us that the Chief District Court Judge in their
district requires that all complaints about magistrates and the process be
made in writing.314 As Lay Magistrate C said, “That knocks down 99% of
them.”315 They further noted that the Chief District Court Judge was
explicit with the magistrates that he implemented this complaint
procedure to make it more cumbersome for litigants to complain.316 Given
potential literacy issues, language barriers, and the like, the litigants for
whom writing a complaint would be a barrier are often going to be the
least powerful litigants. Powerful repeat players see their complaints
potentially block the reappointment of magistrate judges, while poor
litigants experience significant, purposeful roadblocks preventing them
from even filing a complaint.
Issues of race also came up in our interviews, and further exploration
of these issues is warranted. Attorney Magistrate A was always met with
dismissal when they raised concerns about racial issues related to
magistrate judging. They said:
What bonds do I give to Hispanic people? But any indication of
diﬀerent treatment between Black people, Hispanic people,
white people, men, women, older, younger, whatever. Any—any
sort of, you know, ‘Hey, you gave that white guy a $50,000 bond,
you gave $100,000 to the Black guy . . . .’ ‘They seemed like the

312. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court:
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 Law & Soc’y Rev. 941, 942–
43 (1999) (detailing a theory of how “repeat players” have internalized areas of the legal
system in distinct ways that have allowed them to become structurally privileged actors in
the system); Galanter, supra note 14, at 119–21 (identifying the ways in which underlying
procedures within the legal system can act as limitations for those who wish to use the legal
system as a venue for systemically equalizing change).
313. Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2159 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 236–40 (1979)).
314. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C, supra note 202.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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same crime.’ . . . ‘What’s going on?’ Was met with absolute
resistance.317
Attorney Magistrate A said of race that “it was very much not talked
about . . . and bringing it up was very much frowned upon. . . [b]y the
magistrates, by the cops, by whoever.”318 They further said this type of data
is very purposefully not recorded (disparities in bond, for example), and
when they pushed to try to document such data, they were met with
resistance.319 As they said, race “definitely was an oﬀ-limits topic to talk
about.”320
On the criminal side, magistrates are given a sheet from the Chief
District Court Judge with recommended bond amounts for their district,
but magistrates are under no obligation to follow these recommendations.321 Lay Magistrate C said, “[W]e give high bonds in [our] County . . .
‘cause we have a lot of gang activity down here.”322
In contrast, Lay Magistrate C also said that there are a group of
(private) attorneys who frequently work in their court.323 This group, Lay
Magistrate C explained, will sometimes ask judges to make special
exceptions for their clients, which usually involves asking for an unsecured
bond.324 Lay Magistrate C said that they “try to work with them” when one
of these attorneys is involved because “bond is to just make sure they go to
court and . . . [t]hey’re represented by an attorney . . . so you know they’re
gonna go to court most of the time. Some of them don’t, but . . . most [of
the] time they do.”325 The implication should not be lost: Those with
“gang activity” require high bonds, while those who have hired an attorney
can be given unsecured bonds, because somehow, the fact that they had
the money to hire an attorney implies they are less of a flight risk.
Ultimately, both of the attorney magistrates we interviewed said if
there was one thing they would change about the system, it would be for
there to be an attorney requirement for magistrates.326 Attorney Magistrate
B said, when asked what she would change about the whole magistrate
judging system (separately on the civil and criminal side): “I would say that

317. Telephone Interview with Magistrate A, supra note 205.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Telephone Interview with Magistrate C, supra note 202.
322. Id.
323. We asked the magistrates about their experiences with public defenders, but public
defenders almost never appear before magistrates because of the nature of the issues
magistrates adjudicate—it is too early in the criminal process for a public defender to be
appointed to these matters. Magistrates issue arrest warrants, set bail, and deal with
preliminary issues in criminal cases. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Telephone Interview with Magistrate B, supra note 287; Telephone Interview with
Magistrate C, supra note 202.

2022]

JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.

1339

magistrates need to be attorneys.”327 They said this held for both the civil
and criminal sides.328
Taken together, this panel of experts, along with the other data we
collected, provides an important first step in helping to understand the
magistrate system in North Carolina. Of course, the interviews conducted
were limited in number, and generalizations about any subjective
experiences of the interviewees cannot be made. The interviews, however,
provide many factual insights that apply to the magistrate system as a whole
in North Carolina, as well as other provocative insights into the lay judging
system in North Carolina that can serve as a basis for a comprehensive,
mixed-methods empirical study of low-level state courts that employ lay
judges, not only in North Carolina, but across the country.329 Existing
research already suggests the North Carolina experience does not rest
alone, as detailed below.330
F.

It’s Not Just North Carolina—A South Carolina Inquiry

One of the diﬃcult parts of studying low-level state courts is that local
legal culture is diﬀerent in each state. While there are no extensive, recent
studies of magistrate courts in a large number of other states,331 a recent
study of South Carolina’s magistrate court system found similar concerns
to those raised in our North Carolina case study—and some even more
troubling concerns. ProPublica, together with The Post and Courier
(collectively “the investigators”), conducted this investigation into
magistrates in South Carolina, a state which also utilizes magistrate judges
without a J.D. requirement in lower-level courts.332 Similar to North
327. Telephone Interview with Magistrate B, supra note 287.
328. Id.
329. Greene and Guy-Uriel Charles have begun to design such a study, which will
systematically study a number of diﬀerent actors involved in lower-level state court systems
in the United States.
330. See, e.g., Neal, supra note 4, at 729–30 (detailing similar issues within the West
Virginia court system).
332. In 2006, after conducting a one-year investigation, the New York Times published an
extensive story about New York’s 1,250 town and village courts, otherwise known as justice
courts. The Times found that three-quarters of judges on these courts were not lawyers and
many had a limited education (several with only high school diplomas). The story
documented egregious violations of legal rights in these courts, as well as overt racism and
sexism by the judges. While the article is sixteen years old and we are unsure if there have
been subsequent reforms since publication, it is further evidence that the problems
associated with lay judging extend well beyond North Carolina. William Glaberson, In Tiny
Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
332. S.C.
Bar,
Your
Guide
to
Magistrate’s
Court
4
(2016),
https://www.scbar.org/media/filer_public/9c/29/9c290707-9ﬀ2-4780-a78e6928b9f57a22/magistrate_court_guide_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B29U-9743]
(detailing the scope of a magistrate’s responsibilities, including conducing civil hearings in
landlord–tenant disputes).
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Carolina, “[t]hese courtrooms, the busiest in the state, dispose of
hundreds of misdemeanor criminal cases and civil disputes each year.”333
Also, like North Carolina, magistrates in South Carolina are appointed
through a political process, emphasizing connections rather than
credentials.334 Magistrates in South Carolina, three-quarters of whom do
not have law degrees, come from a variety of professions such as
construction workers, pharmacists, and insurance agents, and they receive
minimal training.335
The investigation found instances of “serious judicial errors or
misconduct in thirty of the state’s forty-six counties.”336 Over the past two
decades, the investigation found magistrates have “accepted bribes,”
“flubbed trials,” and “mishandled even the most basic elements” of the
criminal cases before them.337 The investigative project developed a profile
of all 319 South Carolina magistrates, and the results show that more than
a dozen of the sitting magistrates had been disciplined for misconduct.338
Further, since 2005 there had been over thirty magistrates from South
Carolina that were reprimanded, suspended, or removed entirely.339
However, magistrates are not required to disclose their oﬀenses when
seeking a new term, and few do so.340 This has resulted in many magistrates
with misconduct oﬀenses on their records nonetheless being reappointed
for additional terms.341
The investigation focused primarily on criminal matters handled by
magistrates, and the oﬀenses documented by the investigators were
troubling. South Carolina allows magistrates to hear misdemeanor cases,
and in one case, a magistrate did not ask a defendant whether she wanted
an attorney appointed, even though she was entitled to one (the ACLU
has filed a suit, arguing this violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights).342 The judge also did not allow the defendant to defend herself,
another violation of the defendant’s rights.343 This oﬀense appears to stem
from a lack of legal knowledge—others are simply corrupt.

333. Joseph Cranney, These Judges Can Have Less Training Than Barbers but Still
Decide Thousands of Cases Each Year, ProPublica (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/these-judges-can-have-less-training-than-barbers-butstill-decide-thousands-of-cases-each-year [https://perma.cc/44VS-BW5M].
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. (detailing how the South Carolina Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Oﬃce has
commented that it is keeping a close eye on the state’s magistrates).
341. Id. (noting how this gap in the law has allowed magistrates who have abused their
position to continue on in their career).
342. Id.
343. See id. (“In an April 12, 2016, hearing, Brown tried explaining her situation to
Adams, but the judge cut her oﬀ in an exchange captured by courtroom microphones.”).
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For example, the investigators found that one magistrate was accused
of forging a title to a Rolls Royce for a fellow judge, and another once
threatened to beat up a defendant who had questioned his veracity in
court.344 The situation in South Carolina was dire enough that from 2014
to 2015, a team of attorneys from the ACLU and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers observed cases in South Carolina’s local
courts.345 They reported that “magistrates blocked people’s right to
counsel and shuttled unwitting defendants through an assembly line of
guilty pleas.”346
The investigation also detailed many other problems with the
magistrate process similar to those we found in North Carolina. First, the
appointment of magistrates is largely determined by political connections
rather than qualifications. State senators control the process and have
“stocked the courts with friends, political allies and legal novices.”347 The
investigators noted that the state’s criminal codes have grown increasingly
complex, yet the magistrate system has not adjusted in light of the increased complexity. Another problem, similar to North Carolina, is the
lack of training for magistrates. As the investigators said, “Once selected,
[magistrates] undergo fewer hours of mandated training than the
Palmetto State requires of its barbers, masseuses and nail salon
technicians.”348 One of the requirements for South Carolina magistrates is
for them to pass a competency exam. The exam requires a sixth-grade
reading level and a basic knowledge of mathematics, how to tell time, and
days of the week.349 The investigators found that out of a sample of thirtyone sitting magistrates, three took the test multiple times in order to
pass,350 and separately, another four also required multiple attempts.351
The investigators noted there may be more magistrates who required
multiple attempts, but this information was not released to them.
CONCLUSION
The historical arguments for lay judges are out of touch with current
reality, but they can and do serve as a convenient cover for the need to
transform lower-level courts in order to promote legitimacy, fairness, and
equality. The intention of the existing system in many states does not
appear to be legitimacy, fairness, or equality. Instead, poor people’s
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.; see also S.C. App. Ct. R. 510(b)(1).
350. Cranney, supra note 333.
351. See id. (citing Michael Smith, Doubts Cast on Transparency and Legality of
Magistrate Selection Process, The Voice of Blythewood & Fairfield Cnty. (June 13, 2019),
https://www.blythewoodonline.com/2019/06/doubts-cast-on-transparency-and-legality-ofmagistrate-selection-process/ [https://perma.cc/WF9D-WD8H]).
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problems are simply dismissed, deemed unimportant and unworthy of
legal expertise. The two-tiered court system has persisted for long enough
that any expectation of equality has been essentially forgotten.
Justifications, such as a lack of funding, start to seem reasonable, with
inequalities between diﬀerent types of courts largely forgotten.
To be clear, the purpose of this Essay is not to provide an empirical
assessment of adjudicative outcomes of lay judges as compared to lawyerjudges, and the Essay does not provide the data to support such an assessment.352 Instead, this Essay argues that the message states are sending by
allowing lay judging in low-level state courts—the very courts that poor
people, who are disproportionately people of color, are most likely to interact with353—is one of disregard, unimportance, and blame. There is a
sense, as there has been throughout history, that poor people’s problems
are problems of their own making, and thus true investment in such problems is not the responsibility of the State.354 Instead, the State does the
minimum necessary to mechanically process and dispose of such problems.355
Shifting the cultural norms and conversation around the problems of
the poor is of course not easy. Calling attention to the problems of lowerlevel courts generally,356 and in the case of this Essay specifically the
problem of lay judging, can lead to a resurgence of conversation around
this issue—an important first step.
But taking a broader view, how we staﬀ magistrate-led courts (and
their equivalent) needs to be rethought. As the case study of North
Carolina showed, currently many lay magistrates come from law enforcement and probation, careers that (by design) at times treat citizens they
interact with in an adversarial way. These norms may pervade how magistrates then act on the bench. Part of the problem with the lay magistrate
system is that there is a pretense of an impartial, formal, and rule-bound
system of justice. Yet lay judges are not schooled in that system of law. Litigants are left to experience a courtroom of supposed “law,” but they do
not actually experience the law. Instead, they experience a courtroom in
which often no one, not even the judge, is aware of the law, or the one
352. The authors believe that this question and others, such as how litigants experience
lay-judge courtrooms versus lawyer-judge courtrooms, are important and ripe for further
empirical study. Indeed, as noted in supra note 329, Greene is undertaking such a study
with Professor Guy-Uriel Charles.
353. See supra note 2.
354. See supra note 232.
355. See generally Desmond, supra note 141, at 304 (“The principle of due process has
been replaced by mere process: pushing cases through . . . . Every housing court would need
to be adequately funded so that it could function like a court, instead of an eviction assembly
line: stamp, stamp, stamp.”); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 184 (detailing the recent financial
troubles of state courts and detailing how the system fails to serve those that frequent it).
356. Columbia Law Review’s 2022 Symposium “The Other 98%: Racial, Gender, and
Economic Injustice in State Civil Courts” is an important contribution to raising awareness
of these problems.
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person in the courtroom who is aware of the law is the attorney for the more
powerful party (such as a landlord).
This system cannot and should not persist. There needs to be an
increased focus on who staffs low-level state court judgeships and what type of
training they receive. Creative solutions to consider how states might attract a
particularly qualified new crop of judges who could best serve the needs of
the poor are needed.357 One idea is for law schools to invest in joint social
work and J.D. programs, which may spur interest and increase the availability
of law graduates uniquely trained to work within the social contexts of lowlevel state courts. In order to incentivize enrollment in such programs (and
graduates choosing state court work), a state court job corps program could
be created at the federal level. Such a program could provide funding,
training, and housing, among other resources, to participants who agree to
work in certain types of state courts throughout the country.358 Of course, for
357. Other solutions also may help relieve some of the problems of lay judging. For
example, Professors Shanahan and Carpenter have argued that many of the problems state
courts hear may be better addressed in a more holistic, social service, problem-solving way
(through both increased funding to solve problems of poverty outside of courthouses and
through a more problem-solving approach within courthouses). See Colleen F. Shanahan
& Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 Daedalus 128, 132–34
(2019). Professor Steinberg has argued that adopting a problem-solving framework on the
civil side may help combat many of the inequities seen in low-level civil courts. See Jessica
K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1579, 1581–82
(2018). But all of these problem-solving focused solutions depend on the availability of
qualified judges and that is what our solution is aimed at addressing. Another potential
solution may involve videoconferencing, which the COVID-19 pandemic brought into the
mainstream for courts. See, e.g., The Pew Charitable Trs., How Courts Embraced
Technology, Met the Pandemic Challenge, and Revolutionized Their Operations 7–9
(2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2021/12/how-courts-embracedtechnology.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA4B-BDXG] (detailing how the adoption of
technology and other remote digital tools in civil courts during the pandemic significantly
improved access to courts for thousands of litigants); Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark,
Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, COVID, Crisis, and Courts, 99 Tex. L. Rev. Online
10, 17 (2020) (arguing that the nimbleness state courts displayed during the COVID-19
pandemic can be used to innovate in the long term).
358. South Dakota has piloted a program that seeks to incentivize more law graduates
to practice in rural areas (with populations below 10,000). The program pays lawyers
$13,000 on top of their salaries if they practice in such areas. The funding for the program
is split between local governments, the South Dakota Bar Foundation, and the state. As of
2019, twenty-four lawyers were involved with the program. April Simpson, Wanted: Lawyers
for
Rural
America,
The
Pew
Charitable
Trs.
(June
26,
2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/06/26/wantedlawyers-for-rural-america [https://perma.cc/5T7C-GSE2]. The problem of the dearth of lawyers
available in rural areas has been well-documented by others. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda
L. Kool, Lauren Sudeall, Michele Statz, Danielle M. Conway & Hannah Haksgaard, Legal
Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 15,
120–28 (2018) (detailing the problems many states have in providing attorneys to poor
litigants due to the lack of attorneys in rural areas and discussing potential solutions); Lisa
R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59
S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2014) (discussing the lack of rural attorneys across America and South
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there to be the will to fund such programs,359 there needs to be a better
understanding among state and federal policymakers about how low-level
states courts fit into the broader historical story of neglecting institutions
that serve the poor. We need to acknowledge how that neglect has led to
inequities in the legal system and the perpetuation of inequality in our
justice system.
Ultimately, if change can be made in the court system, perhaps that
reform can be an important step in tackling, more broadly, the structures
and institutions in our society that promote inequality.

Dakota in particular, describing the challenges rural attorneys face, and examining existing
and potential programs to increase access to justice in rural communities). To the extent
that lay judging is more common in rural areas, a focus on location may be necessary. Our
proposal, however, focuses on staﬃng all low-level court positions with qualified individuals,
irrespective of whether the positions are in rural areas. The salaries of all magistrates in, for
example, North Carolina are low, no matter the population of the county. See supra section
III.B.
359. Others have advocated for general federal funding of state courts as a means to
generally relieve state court budgets. See Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual
Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1831,
1866–67 (2016); Zambrano, supra note 61, at 2189 (“Increased federal funding for state
courts may help remedy the overburdened and underfunded nature of state judiciaries.”).
While federal money funds hundreds of millions of dollars toward state criminal justice
programs each year, money for state court civil justice improvement is limited to roughly $5
million per year—an almost undetectable amount when it is split between states. WilfTownsend, supra note 184. The program we suggest would provide specific funding to
attract lawyers to judgeships that are often hard to fill due to salary, location, or both.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: STATES THAT ALLOW NON-J.D.S TO SERVE
AS JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Amount in
Controversy
Cutoﬀ?

Jurisdiction

District Court Magistrate Jurisdiction:360
• Issue arrest warrants and set bail in
accordance with the discretionary bail
schedule
• Receive guilty pleas in minor
misdemeanors (where there is a fines
schedule)

Alabama
N/A

Probate Court Jurisdiction:361
• Probate of wills
• Grant, administration, and repeal or
revocation of letters testamentary
• All controversies in relation to the right
of executorship or of administration
• Settlement of accounts of executors and
administrators
• Sale and disposition of the real and
personal property belonging to and the
distribution of intestate’s estates
• Appointment and removal of guardians
for minors and persons of unsound mind
• All controversies as to the right of
guardianship and the settlement of
guardians’ accounts
• Allotment of dower in land in the cases
provided by law

Prerequisites, Initial
Training, and Continuing
Education Requirements
District Court Magistrate
Training:362
• Must enroll in a
magistrates’ orientation
and certification program
approved by the
Administrative Oﬃce of
Courts within twelve
months of taking oﬃce
Probate Judge
Prerequisites:363
• Citizen of Alabama
• Resided in county for one
year preceding election or
appointment
Probate Training and
Continuing Education
Requirements:364
• Six-hour orientation
program for new probate
judges in first twelve
months in oﬃce
• Twelve credits in approved
judicial education each
calendar year thereafter365

360. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18; see also Ala. Code § 12-17-251 (2021).
361. Ala. Code § 12-13-1.
362. Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 18.
363. Ala. Code § 12-13-31; see also Alabama Appellate Courts, Ala. Jud. Sys.,
https://judicial.alabama.gov/Appellate/JudgeQualification
[https://perma.cc/N97FQLTC] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022) (“All justices and judges, with the exception of judges of
the probate courts, must be licensed to practice law in the state of Alabama.”).
364. Ala. Mandatory Jud. Educ. R. 4(2)(b) (“Judicial-education credits shall be earned
by attending conferences or courses approved by or oﬀered through the ALI, the APJA, and
the National Probate Judges Association (‘the NPJA’). Each calendar year, all probate judges
must earn a minimum of six judicial-education credits at courses oﬀered by the ALI.”).
365. Ala. Mandatory Jud. Educ. R. 4(2)(b)–(c) (“When a probate judge earns more
than 12 judicial-education credits in a year, a maximum of 8 of those credits may be carried
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Alabama (cont.)
• Partition of lands within their counties
• Chief election oﬃcial of their counties
• May issue show cause orders and
attachment for contempts oﬀered to the
court or its process by any executor,
administrator, guardian, or other person
and may punish the person by a
maximum fine of $20 and/or
imprisonment for at most twenty-four
hours366
Alaska
Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:367
$10,000369
• Issue a protective order in cases involving
domestic violence or stalking
• Review the revocation or refusal to issue
a driver’s license
• Referee all actions referred to the
magistrate with powers over contempts,
bench warrants, and witnesses
Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:368
• Issue writs of habeas corpus
• Issue warrants of arrest, summons, and
search warrants
• Set, receive, and forfeit bail
• Order temporary detention of a minor

Magistrate Prerequisites:370
• Citizen of the United
States
• At least twenty-one years
old
• Resident of Alaska for at
least six months
immediately preceding
appointment
Training and Continuing
Education Requirements:371
• Initial training and
ongoing education are not
specified in statute
• There is a training judge
assigned to each district to
inspect, train, and report
on the magistrates372

forward and applied toward that probate judge’s judicial-education requirements for the
following year.”).
366. Id. § 12-13-9. Where a probate judge is a licensed attorney in Alabama, the power
to punish for civil contempt is equivalent to that of a circuit court judge. Id.
367. Alaska Stat. § 22.15.100 (2021); see also id. § 22.15.040 (small claims actions); id.
§ 22.15.110(a) (noting additional duties of magistrates). Graduation from an accredited law
school and active membership in the Alaska Bar Association are preferred but not required
for appointment as a magistrate. Alaska Court System Class Specification: Magistrate Judge
IV,
Alaska
Ct.
Sys.,
https://courts.alaska.gov/hr/classspecs/4106.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LVF8-A9EW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
368. Alaska Stat. § 22.15.100. Magistrates may give judgment without action upon the
confession of the defendant during misdemeanor criminal proceedings; hear, try, and enter
judgment upon agreement in writing by the defendant for misdemeanors that are not minor
oﬀenses, and provide post-conviction relief in specified cases. Id. § 22.15.120(a). A minor
oﬀense is a statutory oﬀense which cannot result in incarceration, loss of a valuable license,
or a fine greater than $300; an oﬀense classified as an infraction or violation; or an oﬀense
for which a bail forfeiture amount is authorized by statute and established by the supreme
court. Id. § 22.15.120(c).
369. Id. § 22.15.120.
370. Id. § 22.15.160(b). Notably, district judges need not have a J.D. either. After seven
years, a magistrate is eligible for appointment to a district judge position. Id. § 22.15.160(a).
371. See id. § 22.15.160; see also Alaska R. of Admin. 19.2 (2017).
372. Alaska R. of Admin. 33.
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Arizona
Justice Court Civil Jurisdiction:373
$10,000376
• All civil actions when amount in
controversy does not exceed $10,000
(including forcible entry and detainer)
• Forcible entry
• Hear civil traﬃc, domestic violence, and
harassment cases
• Issue orders of protection and injunctions
prohibiting harassment
Justice Court Criminal Jurisdiction:374
• Petty oﬀenses, misdemeanors, and
criminal oﬀenses punishable by fines not
exceeding $2,500 and/or imprisonment in
county jail not exceeding six months
• Assault or battery
• Felonies only for purposes of issuing
warrants and conducting preliminary
hearings
Municipal Court Jurisdiction:375
• Municipal court judges hear civil traﬃc
cases, violations of city ordinances and
codes, and issue search warrants
• Municipal court judges hear misdemeanor
criminal traﬃc oﬀenses where no serious
injuries occur and issue search warrants
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Justice of the Peace
Prerequisites:377
• At least eighteen years old
• Resident of Arizona
• Qualified voter in precinct
where duties are
performed
• Read and write English
Municipal Court Judge
Prerequisites:378
• Qualifications established
on a local basis by city
charters or ordinances
Training Requirements:379
• All full-time judges
required to complete at
least sixteen credit hours
of judicial education
including:
o Ethics
o Computer and
network security
o Live training

373. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 22-201 (2021). In Arizona, “magistrate” refers to any court oﬃcer
with the power to issue a warrant for arrest of individuals charged with a public oﬀense and
includes “justices of the supreme court, judges of the superior court, judges of the court of
appeals, justices of the peace and judges of a municipal court.” Id. § 1-215(18).
374. Id. § 22-301.
375. Municipal court judges do not hear civil lawsuits. Limited Jurisdiction Courts, Ariz.
Sup.
Ct.,
https://www.azcourts.gov/guidetoazcourts/Limited-Jurisdiction-Courts
[https://perma.cc/C8PU-WEJ8] [hereinafter Ariz. Limited Jurisdiction Courts] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
376. Id. § 22-201. The Arizona judicial system also includes a small claims division which
has concurrent jurisdiction with the justice court in specified matters where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $3,500. Id. § 22-503. In landlord–tenant disputes, justice courts
have no jurisdiction over disputes involving greater than $10,000 and also lack jurisdiction
in matters regarding title to (as opposed to possession of) real property. For disputes
involving damages between $5,000 and $10,000, jurisdiction is concurrent with superior
courts, see Ariz. Limited Jurisdiction Courts, supra note 375.
377. Ariz. Limited Jurisdiction Courts, supra note 375.
378. Id. Some cities do not require municipal court judges to be attorneys. Id.
379. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1-302.
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Colorado
(Small) County Court Civil Judges:380
$25,000383
• Concurrent jurisdiction with district courts
in civil actions, including:
o Actions to foreclose liens
o Cases seeking rent or damages for
injury to property and unlawful
detention
o Petitions for change of name
o Temporary and permanent civil
restraining orders
• Original jurisdiction in hearings
concerning the impoundment of motor
vehicles
(Small) County Court Criminal Judges:381
• Concurrent jurisdiction in criminal
matters in:
o Misdemeanors and petty oﬀenses
(other than those involving children)
o Issuing warrants and bindover orders
o Conducting preliminary examinations
and dispositional hearings
o Admitting bail in felonies and
misdemeanors

[Vol. 122:1287

Smaller County and
Municipal Judge
Requirements:384
• High school graduate or
equivalent
• Some counties require a
judge to be a qualified
elector of the municipality
or county in which the
judge presides
Training Requirements:385
• County judges not
admitted to the practice of
law must attend an
institute on the duties and
functions of the court

Municipal Court Judges:
• Jurisdiction over municipal ordinance
violations only382

380. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-104 (2021).
381. Id. § 13-6-106.
382. Id. § 13-10-104.
383. Id. § 13-6-104(2).
384. Id. § 13-6-203(4). In Class C and D counties only, county judges may be appointed
with a high school equivalency and without license to practice law in Colorado. Id. But
preference is to be given to the appointment of a municipal judge who is licensed to practice
law in Colorado or trained in the law. Id. § 13-10-106(2).
385. Id. § 13-6-203(5). The obligation to attend an institute for judicial training may be
waived by the state supreme court. Id.
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Delaware
Justice of the Peace Civil Jurisdiction:386
$25,000394
• Contractual disputes
• Replevin actions
• Negligence cases (not involving physical
injury)
• Landlord–tenant cases387
Justice of the Peace Criminal Jurisdiction:388
• All criminal misdemeanor cases unless
specifically excluded by law389
• Most traﬃc oﬀenses not involving physical
injury or death390
• Violations of any “ordinance, code or
regulation of the governments of their
respective counties and municipalities”391
• Truancy cases392
• For all criminal oﬀenses:393
o Issue summonses and search warrants,
based upon finding of probable cause,
and issue and execute capiases
o Conduct initial appearances to set
bond and bond review hearings
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Justice of the Peace Eligibility
Requirements:395
• Resident of Delaware
• At least twenty-five years
old
• Resides in county in which
the justice of the peace
serves
Justice of the Peace Training
and Education
Requirements:396
• Basic legal education
program
• Minimum of thirty hours
of actual instruction in
approved continuing legal
education over each twoyear period of service,
including at least two
hours of instruction on
judicial or legal ethics

386. In Delaware, Justices of the Peace are also called “magistrates.” Magistrate
Screening, Delaware.gov: Div. of Prof. Reg., https://dpr.delaware.gov/boards/magistrate/
[https://perma.cc/T8ZA-B583] (last visited Mar. 2, 2022). Jurisdiction extends only where
amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000. Del. Code tit. 10, § 9301 (2021).
387. Jurisdiction in landlord–tenant cases includes summary proceedings for possession
for which jury trials are authorized and appeals to special courts consisting of a three-judge
panel.
Justice
of
the
Peace
Court:
Jurisdiction,
Del.
Cts.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/jpcourt/jurisdiction.aspx [https://perma.cc/NWY3-U88A]
[hereinafter Del. Justice of the Peace Court: Jurisdiction] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
388. Id.
389. The Delaware Code provides: “The Justice of the Peace Court shall have original
jurisdiction to hear, try and finally determine all misdemeanors created in Chapter 5 of this
title, and any attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit such misdemeanors unless such
jurisdiction is excluded by subsection (b) of this section or is otherwise excluded by law.”
Del. Code tit. 11, § 2702.
390. Del. Justice of the Peace Court: Jurisdiction, supra note 387.
391. Del. Code tit. 11, § 5917.
392. Id. tit. 14, § 2733; see also id. tit. 10, § 921 (“Justice of the Peace Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over truancy matters . . . .”). In other cases, Justices of the
Peace have only limited jurisdiction over juvenile oﬀenses. Del. Justice of the Peace Court:
Jurisdiction, supra note 387.
393. Del. Justice of the Peace Court: Jurisdiction, supra note 387 (noting that capiases
are bench or arrest warrants issued by a judge for a defendant who has failed to appear for
arraignment, trial, or sentencing or who has failed to pay a court-ordered fine).
394. Del. Code tit. 10, § 9301.
395. Magistrates need not know the law, and the Delaware magistrate screening
examinations do not include questions on Delaware law. Magistrate Screening Committee,
Del. Cts., https://courts.delaware.gov/jpcourt/screening.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XXDD3ZW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) (“Legal knowledge is not tested.”); see also Del. Code tit.
10, § 9206 (stating that judges must reside in county in which the justice of the peace sits).
396. Del. Just. Peace Ct. Civ. R. 108.
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Magistrate Court Jurisdiction:397
• Civil claims including garnishment and
attachment, unless exclusive
jurisdiction vested in superior court
• Issuing arrest and search warrants
• Issuing subpoenas to compel
attendance of witnesses and for the
production of documentary evidence
before the magistrate court
• Holding of courts of inquiry
• Violations of “county ordinances and
penal ordinances of state authorities”
• Punishment of contempt with fines not
greater than $200 and/or
imprisonment not exceeding ten days
• Granting bail, unless power to do so is
“exclusively committed to some other
court or oﬃcer”
• Foreclosure of liens on abandoned
mobile homes and animals
• Trial and sentencing of misdemeanor
violations in certain cases concerning
marijuana possession, shoplifting,
alcohol violations relating to minors,
and criminal trespass398

Georgia
$15,000399
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Magistrate Eligibility:400
• Citizen of the United States
• Resident of the county in
which the individual seeks
the oﬃce of judge of the
probate court for at least two
years prior to qualifying for
election and throughout
term of oﬃce
• Registered voter
• At least twenty-five years old
• High school graduate or
equivalent
Magistrate Judge Training
Requirements:401
• Complete eighty hours of
training specified by the
Georgia Magistrate Courts
Training Council
“concerning the
performance of his or her
duties” within two years of
becoming a magistrate402
• Complete “a program of
orientation activities”
supervised by an experienced
magistrate or judge within
the first year of oﬃce
• Complete a minimum
number of continuing
education training hours
annually after the first year of
service as a magistrate

397. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-10-2 (2021).
398. Id. § 15-10-260. Jurisdiction only exists where the misdemeanor violation occurred
in the “unincorporated area of the county” in which the magistrate sits and where the
defendant has “waive[d] in writing a trial by jury.” Id. §§ 15-10-260, -261.
399. Id. § 15-10-2.
400. Id. § 15-10-22 (“Additional qualifications for the oﬃce of chief magistrate or
magistrate or both may be imposed by local law.”).
401. Id. § 15-10-137.
402. Any magistrate who is also an active member of the State Bar of Georgia is not
required to complete these eighty hours of training as a condition to certification for oﬃce.
Id. § 15-10-137(d).
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Georgia (cont.)
Probate Court Judge Civil Jurisdiction:403
• Probate of wills
• Administration of estates
• Traﬃc cases
• Appointment of guardians and
conservators of minors and
incapacitated adults
Probate Court Judge Criminal
Jurisdiction:404
• Violations of game and fish laws
• Criminal commitment hearings
• Miscellaneous misdemeanors
• Traﬃc and truancy in some counties
• Holding of courts of inquiry
• Issuance of search and arrest warrants
in some cases
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Probate Court Judge
Eligibility:405
• Same qualifications as
magistrates
• Must never have been
convicted of “a felony
oﬀense or any oﬀense
involving moral turpitude”
contrary to federal law or the
laws of any state
Probate Judge Training
Requirements:406
• New judge orientation
training course and yearly
additional training
prescribed by the Probate
Judges Training Council and
the Institute of Continuing
Judicial Education of
Georgia

403. Id. § 15-9-30.
404. Id.; see also id. §§ 17-7-20, 17-7-72, 17-10-3.
405. In counties with populations greater than 90,000, no person can be appointed as a
probate court judge unless that person has been admitted to practice law for seven years
preceding the election, is “a member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia,” and
is at least thirty years of age. Id. § 15-9-4. Notwithstanding these requirements, probate court
judges “holding such oﬃce on or after June 30, 2000, shall continue to hold such oﬃce and
shall be allowed to seek reelection for such oﬃce.” Id.
406. Id. § 15-9-1.1.
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District Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:407
• All civil actions (concurrent with
district judges), unless explicitly
excluded
• Uncontested actions for divorce
District Magistrate Criminal
Jurisdiction:408
• Violations of state laws or rules and
regulations adopted thereunder
• Cigarette or tobacco infractions or
misdemeanors
• Felony first appearance hearings,
preliminary examination of felony
charges, and misdemeanor or felony
arraignments
Municipal Jurisdiction:409
• Jurisdiction over violations of city
ordinances410
• Administration of matters relating to
sentencing, parole, and release on
probation

Kansas
$10,000411
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District Magistrate and Municipal
Judge Eligibility:412
• High school or secondary
school graduate or equivalent
• Resident of the county “for
which elected or appointed to
serve at the time of taking the
oath of oﬃce and shall
maintain residency in the
county while holding oﬃce”
• Either admitted to practice
law in Kansas, or certified by
the Supreme Court as
qualified to serve as a district
magistrate judge or municipal
judge413
District Magistrate and Municipal
Judge Training and Continuing
Education:
• Thirteen hours of continuing
judicial education credit each
calendar year, including a
minimum of two hours
accredited for judicial ethics
credit414

407. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-302b (West 2021) (stating that district magistrates have no
jurisdiction over the following actions: against state oﬃcers, contested divorce and custody
of minor children, habeas corpus, receiverships, declaratory judgments, mandamus and quo
warranto, injunctions, class actions, and certain real estate actions).
408. Id.
409. Id. § 12-4104.
410. Municipal judges have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide cases concerning
ordinance violations with the same elements of enumerated state statutes, which would
constitute and be punished as a felony if charged in district court: (1) driving under the
influence; (2) domestic battery; (3) theft; (4) writing a worthless check; and (5) marijuana
possession. Id.
411. Applies as to the jurisdiction of district magistrate judges. Id. § 20-302b.
412. Id. § 20-334 (district magistrate judge qualifications); id. § 12-4105 (municipal
judge qualifications).
413. A district magistrate judge, who has not been regularly admitted to practice law in
Kansas, will be granted a temporary certification to hold a temporary certificate permitting
them to hold oﬃce, conditioned that such district magistrate passes an exam to ensure the
judge “possesses the minimum skills and knowledge necessary to carry out the duties of such
oﬃce” within eighteen months of the date that judge takes oﬃce. Id. § 20-337 (district
magistrate judge alternative to licensed attorney requirement); id. § 12-4114 (municipal
judge alternative to licensed attorney requirement). However, in “first class” cities, a
municipal judge must be an attorney regularly admitted to practice law in the state of
Kansas. Id.
414. Kan. Ct. R. 501 (requiring continuing judicial education for appellate and district
judges). Municipal court judges who are also district magistrate judges are governed by Rule
501. Kan. Ct. R. 502(a)(1). Municipal court judges who are not licensed to practice law are
governed by the same annual continuing education requirement to complete thirteen
credit hours (including two credit hours of judicial ethics). Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 502(a)(2).
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Louisiana
Justice of the Peace Civil Jurisdiction:415
$5,000417
• Concurrent jurisdiction with parish or
district courts in certain civil matters,
including suits:
o Over the ownership or possession of
movable property, of a
manufactured home not exceeding
$5,000 in value416
o By landowners or lessors for the
eviction of occupants or tenants of:
§ Leased commercial premises or
farmlands, where monthly rent
does not exceed $5,000
§ Leased residential premises,
“regardless of the amount of
monthly or yearly rent or the
rent for the unexpired term of
the lease”
• Original jurisdiction over the
enforcement and collection of
garnishments, debtor examinations, and
the issuance of writs to enforce its
judgments
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Justice of the Peace and
Constable Eligibility:418
• “Good moral character”
• Qualified elector419
• Resident of “the ward and
district from which elected”
• English literacy
• High school or secondary
school graduate or
equivalent
Justice of the Peace and
Constable Training and
Continuing Education:420
• Attend the first Justice of the
Peace training course
available after appointment
• Attend the training course
once every two years
thereafter

415. La. Stat. Ann. § 13:2586 (2021). Local ordinances in certain parishes expand or
contract the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts. See id. A justice of the peace court
has jurisdiction over actions where “a title to real estate is involved, when the state or any
political subdivision is a defendant, or in successions or probate matters.” JP-C Duties and
Requirements, Att’y Gen. Jeﬀ Landry: La. DOJ, https://www.ag.state.la.us/Article/178/
[https://perma.cc/T265-EGQY] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
416. La. Stat. Ann. § 13:2586; La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 4911–4912 (2021). The
jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court is limited by the amount in controversy and the
nature of the proceeding and does not extend to actions involving: title to immovable
property; civil or political rights arising under the federal or state constitutions; annulment,
divorce, separation, child support, or child custody; “adoption, tutorship, emancipation, or
partition proceeding”; a “succession, interdiction, receivership, liquidation, habeas corpus,
or quo warranto proceeding”; cases against state or local government, or other political
corporations; executory proceedings; nor an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding. La. Code
Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 4913.
417. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 4911.
418. La. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:2582–:2583.
419. Constables must be an “elector and resident of the ward or district from which
elected.” Id. § 13:2583.
420. Id. § 49:251.1.
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Louisiana (cont.)
Justice of the Peace Criminal Jurisdiction: 421
• Criminal jurisdiction as magistrates
within parish that the justice of the peace
holds oﬃce
• Power to bail or discharge in noncapital
cases
• Concurrent jurisdiction with district
court over state and local ordinances
concerning the prosecution of litter
violations422 and of “removal, disposition,
or abandonment” violations423
Constable Powers and Duties:424
• Carry out the orders of, and serve
citations ordered by, the Justice of the
Peace Court
• Enforce evictions and garnishments
ordered by the Justice of the Peace Court
Maryland
Orphans’ Court Jurisdiction:
N/A
• Power to “secure the rights of a minor
whose estate is being administered by a
guardian under its jurisdiction”425

Orphans’ Court Judge
Eligibility:426
• Citizen of Maryland
• Residency in the jurisdiction
where the judge sites for
twelve months preceding
taking oﬃce
Orphans’ Court Judge Training
and Continuing Education:427
• Attend an orientation
program for new Orphans’
Court judges
• Register for and attend
annually one or more
courses with an aggregate
scheduled length of twelve
hours

421. La. Stat. Ann. § 13:2586.
422. Id. § 13:2587.1.
423. Id. § 13:2586.
424. Id. § 13:2154.
425. Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-106, 2-101 to -105 (West 2021). Jurisdiction
exists only where expressly conferred by law, according to which orphans’ courts are
authorized to: conduct judicial probate; direct a personal representative; summon witnesses;
and issue orders necessary in the administration of a decedent’s estate or trust. Id.
426. Frequently Asked Questions, Maryland Courts: Maryland Orphans’ Court,
https://mdcourts.gov/orphanscourt/faqs [https://perma.cc/6TZ8-43GC] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
427. Administrative Order on Continuing Education of Judges, Magistrates, and
Commissioners (Md. Ct. App. June 6, 2016), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20160606continuingedofjudgesmagistratescommissioners.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PBW-ABJ7].
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Clerk-Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:428
• Grant uncontested continuances
• Hear and rule on uncontested
nonevidentiary motions
• Gauge trial readiness and set trial
date via pretrial conferences
• Mediate actions
• Receive citations and hold hearings
related to the operation of vehicles
by nonresidents, vehicle registrations,
and license suspensions and
revocations429
• Receive petitions and review orders
relating to nuisance and dangerous
dogs430
• Small claims court431
Clerk-Magistrate Criminal
Jurisdiction:432
• Issue warrants, search warrants, and
summonses433
• Hold preliminary hearings to
determine probation violations
• Set bail on arraignments when a
justice is unavailable
• Determine probable cause for
detention after a warrantless arrest
via ex parte proceedings434
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Massachusetts
Claim
Clerk-Magistrate Eligibility:436
Depend
• Resident of Massachusetts
-ent435
• Citizen of the United States
• Education:
(1) Graduate of an accredited
undergraduate institution; or
(2) Demonstrate fifteen years of
experience in the court applied
for or comparable court
• Experience:
(1) Membership in the Massachusetts
Bar for at least three years
preceding application; or
(2) Nonattorney applicants must
have at least five years of
experience in the court applied
for or comparable court, or five
years of otherwise “relevant
experience”
Training and Continuing Education
Requirements:437
• Initial training and ongoing
education are not specified in statute
• Receive trainings from the Trial
Court’s Judicial Institute and
Association of Magistrates and
Assistant Clerks of the Trial Courts of
Massachusetts438

428. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, § 62C (West 2021).
429. Id. ch. 90, § 3.
430. Id. ch. 140, § 157.
431. See id. ch. 218, §§ 21–25.
432. Clerk-magistrates are distinct from “special magistrates.” Special magistrates have
broader criminal jurisdiction with authority to assign counsel, preside at arraignments, mark
up pretrial motions, and perform some fact-finding. Mass. R. Crim. P. 47. Because of these
“quasi-judicial responsibilities,” special magistrates are meant to “be at the least attorneys
admitted to practice before the bar and preferably . . . be retired judges.” Id.
433. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 218, § 33.
434. See id. ch. 218, § 34; Mass. R. Crim. P. 3.1(b) (reporter’s notes).
435. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 218, § 21. Small claims jurisdiction extends over actions
arising in contract and tort (other than slander and libel) in which a plaintiﬀ claims $7,000
or less. Id. A city or town may bring an action to collect “unpaid taxes on personal property”
or an action “which shall not exceed $15,000.” Id. The jurisdictional amount does not apply
to actions for property damage caused by a motor vehicle. Id.
436. Mass. Exec. Order No. 558, § 2.2 (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.mass.gov/executiveorders/no-558-reconstituting-the-judicial-nominating-commission-and-establishing-a-code-ofconduct-for-commission-members-and-nominees-to-judicial-office
[https://perma.cc/2AK593RJ].
437. Id.
438. Anne Johnson Landry, The Appointment and Training of Clerk Magistrates and
Assistant Clerk Magistrates (Nov. 1, 2018), https://willbrownsberger.com/the-appointment-andtraining-of-clerk-magistrates-and-assistant-clerk-magistrates/ [https://perma.cc/K7UL-BFG4].
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Michigan
Nonattorney District Court Magistrate Civil
Jurisdiction:439
• In civil infraction actions: 440
o Hear and preside over admissions
o Conduct informal hearings
o Impose sanctions in traﬃc, municipal, and
state civil infractions
• Perform marriages441
• Suspend payment of court fees by indigent parties
in civil, small claims, or summary proceedings
actions, until after judgment has been entered442
• Administer oaths and aﬃrmations and take
acknowledgments in writing443
Nonattorney District Court Magistrates Criminal
Jurisdiction:444
• Conduct arraignments and sentence upon guilty
plea or nolo contendere for specified violations445
• Accept guilty or nolo contendere pleas and
impose sentences for misdemeanor or ordinance
violations punishable by only fines446
• Issue search and arrest warrants and summonses447
• Conduct probable cause conferences
• Fix bail and accept bond in all criminal cases
• Conduct first appearances of defendants in
criminal and ordinance violation cases448
• Approve and grant petitions for the appointment
of attorneys to represent indigent clients accused
of misdemeanors

N/A

[Vol. 122:1287
Nonattorney District Court
Magistrate Prerequisites:449
• Registered elector in
the county in which
appointed
• Take a “constitutional
oath of oﬃce and file a
bond with the treasurer
of a district funding
unit of that district in
an amount determined
by the state court
administrator”
Training and Continuing
Education Requirements:
• Initial training and ongoing education are not
specified450
• District court magistrate
cannot conduct an
informal hearing in a
civil infraction action
involving a traﬃc or
parking violation until
successful completion
of a special traﬃc law
adjudication training
course451

439. See Mich. Jud. Inst., District Court Magistrate Manual—Revised Edition (2022),
https://mjieducation.mi.gov/documents/benchbooks/421-dcmm/file
[https://perma.cc/5FT6-SYBH]; Mich. State Ct. Admin. Oﬀ., Model Local Administrative
Order 3a—Appointment of Non-Attorney Magistrate (2021). Although district court
magistrates are judicial oﬃcers and perform limited judicial functions, “they are not judges
for purposes of Const 1963, art 6, § 19 (requiring ‘judges of courts’ to be licensed
attorneys).” Mich. Jud. Inst., supra, at 2-16. A district court magistrate “may only exercise
the jurisdiction expressly provided by law and authorized by the chief judge of the district
or division.” Id. at 1-4; Mich. Ct. R. 4.401(B).
440. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.8512, .8719, .8819 (West 2021). A district court
magistrate may only conduct informal hearings involving traﬃc and parking civil infractions
upon successful completion of a “special training course in traﬃc law adjudication and
sanctions.” Id. § 600.8512(2).
441. Id. § 600.8516.
442. Id. § 600.8513(2)(b).
443. Id. § 600.8517.
444. See generally Mich. Jud. Inst., supra note 439 (describing the role).
445. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.8511(a)–(d).
446. Id. § 600.8512a(b).
447. Id. § 600.8511.
448. Id. § 600.8513.
449. Id. § 600.8507(1).
450. See id. § 600.8507; see also id. § 600.8512.
451. Id. § 600.8512(2).
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Justice Court Jurisdiction:452
• All civil actions small claims cases
involving amounts not exceeding
$3,500
• Misdemeanor criminal cases
• Certain traﬃc oﬀenses
• First appearance felony cases453
Municipal Court Jurisdiction:454
• Misdemeanor crimes
• Municipal ordinances and city traﬃc
violations
• Conduct “initial appearances in which
defendants are advised of the charges
being filed, as well as bond hearings
and preliminary hearings”455

Mississippi
$3,500456
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Justice Court Judge Eligibility:457
• High school graduate or equivalent
• Resident of county in which the justice
court judge serves for two years
preceding election to oﬃce
Justice Court Judge Training and
Continuing Education:
• Successfully complete, within six
months of election to oﬃce: a basic
course of “training and education
conducted by the Mississippi Judicial
College of the University of Mississippi
Law Center”; and “a minimum
competency examination administered
by the Mississippi Judicial College of
the University of Mississippi Law
Center”458
• Each year thereafter complete a course
of continuing education conducted by
the Mississippi Judicial College459
Municipal Court Judges Eligibility (in
municipalities with populations under
10,000):460
• Qualified elector of the county where
the municipality is located

452. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-11-9 (2021).
453. See, e.g., Justice Court, Adams Cnty. Miss., https://www.adamscountyms.net/justicecourt [https://perma.cc/MA2B-X6VV] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
454. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-23-3, -5, -7. Among other powers and duties, municipal court
judges have jurisdiction to: (1) hear and determine, without a jury or record of testimony,
all cases concerning violations of municipal ordinances, city traﬃc oﬀenses, and state
misdemeanors; (2) conduct preliminary hearings in all violations of Mississippi state
criminal laws occurring within the municipality over which the judge presides; and, in
certain circumstances, sentence defendant; (3) “solemnize marriages, take oaths, aﬃdavits
and acknowledgments, and issue orders, subpoenas, summonses, citations, warrants for
search and arrest upon a finding of probable cause”; and (4) expunge records in certain
cases of misdemeanors, where charges were dropped, or where the person was found not
guilty at trial. See id. § 21-23-7.
455. Municipal
Court,
State
of
Miss.
Judiciary,
https://courts.ms.gov/trialcourts/municipalcourt/municipalcourt.php
[https://perma.cc/NPF4-KRAF] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
456. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.
457. Miss. Const. art. VI, § 171 (West 2022); see also Miss. Jud. Coll. & Univ. of Miss.,
Manual for Mississippi Justice Courts 202l (2021), https://mjc.olemiss.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/134/2020/06/Manual-for-Mississippi-Justice-Courts-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJJ7-762K].
458. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-11-3. The basic “Justice Court Judge Training Course” consists
of eighty hours of training. Id. § 9-11-4.
459. Id. § 9-11-4. The “Continuing Education Course for Justice Court Judges” consists
of twenty-four hours of training. Id.
460. Id. §§ 21-23-3, -5. In general, justice court judges in counties with a population of
over 10,000 must be attorneys at law. Id.
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Municipal Judge:461
• Hear and determine violations of
municipal ordinances
• Issue warrants462
• Administer oaths, enforce orders, and
punish contempt to the same extent as
a circuit judge463
• Certain traﬃc oﬀenses464
• Grant and set conditions of parole or
probation465

Missouri
N/A

[Vol. 122:1287

Municipal Judge Eligibility (in
municipalities with populations
under 7,500):466
• Resident of Missouri467
• At least twenty-one years old and
younger than seventy-five years
old
Municipal Judge (Nonattorney)
Training and Continuing
Education:468
• Complete instructional course
prescribed by the Missouri
Supreme Court within six
months of selection for oﬃce
• Complete “New Municipal Judge
Orientation”469
• Annually earn and report fifteen
hours of continuing legal
education, including three credit
hours of Judicial Ethics and
Professionalism470

461. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 479.020(1) (West 2021).
462. Id. § 479.100.
463. Id. § 479.070.
464. See id. §§ 479.050, .172.
465. Id. § 479.190.
466. Id. § 479.020. In municipalities with a population of 7,500 or greater, municipal
judges must be licensed to practice law in Missouri. Id. § 479.020(3).
467. A municipal judge need not be resident of the municipality or circuit in which the
judge serves (unless an ordinance or charter provides otherwise). Id. § 479.020(4).
468. Id. § 479.020(8).
469. This requirement applies for both lawyer and nonlawyer municipal judges.
Municipal Judge Education, Mo. Cts., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1805 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
470. Id.; see also Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 18.05(a)(2) (“[A]t least one of the three ethics credit
hours required under Rule 18.05(a)(1) must be devoted exclusively to explicit or implicit
bias, diversity, inclusion, or cultural competency.”). Lawyer municipal judges need only
complete five hours of continuing education annually. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 18.05(b).
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Montana
Justice of the Peace Civil Jurisdiction:
Justice
Court:
• In civil actions where amount in controversy
$15,000479
does not exceed $15,000 in the following
actions: 471
o Contract actions
o Damages for personal injury or injury to
personal property472
o Actions to recover personal property
o In certain actions for a fine, penalty, or
forfeiture
o Actions upon bonds or undertakings
• Take and enter judgment for recovery of
money upon confession of defendant
• Issue temporary restraining orders and
orders of protection473
• Issue orders relating to the restoration of
streams (within monetary jurisdiction)474
• Concurrent jurisdiction with district courts
in actions of “forcible entry, unlawful
detainer, rent deposits, and residential and
residential mobile home landlord–tenant
disputes”475
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Justice of the Peace
Eligibility:480
• Citizen of the United
States
• Resident of county in
which justice’s court is
held for at least one year
preceding election or
appointment
Justice of the Peace
Training and Continuing
Education:481
• As soon as practical
following election,
complete a course of
study under supervision
of Montana Supreme
Court
• Annually attend two
mandatory training
sessions

Justice of the Peace Criminal Jurisdiction:476
• All misdemeanors punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six months
and/or fines not exceeding $500
• Fish and game statute misdemeanor oﬀenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
six months and/or fines not exceeding
$1,000
• Preliminary hearings in criminal cases
• Certain vehicle oﬀenses477
• Misdemeanor violations relating to livestock
markets and dealers478

471. Mont. Code Ann. § 3-10-301 (West 2021).
472. But justices of the peace have no jurisdiction in actions for “false imprisonment,
libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, malicious prosecution, determination of
paternity, and abduction” or where issues are raised involving title to or possession of real
property. Id. § 3-10-301(1)(b)–(c).
473. Id. § 3-10-301(1)(i).
474. Id. § 3-10-301(1)(j).
475. Id. § 3-10-302.
476. Id. § 3-10-303.
477. Id. §§ 3-10-303(1)(f), 61-10-107.
478. Id. §§ 3-10-303(1)(g), 81-8-2.
479. Id. § 3-10-301.
480. Id. § 3-10-204.
481. Id. § 3-10-203.
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Montana (cont.)
City Court Jurisdiction:
City Court:
$9,500485
• Concurrent jurisdiction with justice court of
misdemeanors and for preliminary hearings in
felony cases482
• Civil and criminal violations of city or town
ordinances483
• Actions for collections of license fees
• Within monetary jurisdiction of $9,500,
actions when city or town is party or “is in any
way interested”:484
o Breach of oﬃcial bonds or contracts
o Damages
o Enforcement of forfeited recognizances
o Collection on bonds
o Recovery of personal property (belonging
to city or town)
o Collection of money due to city or town
o Collections of taxes or assessments on
certain cases
Nebraska
Clerk Magistrate Jurisdiction:488
N/A
• Conduct proceedings based on:
o Misdemeanors
o Traﬃc infractions
o Violations of city or village ordinances
o State law infraction or traﬃc violation
(except where the defendant pleads not
guilty)
• Issue warrants for arrest, searches, or seizure
when no district judge is available
• Adjudicate nonfelony proceedings (including
determining probable cause or release on
bail)
• Determine temporary custody of juvenile
• Determine noncontested proceedings relating
to decadents’ estates, inheritance tax matters,
and guardianship or conservatorship489
• Entering orders for hearings and trials
(including for garnishment)
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City Judge Eligibility:486
• Meet qualifications of
justice of the peace
City Judge Training and
Continuing Education:487
• Annually attend two
mandatory training
sessions

Clerk Magistrate Eligibility:490
• High school graduate or
equivalent
Clerk Magistrate Continuing
Education:
• Annually earn at least eight
judicial branch credits491

482. Id. § 3-11-102.
483. Id. § 3-11-103.
484. Montana city courts have no jurisdiction in civil actions that “might result in a
judgment against the state for the payment of money.” Id. § 3-11-104.
485. Id. § 3-11-103.
486. Id. § 3-11-202.
487. Id. § 3-11-204.
488. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-519 (2021).
489. But clerk magistrates have no jurisdiction for matters relating to construction of
wills and trusts, determining title to real estate, or authorizing sale or mortgaging of real
estate. Id. § 24-519(5).
490. Id. § 24-508.
491. Neb. Sup. Ct. R. § 1-503; see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-508(3) (“A clerk magistrate
shall comply with the Supreme Court judicial branch education requirements as required
by the Supreme Court.”).
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Justice Courts:492
• Nontraﬃc misdemeanors
• Traﬃc cases
• Small claims disputes and other civil
matters less than $15,000
• Temporary protective orders against
domestic violence
• Evictions and other landlord–tenant
proceedings

Nevada
$15,000493
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Justice of the Peace
Eligibility (in townships of
100,000 or less):494
• Qualified elector
• Resident of township
• Never removed or retired
from judicial oﬃce
• High school graduate or
equivalent
Justice Court Training and
Continuing Education
Requirements:495
• Two-week initial training
session
• Complete thirteen hours
of ongoing training

492. Justice
Courts,
Sup.
Ct.
of
Nev.
&
Nev.
Ct.
of
Appeals,
https://nvcourts.gov/Find_a_Court/Justice_Courts/
[https://perma.cc/57EW-WY3N]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
493. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 4.370 (2021).
494. Id. § 4.010. In counties with a population of at least 100,000, a justice of the peace
must, at the time of election or appointment to oﬃce, be an attorney who is licensed and
admitted to practice law in Nevada and have been licensed and admitted to practice law in
a U.S. jurisdiction for at least five years preceding election or appointment. Id.
495. Id. § 4.035; see also Sup. Ct. of Nev.: Admin. Off. of the Cts., Judicial Education
Overview, https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_Services/Judicial_Education/Overview/
[https://perma.cc/E6JW-HHCJ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
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New Mexico
Magistrate Judge Civil Jurisdiction:
$10,000501
• Civil actions in contract, quasi-contract,
and tort (with limited exceptions)
where amount in controversy does not
exceed $10,000496
• Administer oaths and aﬃrmations and
take acknowledgements of instruments
in writing497
• Solemnize marriages498
Magistrate Judge Criminal Jurisdiction:499
• Misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors
• Violations of county and municipal
ordinances (including issuing
subpoenas and warrants and punishing
contempt)
• Conduct preliminary examinations in
criminal actions
• In actions beyond criminal jurisdiction,
a magistrate “may commit to jail,
discharge or recognize the defendant to
appear before the district court”
Municipal Court Jurisdiction:500
• All oﬀenses and complaints under
municipal ordinances
• Issue subpoenas and warrants and
punish contempt
• Certain traﬃc violations
• Criminal DUI cases
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Magistrate Eligibility (districts
with populations of less than
200,000):502
• Elector and resident of
district in which appointed
• High school graduate or
equivalent
Magistrate Training and
Continuing Education:
• Within forty-five days of
election or appointment
attend a qualification
training program
conducted by the
administrative oﬃce of the
courts503
• Annually attend at least one
magistrate training
program (“designed to
inform magistrates with
reference to judicial powers
and duties and to improve
the administration of
justice”)504
Municipal Judge Training and
Continuing Education:505
• Annually attend a judicial
training program

496. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-3-3 (West 2021). Magistrates have no jurisdiction in civil
actions for malicious prosecution, libel, or slander; against public oﬃcers for misconduct in
oﬃce; specific performance in the sale of real property; in which title or land-boundaries
are disputed; aﬀecting domestic relations; or to grant injunctive relief or habeas corpus. Id.
§ 35-3-3(c).
497. Id. § 35-3-1.
498. Id. § 35-3-2.
499. Id. § 35-3-4.
500. Id. § 35-14-2.
501. Id. § 35-3-3.
502. Id. § 35-2-1. In districts with a population greater than 200,000, magistrates must
either be a member of the New Mexico Bar and licensed to practice law in New Mexico or
have held oﬃce as a magistrate continuously since the publication of the federal decennial
census. Id.
503. Id. § 35-2-3.
504. Id. § 35-2-4.
505. Id. § 35-14-10. Qualifications otherwise vary by municipality. Id. § 35-14-3.
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Town and Village Court Civil
Jurisdiction:506
• Traﬃc cases
• Small claims
• Landlord–tenant matters including
eviction proceedings507
• Summary proceedings508
• Certain statutory violations509
Town and Village Court Criminal
Jurisdiction:510
• Misdemeanors and violations
committed within the jurisdiction of
the town or village
• Vehicle and traﬃc law misdemeanors
and felony infractions
• Arraignments and preliminary
hearings in felony matters

New York
$3,000511
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Town and Village Judge
Eligibility:512
• Resident within the town or
village in which elected
• Town judges must be
electors of town at time of
election and throughout
term of oﬃce
• Never been convicted of
felony
• Citizen of the United States
• At least eighteen years old
Town and Village Judge
(Nonattorney) Training and
Continuing Education:
• Attend first available
certification course after
appointment or election513

506. City,
Town
&
Village
Courts,
NYCourts.gov,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/townandvillage [https://perma.cc/E395-CJUK] (last
visited Feb. 3, 2022).
507. N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 701 (McKinney 2021).
508. See N.Y. Const. art. VI, §§ 15(a), 16, 17(a); N.Y. Uniform Just. Ct. Act § 204
(McKinney 2021); N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 701.
509. See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 123 (McKinney 2021) (including proceedings
to destroy or securely confine dangerous dogs); N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law § 71-0513
(McKinney 2021); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 271 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.43
(McKinney 2021).
510. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 10.30 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. Uniform Just. Ct. Act § 2001.
511. N.Y. Uniform Just. Ct. Act § 201. There is no limitation on monetary jurisdiction
in landlord–tenant actions. Id. § 204.
512. N.Y. Town Law § 23 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. Village Law § 3-300 (McKinney 2021).
The requirements apply unless a village has a population of less than 3,000 and allows for
justices to reside in the county in which the village is located. See N.Y. Village Law § 3300(2)(b).
513. N.Y. Uniform Just. Ct. Act § 105; see also N.Y. Town Law § 31(2).
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North Carolina
Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:514
$10,000518
• Perform marriages
• Hear small claims cases515
• Enter orders for summary ejectment
(evictions)
• Determine involuntary commitment
• Administer oaths
• Conduct hearings for driver’s license
revocations516
Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:517
• Hear certain infractions, misdemeanors,
and statutory oﬀenses
• Conduct initial proceedings
• Set conditions of release (noncapital
oﬀenses)
• Issue arrest and search warrants
• Issue subpoenas
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Magistrate Eligibility:519
• Must have
(1) four-year college
degree; or
(2) eight years of
experience as clerk of
superior court; or
(3) two-year associate
degree and four years
of experience “in a job
related to the court
system, law
enforcement, or other
public service work”
Magistrate Required Training
and Continuing Education:520
• Must complete courses in
basic training and annual
in-service training to be
eligible for renomination
• Must annually complete at
least twelve hours of
training in civil and
criminal areas, including,
but not limited to, subjects
on conditions of pretrial
release, impaired driving
laws, issuing criminal
processes, issuing search
warrants, technology, and
orders of protection

514. The
Important
Role
of
the
North
Carolina
Magistrate,
N.C.
Jud.
Branch:
Gen.
Ct.
of
Just.
2
(2018),
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/Magistrates_FactSheet_2018.p
df?qsTgXGl3Z8LM68un15bwTNR.fJVIvcsw#:~:text=While%20magistrates%20are%20not%
20under,the%20same%20mandatory%20retirement%20age
[https://perma.cc/3FQQ65H8].
515. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-210 (2021).
516. Id. § 20-16.5.
517. Id. § 7A-273.
518. Id. § 7A-210.
519. Id. § 7A-171.2.
520. 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 146.
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Municipal Court Jurisdiction:521
• Violations of municipal ordinances

North Dakota
N/A
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Municipal Judge Eligibility
(only in cities with
populations under 5,000):522
• Need not be resident of the
city nor licensed to practice
law in North Dakota
Municipal Judge Required
Training and Continuing
Education:523
• Orientation within first
three months of oﬃce524
• Eighteen hours of
approved coursework over
each three-year period in
oﬃce525

Oklahoma
Municipal Court Jurisdiction:526
N/A
• Violations of any ordinance of the
municipality in which the court sits
• Traﬃc oﬀenses (including prescribing
bail or arrests in misdemeanor
violations of traﬃc ordinances)527
• Issue arrest warrants528
• Make arraignments529
• Set terms of sentence530
• Punish contempt531

Municipal Court Judge
Eligibility:
• Resident of county in
which municipality is
located532
Municipal Court Training and
Continuing Education
Requirements:533
• Annually complete twelve
hours of continuing
education

521. N.D. Cent. Code § 40-18-01 (2021).
522. Id. In cities with populations greater than 5,000, municipal judge must be licensed
to practice law “unless no person so licensed is available in the city.” Id.
523. Id. § 40-18-22.
524. N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 36.4(b).
525. N.D. Cent. Code § 40-18-22.
526. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 27-103 (2021).
527. Id. § 27-117.1.
528. Id. §§ 27-113–117.
529. Id. § 27-116.
530. See id. §§ 27-122.1–122.2.
531. Id. § 27-125.
532. Id. § 27-104. In general, a municipal court judge must be licensed to practice law
in Oklahoma. Id. § 27-104(A). In municipalities with a population of less than 7,500,
however, such judges may be “any suitable person who resides in the county in which the
municipality is located or in an adjacent county.” Id. § 27-104(B). Similarly, in
municipalities with a population greater than 7,500 but where no attorney licensed to
practice law in Oklahoma who is willing to accept appointment as judge resides in the county
or an adjacent county, a municipality may appoint as judge “any suitable and proper
person.” Id. § 27-104(C).
533. Id. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4-B, r. 4 (2021).
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Justice Court Civil Jurisdiction:534
• Civil actions where amount in
controversy does not exceed $10,000
• Judgment without action upon
confession of defendant
• Small claims jurisdiction

Oregon
$10,000537

Justice Court Criminal Jurisdiction:535
• Concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
court over criminal and traﬃc oﬀenses
committed and triable within the
jurisdiction (except felony trials)
Municipal Court:536
• Concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and
justice courts over violations and
misdemeanors committed and triable in
city where court is located (except
felonies and drug-related
misdemeanors)

534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
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Justice of the Peace
Eligibility:538
• Citizen of the United States
• Resident of Oregon for at
least three years preceding
appointment or candidacy
• Resident in peace district
in which justice court
located
Municipal Judge and Justice of
the Peace (Nonattorney)
Required Training and
Continuing Education:539
• Within twelve months of
appointment or election
complete a course “on
courts of special
jurisdiction oﬀered by the
National Judicial College”
or an equivalent course
• Annually complete thirty
hours of continuing
education540

Or. Rev. Stat. § 51.080 (2021).
Id. § 51.050.
Id. § 221.339.
Id. § 51.080.
Id. § 51.240.
Id. §§ 51.240 (justices of the peace), 221.142 (municipal judges).
Id. § 51.245.
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Pennsylvania
Magisterial District Judges:541
Magisterial
District
• Civil claims where amount of
Court:
controversy does not exceed $12,000542
$12,000545
• Summary oﬀenses
• Matters arising under the Landlord
Tenant Act of 1951543
• Preside at arraignments
• Issue warrants and accept bail in
noncapital oﬀenses
• Hear certain DUI cases
Traﬃc Court:544
• Oﬀenses arising under the Motor
Vehicle Code and related ordinances
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Magisterial and Traﬃc Judge
Eligibility: 546
• Citizen of Pennsylvania
• At least twenty-one years
old
• Resident of district in
which appointed for at
least one year preceding
election or appointment
and throughout term of
oﬃce
Magisterial District Judge
Required Training and
Continuing Education:
• Minimum forty-hour
training in “civil and
criminal law, including
evidence and procedure,
summary proceedings,
motor vehicles and courses
in judicial ethics”547
• Annually complete thirtytwo hours of continuing
education courses,
including one course in
matters related to children
and child abuse548
Traﬃc Court Required
Training and Continuing
Education:549
• Minimum twenty-hour
training on “summary
proceedings and laws
relating to motor
vehicles”550

541. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1515 (2021).
542. Magisterial district judge jurisdiction extends only to cases: (1) in assumpsit, unless
involving real contract where title to real property comes into question; (2) in trespass; and
(3) for fines and penalties by any government agency. Id. § 1515(a)(3). Jurisdiction does
not extend to claims against a Commonwealth party. Id.
543. 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 250.101–.602 (2021).
544. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1302.
545. Id. § 1515. However, plaintiﬀs may waive a portion of their claim to bring the claim
within monetary jurisdiction. Id.
546. Id. § 3101.
547. Id. § 3113(b); 201 Pa. Code § 601 (2021).
548. Every six years the course “shall include the identification of mental illness,
intellectual disabilities and autism and the availability of diversionary options for individuals
with mental illness, intellectual disabilities or autism.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3118.
549. Id. § 3101.
550. Id. § 3113(b).
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South Carolina
Magistrate Court Civil Jurisdiction:551
$7,500559
• Concurrent jurisdiction in actions:552
o Arising on contracts
o For damages for injury to rights to
person or real property
o For penalty, fine, or forfeiture
o Upon surety bond taken by them
o Commenced by property attachment
o Upon a bond for payment of money
o To take and enter judgment upon the
confession of defendant
o To recover personal property
o Of interpleader arising from real estate
contracts
o Regarding landlord–tenant matters
Magistrate Court Criminal Jurisdiction:
• Exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases
charging oﬀenses committed in which
punishment does not exceed thirty-day
imprisonment or fine of $100553
• Admit bail, conduct bond hearings, and
determine conditions of release554
• Issue search warrants in gambling oﬀenses555
• Issue arrest warrants556
• Examine into treasons, felonies, grand
larcenies, high crimes, and misdemeanors557
• Expunge criminal records in certain cases558
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Magistrate Eligibility:560
• Citizen of the United
States and South Carolina
• Resident of South
Carolina for at least five
years
• At least twenty-one years
old and younger than
seventy-two years old561
• High school graduate or
equivalent
• Received a four-year
bachelor’s degree562
Magistrate Required Training
and Continuing Education:
• Must complete training
program and pass
certification exam within
one year of taking oﬃce563
and recertification exam
every eight years
thereafter564
• Two-year continuing
education program
providing “extensive
instruction in civil and
criminal procedures”565

551. S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-10 (2021). Magistrates have no civil jurisdiction in actions in
which the state is a party (unless for a penalty not exceeding $100), or when title to real
property comes into question (with limited exceptions). Id. § 22-3-20.
552. Id. § 22-3-10.
553. Id. § 22-3-540. However, criminal jurisdiction is abolished in all counties in which
a county court is established. Id. § 22-3-510. In these counties, magistrates are to issue
warrants and hold preliminary examinations. Id. § 22-5-710. In criminal matters beyond
their jurisdiction to try, magistrates have jurisdiction to examine, commit, discharge, and
(except in capital cases) recognize individuals charged with such oﬀenses. Id. § 22-3-310.
554. Id. § 22-5-510.
555. Id. § 22-5-10.
556. Id. §§ 22-5-110(A)(1), -150.
557. Id. § 22-5-110(A)(2).
558. Id. §§ 22-5-910 (general), 22-9-520 (youth oﬀenders), 22-5-930 (first oﬀense drug
convictions).
559. Id. § 22-3-10.
560. Id. § 22-1-10.
561. See id. §§ 22-1-10, -25.
562. Applies only to magistrates appointed on and after July 1, 2005. Id. § 22-1-10(B)(2).
Magistrates appointed on and after July 1, 2001 must have a two-year associate degree. Id.
563. Id. §§ 22-1-10(C), 22-2-5.
564. Id. § 22-1-10(D).
565. Id. § 22-1-17; see also S.C. App. Ct. R. 510(b)(1) (noting that of the required
eighteen continuing education hours at least six shall be devoted to civil law issues, six shall
be devoted to criminal law issues, and two shall be devoted to ethical issues).
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South Carolina (cont.)
Both civil and criminal:
• Punish contempt566
• Issue summonses567
• Take testimony de bene esse568
• Grant new trials for cases tried in the
magistrate’s court569
Municipal Court:570
• All cases arising under municipal ordinances
• Equivalent powers in criminal cases
conferred upon magistrates
• Punish contempt
• No jurisdiction in civil matters
Probate Court:571
• Issue marriage licenses
• Perform duties of clerk of court in certain
proceedings in eminent domain
• Adjudicate matters concerning involuntary
commitment of people suﬀering from
“mental illness, intellectual disability,
alcoholism, drug addiction, and active
pulmonary tuberculosis”
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Municipal Eligibility:572
• Need not be resident of
municipality in which
holds oﬃce
Municipal Required Training
and Continuing Education:573
• Complete training
program and pass
certification exam upon
first appointment
• Annually attend specified
number of continuing
education hours in
criminal law and other
relevant subject hours as
required by Supreme
Court of South Carolina574
Probate Eligibility:575
• Citizen of the United
States and South Carolina
• At least twenty-one years
old
• Qualified elector in
county in which oﬃce is
held
• Four-year bachelor’s
degree from accredited
institution or four years’
experience as employee in
probate judge’s oﬃce

566. S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-950.
567. Id. § 22-3-930.
568. Id. § 22-3-940.
569. Id. § 22-3-990.
570. Id. § 14-25-45.
571. Id. § 14-23-1150.
572. Id. § 14-25-25.
573. Id. § 14-25-15.
574. S.C. App. Ct. R. 510(b)(1) (noting that of the required eighteen continuing
education hours at least six shall be devoted to civil law issues, six shall be devoted to
criminal law issues, and two shall be devoted to ethical issues).
575. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-23-1040.
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South Dakota
Clerk Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction: 576
$12,000585
• Concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
courts in civil actions or noncontested
small claims proceedings within
monetary jurisdiction577
• Solemnize marriages578
• Administer oaths and take
acknowledgments and depositions579
Clerk Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:
• Concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
courts to:
o Commit and conduct preliminary
hearings580
o Issue summonses, warrants of
arrest, and warrants for searches
and seizures581
o Fix bonds or take personal
recognizance582
o Adjudicate matters concerning
petty oﬀenses if the punishment
does not exceed a fine of $500
and/or thirty-day imprisonment583
o Forfeiture of bonds for violations of
any ordinance, bylaw, or other
police regulation584
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Clerk Magistrate Eligibility: 586
• High school graduate or
equivalent
Clerk Magistrate Training and
Education:587
• Complete training on
evidence-based practices
• Annually attend judicial
conference

576. A clerk magistrate need not be licensed to practice law but has more limited
jurisdiction than a magistrate judge who must be licensed to practice law in South Dakota.
See S.D. Codified Laws § 16-12A-1.1 (2021).
577. Id. § 16-12C-13.
578. Id. § 16-12C-5.
579. Id. § 16-12C-6.
580. Jurisdiction is concurrent with circuit courts to commit where informed waiver of
preliminary hearing is given and is concurrent to conduct preliminary hearings unless
defendant expressly demands hearing be conducted before a magistrate or circuit judge.
Id. § 16-12C-9.
581. Id. § 16-12C-7.
582. Id. § 16-12C-10.
583. Id. § 16-12C-11.
584. Id. § 16-12C-12.
585. Id. § 16-12C-13.
585. Id. § 16-12C-5.
586. Id. § 16-12C-2. While a magistrate judge must be licensed to practice law, a clerk
magistrate need not be. Id. § 16-12A-1.1.
587. Id. § 16-14-4.
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City (or “Municipal”588) Court
Jurisdiction:589
• Laws and ordinances of the
municipality590
• Traﬃc violations

Tennessee
N/A

1371

City Judge Eligibility:591
• At least thirty years old
• Resident of Tennessee for
five years preceding
election
• Resident of circuit or
district in which oﬃce is
held for one year
preceding election
City Judge Training and
Continuing Education:592
• Annually attend three
hours of training or
continuing education
courses approved by the
administrative oﬃce of
courts consisting of
material concerning issues,
procedures, and new
developments relevant to
city judges593

588. A municipal court is also called a “city court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-301(2) (2021);
see also About Municipal Courts, TNCourts.gov, https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/municipalcourts/about [https://perma.cc/74WE-B2EE] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
589. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-302. In municipalities with a population greater than
150,000, jurisdiction also extends to additional enumerated misdemeanors and other
oﬀenses. Id. § 16-18-302(b).
590. This power includes jurisdiction over municipal laws and ordinances that duplicate
or incorporate the language of state criminal statutes that are Class C misdemeanors with a
maximum penalty of a civil fine not more than $50. Id. § 16-18-302(a)(2).
591. Id. § 16-18-202; Tenn. Const. art VI, § 4. In cities with a population of more than
160,000, city judges must be lawyers authorized to practice law in Tennessee. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 17-1-106(d).
592. Id. § 16-18-309.
593. If a municipal judge is an attorney authorized to practice law in Tennessee then
such judge may complete three hours of training required for practicing attorneys instead.
Id. § 16-18-309(a)(4).
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Justice Courts:594
• Civil matters where amount in
controversy does not exceed $20,000595
• Cases relating to forcible entry and
detainer596
• Enforce deed restrictions597
• Issue writs of sequestration,
garnishment, and attachment598
• Foreclosure of mortgages and
enforcement of liens on personal
property599
• Conduct hearings relating to driver’s
license suspensions600
• Issue arrest and search warrants
• Conduct court for minor misdemeanor
oﬀenses
• Examine witnesses regarding labor act
violations601
• Concurrent civil jurisdiction with
municipal court for minor
misdemeanors (Class C)
• Marriage ceremonies602
• Ex oﬃcio notary public
• Conduct justice court
• Variety of civil process
• Judge of small claims court603
• Administer and certify oaths and
aﬃdavits604

Texas
Justice:
$20,000605
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Justice of the Peace
Eligibility:606
• No specific requirements
Justice of the Peace Required
Training and Continuing
Education:
Initially:
• Within one year of
election, an “eighty-hour
course in the performance
of the justice’s duties”607
• Eight-hour initial training
course in criminal case
matters608
Annually:
• Twenty-hour judicial
course including at least
ten hours of instruction on
“substantive, procedural,
and evidentiary law in civil
matters”609
• Two-hour continuing
education course relating
to criminal matters610

594. See generally Tex. Gov’t Code § 27 (2021) (justice courts); David B. Brooks, Tex.
Ass’n of Counties, 2021 Guide to Texas Laws for County Oﬃcials 1 (2021),
https://www.county.org/TAC/media/TACMedia/Legal/Legal%20Publications%20Docu
ments/2021/2021-Guide-to-Laws-for-County-Oﬃcials.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9LN-64SQ]
(“This guide is a compilation of current statutes aﬀecting the administration and operation
of the principal county oﬃces . . . . [I]t is primarily intended to provide . . . a convenient
reference source for questions regarding the scope of their individual duties.”).
595. Tex. Gov’t Code § 27.031(a).
596. Id.
597. Id. § 27.034.
598. Id. § 27.032.
599. Id. § 27.031.
600. Tex. Transp. Code §§ 521.291–.320 (2021).
601. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5202 (West 2021).
602. Tex. Fam. Code § 2.202 (2021).
603. Tex. Gov’t Code § 27.060.
604. Id. § 602.
605. Id. § 27.031.
606. See Judge Qualifications and Selection in the State of Texas, Tex. Cts.,
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/48745/Judge-Qualifications-6_26_14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QTB9-4PXP] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
607. Tex. Gov’t Code § 27.005.
608. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.024, 17.0501 (West 2021).
609. Tex. Gov’t Code § 27.005.
610. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.024, 17.0501.
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Texas (cont.)
Constitutional County Courts:611
County:
$20,000615
• Concurrent jurisdiction with justice
courts where amount in controversy is
Municipal:
greater than $200 and less than
$500616
$20,000612
613
• Juvenile jurisdiction
Municipal Courts:614
• Violations of city ordinances
• Search and arrest warrants
• Airport-related matters
• Concurrent jurisdiction with justice
courts in criminal cases:
o Punishable only by fines
o Arising under the Alcoholic
Beverage Code
• Judgment of all bail and personal
bonds in criminal cases
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County Judge Eligibility:617
• Citizen of the United States
• Resident of Texas for at
least twelve consecutive
months
• Resident of county for at
least six consecutive
months
• Qualified voter in county
• Never have been convicted
of felony
• Not have been determined
to be mentally
incapacitated
County Judge Required
Training and Continuing
Education:618
• Thirty credit hours in first
twelve months
• Sixteen hours annually
thereafter
Municipal (Nonattorney)
Judge Required Training and
Continuing Education:619
• Thirty-two hours of
continuing judicial
education within one year
of appointment or election
• Annually attend regional
seminar

611. See Brooks, supra note 594, at 64–72.
612. Tex. Gov’t Code § 26.042.
613. Id. § 23.001.
614. Tex. Gov’t Code § 29.003.
615. Id. § 26.042. Civil jurisdiction is concurrent with justice courts between $200 and
$20,000 and concurrent with district courts between $500 and $5,000. Id.
616. The municipal court jurisdictional amount is $500 generally; $2,000 in matters
relating to fire safety, zoning, or public health and sanitation; and $4,000 in matters
concerning dumping of refuse. Id. § 29.003(a)(2).
617. Tex. Const. art. V, § 15 (amended 1954); Tex. Elec. Code § 141.001 (2021).
618. Texas County Judge, Tex. Ass’n of Counties, https://www.county.org/AboutTexas-Counties/About-Texas-County-Oﬃcials/%e2%80%8bTexas-County-Judge
[https://perma.cc/7QZ2-UCFG] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
619. Judges, Tex. Mun. Ct. Educ. Ctr., https://www.tmcec.com/programs/judges/
[https://perma.cc/M6VJ-K9MM] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022).
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Justice Court Criminal Jurisdiction:620
• Class B and C misdemeanors
• Violations of ordinances
• Infractions
Justice Court Civil Jurisdiction:621
• Small claims when either defendant
resides or debt arose within
territorial jurisdiction of justice court

Utah
$11,000622
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Justice Court Judge Eligibility:623
• Citizen of the United States
• At least twenty-five years old and
younger than seventy-five years old
• Utah resident for a minimum of
three years immediately preceding
appointment
• Resident of county in which court
located for a minimum of six
months immediately preceding
appointment
• Qualified voter in county in which
judge resides
• A high school graduate or
equivalent624
Justice Court Judge Training and
Education:625
• Attend the first designated
orientation program upon taking
oﬃce626
• Be certified as meeting the
continuing education
requirements of judicial council
including instruction regarding:
o Understanding of
constitutional provisions
o Laws relating to the
jurisdiction of the court
o Rules of evidence
o Rules of civil and criminal
procedure

620. Utah Code § 78A-7-106 (2021). In general, justice court jurisdiction extends only
to oﬀenses committed within the justice court’s territorial jurisdiction by oﬀenders ages
eighteen and older. Id. Jurisdiction also extends to the following oﬀenses committed with
in the justice court’s territorial jurisdiction by individuals ages 16 and 17: certain oﬀenses
relating to the Driver Licensing Act, Wildlife Resources Code, Motor Vehicle Act, Traﬃc
Code, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, Oﬀ-Highway
Vehicles, State Boating Act, Boating—Litter and Pollution Control, Water Safety, and
Financial Responsibility of Motorboat Owners and Operators Act. Id. § 78A-7-106(2).
621. Id. § 78A-7-106(5). Small claims actions are civil actions where amount in
controversy does not exceed $11,000. Id. § 78A-8-102.
622. Id. § 78A-8-102.
623. Id. § 78A-7-201.
624. As of May 10, 2016, this only applies in third, fourth, fifth, or sixth class counties;
in first and second class counties a judge must have a degree from a law school and be bar
eligible in any state. Id. § 78A-7-201(2). Justice court judges in first and second class counties
holding oﬃce on May 10, 2016, who did not have a J.D., were grandfathered in and were
allowed to continue to hold oﬃce until they resign, retire, or are removed from oﬃce or
not reelected in a subsequent election. Id. § 78A-7-201(7).
625. Id. § 78A-7-205. Justice court judges must complete thirty hours of preapproved
education annually. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-403(3).
626. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-403(3).
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Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:627
• Issue civil warrants
• Administer oaths and take
acknowledgments
• Act as conservators of the peace
• Issue attachment summonses, distress
warrants, and detinue seizure
orders628
• Issue emergency custody orders629
• Issue emergency protective orders630
• Issue subpoenas duces tecum631
Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:632
• Issue search warrants
• Issue process of arrest
• Issue warrants and subpoenas633
• Admit bail
• Issue temporary detention orders634
• Conduct probable cause and bail
hearings and issue warrants for
federal criminal cases635

Virginia
N/A
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Magistrate Eligibility:636
• Citizen of the United States
• Resident of Virginia
• Bachelor’s degree from
accredited institution637
Magistrate Training and
Continuing Education:
• Complete minimum training
standards established by the
Committee on District Courts
within nine months of
appointment638
• Annually obtain twenty
continuing legal education
credits639

627. Va. Code § 19.2-45 (2021).
628. Id. §§ 8.01-54, 8.01-114, 55-230, 55-232.
629. Id. §§ 19.2-182.9, 37.2-808, 37.2-913.
630. Id. §§ 16.1-253.4, 19.2-152.8.
631. Id. §§ 16.1-69.25, 19.2-45.
632. Id. § 19.2-45.
633. “The same power to issue warrants and subpoenas as is conferred upon district
courts and as limited by the provisions of §§ 19.2-71 through 19.2-82.” Id. § 19.2-45(4).
634. Id. §§ 19.2-182.9, 37.2-808, 37.2-913; see also Oﬀ. of the Exec. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Magistrate Servs., Magistrate Manual: Introduction to the Magistrate System of Virginia 14
(2021),
https://www.vacourts.gov/courtadmin/aoc/mag/resources/magman/chapter01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48FD-YYE8] [hereinafter Va. Magistrate Manual].
635. Va. Code § 2.2-2801(A)(21); see also Va. Magistrate Manual, supra note 634, at 14
(“Va. Code § 2.2-2801 specifically allows Virginia magistrates to perform acts and functions
with respect to United States criminal proceedings.”).
636. Va. Code § 19.2-37. An individual is ineligible for appointment as a magistrate if
that person is a law enforcement oﬃcer; is on any governing body for any political
subdivision of Virginia; “if such person or his spouse is a clerk, deputy or assistant clerk, or
employee of any such clerk of a district court or circuit court”; or if such person’s parent,
child, spouse, or sibling is a district or circuit court judge in the region in which that person
would be appointed. Id.
637. A bachelor’s degree is not required for magistrates appointed and continuing to
hold oﬃce since July 1, 2008. Id. § 19.2-37(B).
638. Id. § 19.2-38.1.
639. Va. Magistrate Manual, supra note 634, at 11–12.
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Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:640
• All civil actions where amount in
controversy does not exceed $10,000
• Eviction-related matters
• Administer oaths or aﬃrmation
• Take aﬃdavits or depositions

West Virginia
$10,000645

Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:641
• All misdemeanor oﬀenses
• Conduct preliminary examinations
on warrants charging felonies and
probation violations
• Issue arrest warrants in all criminal
matters and warrants for search and
seizure (in cases not involving capital
oﬀenses)
• Set and admit bail642
• Suspend sentences and impose
unsupervised probation643
Municipal Court Jurisdiction:644
• Cases involving municipal violations
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Magistrate Eligibility:646
• At least twenty-one years old
• High school graduate or
equivalent
• Never convicted of felony or
misdemeanor involving “moral
turpitude”
• Resident in county in which
elected
Magistrate Training and
Continuing Education:647
• Attend and complete course
instruction on “rudimentary
principles of law and
procedure”
• Attend courses of continuing
education “as may be required
by supervisory rule of the
Supreme Court of Appeals”
Municipal Judge Training and
Continuing Education:648
• Must “attend and complete the
next available course of
instruction in rudimentary
principles of law and
procedure”
• Annually attend a course “for
the purpose of continuing
education”

640. W. Va. Code Ann. § 50-2-1 (LexisNexis 2021).
641. Jurisdiction extends only over misdemeanors and felonies committed within the
county and over probation violations “upon order of referral from the circuit courts.” Id.
§ 50-2-3 (LexisNexis).
642. Id. (“[I]n cases punishable only by the fine, such bail or recognizance shall not
exceed the maximum amount of the fine and applicable court costs permitted or authorized
by statute to be imposed in the event of conviction.”).
643. This jurisdiction is limited for certain oﬀenses including oﬀenses for which the
penalty includes mandatory incarceration. Id. § 50-2-3a (LexisNexis).
644. Id. § 8-10-2 (LexisNexis).
645. Id. § 50-2-1 (LexisNexis).
646. Id. § 50-1-4 (LexisNexis).
647. Id.
648. Training and continuing education requirements do not apply to “attorneys
admitted to practice in this state.” Id. § 8-10-2(c) (LexisNexis).
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Municipal Judge Jurisdiction:649
• Cases concerning traﬃc oﬀenses and
ordinance violations650
• Issue subpoenas, inspection warrants,
and, in certain cases, civil warrants651
• Issue summonses cases concerning
municipal ordinance violations652
• Order payments of restitution in
violations of nontraﬃc ordinances653
• Punish contempt of court654
• Concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile
court of children in certain cases655
• Perform marriages656
• Preside over depositions in certain
cases657

Wisconsin
N/A
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Municipal Judge Eligibility:658
• Qualified elector at time of
election or appointment
• Resident of jurisdiction during
term
Municipal Judge Training and
Continuing Education:659
• Immediately following
appointment or election, new
municipal judges must attend
the Municipal Judge
Orientation and Institute
• Earn four credits each year at a
“municipal judge orientation
institute, review institute or
graduate institute developed by
the judicial education oﬃce”

649. Wis. Stat. § 755.045 (2021); see also Wis. Sup. Ct., Dir. of State Cts. & Oﬀ. of Jud.
Educ.,
Wisconsin
Municipal
Judge
Benchbook
1-7
to
1-9
(2020),
https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/guides/docs/munibenchbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W5Z3-GCGC] [hereinafter Wis. Municipal Judge Benchbook].
650. Jurisdiction is exclusive when the penalty is a forfeiture. Wis. Stat. § 755.045(1).
651. Id. §§ 755.045(2), 800.02(5), 885.04.
652. Id. § 800.02(4).
653. This power applies where ordinances prohibit the same or similar conduct to state
statutes which are punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Id. §§ 755.045(3), 800.093.
654. Id. § 800.12.
655. This jurisdiction is concurrent with children twelve years or older who allegedly
violated a municipal ordinance and children of any age alleged to be “habitually truant.”
Id. § 938.17(2)(a).
656. Id. § 765.16(1m)(f).
657. Id. §§ 13.24(1), 887.20, 887.23.
658. Wis. Municipal Judge Benchbook, supra note 649, at 1-10.
659. Wis. Stat. § 755.18; Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 33.04; Wis. Municipal Judge Benchbook, supra
note 649, at 1-10.
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Wyoming
Circuit Court Magistrate Civil Jurisdiction:660
• Administer oaths
• Acknowledge deeds and mortgages
• Perform marriages
• Subpoena witnesses and mandate appearances
• Handle eviction matters661 and all civil actions
where the jurisdictional amount is $5,000 or less662
• Try actions concerning “any instrument payable in
installments” or disposal of an abandoned vehicle
• Issue attachments, executions, and garnishments
of debtors in certain cases, and executions on
judgments rendered by the magistrate663
664

Circuit Court Magistrate Criminal Jurisdiction:
• Issue warrants or summonses
• Set bail665
• Arraign, try, and sentence defendants for
misdemeanors punishable by one year or less of
imprisonment, regardless of any fine imposed666
• Correct an illegal sentence or reduce sentences
• Hear and issue orders in peace bond, stalking, and
domestic violence cases
Municipal Court Judge Jurisdiction:
• All oﬀenses arising under municipal ordinances667

$5,000668
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Circuit Court
Magistrate Eligibility
(Full-Time):669
• Full-Time: Qualified
elector and resident
in county
• Part-Time: Qualified
elector and resident
in “district within
which the circuit is
located”670
Municipal Judge
Eligibility:
• Qualified elector of
Wyoming671
Magistrate and
Municipal Judge
Training and
Continuing Education:
• Annually complete
at least fifteen hours
of accredited
continuing judicial
or legal education672

660. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-208 (2021). A full-time magistrate, authorized to practice law
in Wyoming, enjoys broader jurisdiction and with limited exception may exercise “all of the
powers of a circuit court” as authorized by law or with consent of all parties. Id.
661. Id. § 5-9-208(c)(v) (“Try the action for forcible entry and detainer . . . .”). A
magistrate not licensed to practice law may preside over cases against tenants “holding over
their terms or . . . fail[ing] to pay rent for three (3) days after it is due,” and renters who are
not “current on all payments required by the rental agreement” or fail to comply “with all
lawful requirements of the rental agreement.” Id. §§ 1-21-1002(a)(i), 1204, 1205.
662. Within the jurisdictional amount, powers include entering judgments by default,
on the pleadings, and on a confession of a party, as well as summary judgment, setting aside
default judgments, and issuing any order a circuit judge can enter. Id. § 5-9-208(c)(xiii).
663. Magistrates can also try the rights of claimants to property taken in execution,
garnishment, or attachment. Id. §§ 5-9-208(c)(vii), (viii), (ix), (xii), (xiv).
664. Id. § 5-9-208.
665. This includes the power to set bail for witnesses. Id. § 5-9-208(c)(xvi).
666. This includes the power to: (1) accept pleas; (2) order examinations of defendants
who claim mental illness, and order presentence investigations, substance abuse evaluations,
and pretrial conferences; (3) impose sentences and terms of probation; (4) issue orders to
show cause and conduct related hearings; and (5) enter other orders within the power of
circuit judges when the judge is unavailable, recused, or disqualified. Id. § 5-9-208(c)(xviii).
667. Id. § 5-6-101.
668. Id. § 5-9-208(c)(x).
669. Id. §§ 5-9-201(a), 5-9-206.
670. Id. §§ 5-9-201(b)(2), -210.
671. Id. § 5-6-103 (“Municipal judges . . . shall be qualified electors of the state unless
otherwise provided by ordinance.”) (emphasis added).
672. Wyo. R. for Continuing Jud. Educ. 2.
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF STATES THAT ALLOW NON-J.D.S TO SERVE
AS JUDICIAL OFFICERS
State

Ala.

Alaska

Ariz.

Are lay judges
required to complete,
or are they provided
with, some sort of
training?
YES (initial
orientation program
required within the
first twelve months of
taking oﬃce and
continuing education
requirement)
YES (not specified in
statute; a training
judge is assigned to
each judicial district
to inspect, train, and
report on the
magistrates)
YES (must complete at
least sixteen hours of
judicial education in
ethics, technology
training, and live
training)

Are lay judges
authorized to
hear eviction
cases?

Are lay judges
authorized to hear
criminal cases?

NO

YES (district court
magistrate judges may
issue arrest warrants
and set bail amounts)

NO

YES (jurisdiction
includes issuing writs of
habeas corpus; issuing
arrest warrants,
summons, and search
warrants; and can set,
receive, and forfeit
bail)
YES (justice court
judges have jurisdiction
over petty oﬀenses,
misdemeanors, and
criminal oﬀenses
punishable by fines not
exceeding $2,500
and/or imprisonment
in jail not exceeding six
months)

YES
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Colo.

YES (nonlawyer
county judges must
attend a state-run
institute on duties and
function of court
system)

YES

Del.

YES (required to
attend a basic legal
education program
and must complete
thirty hours of
continuing legal
education and
training every two
years)

YES

Ga.

YES (must complete
an orientation
program within the
first year of oﬃce and
eighty hours of
training specified by
the Georgia
Magistrate Courts
Training Council
within two years of
becoming a
magistrate, along with
other continuing
education
requirements)

YES
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YES (county court
judges have jurisdiction
over misdemeanors and
petty oﬀenses (other
than those involving
children); issuing
warrants and bindover
orders; conducting
preliminary
examinations and
dispositional hearings;
and setting bail in
felonies and
misdemeanors)
YES (jurisdiction over
all criminal
misdemeanor cases
(except for those
specifically excluded by
law); issue summonses
and warrants, and
search warrants, based
upon finding of
probable cause, and
issue and execute
capiases; and conduct
initial appearances to
set bond and conduct
bond review hearings
upon request)
YES (jurisdiction over
violations of game and
fish laws; criminal
commitment hearings;
miscellaneous
misdemeanors; and
traﬃc and truancy in
some counties; and
issuance of search and
arrest warrants in some
cases)
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Kan.

YES (must complete at
least thirteen hours of
continuing legal
education annually,
with at least two hours
concerning judicial
ethics)

YES

La.

YES (required to
attend an initial
training course and an
additional training
course once every two
years thereafter)

YES

Md.

YES (must attend an
orientation program
for new judges and
obtain at least twelve
hours of continuing
education annually)
YES (not specified in
statute; magistrates
receiving training
through a
collaboration between
the Trial Court’s
Judicial Institute and
Association of
Magistrates and
Assistant Clerks of the
Trial Courts of
Massachusetts)

NO

Mass.

NO
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YES (jurisdiction over
violations of state law,
cigarette or tobacco
infractions or
misdemeanors; and
first appearance
hearings in felonies,
preliminary
examination of felony
charges, and
misdemeanor or felony
arraignments)
YES (jurisdiction over
setting bail or discharge
in noncapital cases; and
concurrent jurisdiction
with district court over
specified state and local
ordinances concerning
the prosecution of litter
violations and of
“removal, disposition,
or abandonment”
violations)
NO

YES (jurisdiction to
issue warrants, search
warrants, and
summonses; hold
preliminary hearings to
determine probation
violations; set bail on
arraignments when a
justice is unavailable;
and conduct an ex
parte proceeding to
determine probable
cause for detention
after a warrantless
arrest)
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Mich.

YES (not specified in
statute; must
successfully complete
a special training
course in traﬃc law
adjudication and
sanctions prior to
overseeing these
claims)

NO

Miss.

YES (must complete a
basic training course
and a competency
exam within six
months of election
and annually
complete a continuing
education course
thereafter)

NO

Mo.

YES (must complete
an instructional
course within six
months of becoming a
magistrate and
complete at least
fifteen hours of
continuing legal
education annually)

NO
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YES (jurisdiction to
issue search warrants,
and arrest warrants and
summonses; conduct
probable cause
conferences; fix bail
and accept a bond in
all criminal cases;
conduct first
appearances of
defendants in criminal
and ordinance violation
cases; and approve and
grant petitions for the
appointment of
attorneys to represent
indigent clients accused
of misdemeanors)
YES (jurisdiction over
misdemeanor crimes,
municipal ordinances,
and city traﬃc
violations; and can
oversee initial
appearances as well as
bond hearings and
preliminary hearings
and first appearances in
felony cases)
YES (jurisdiction to
hear and determine
violations of municipal
ordinances; issue
warrants; certain traﬃc
oﬀenses; and grant and
set conditions of parole
or probation)

2022]

JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.

Mont.

YES (must complete
an initial training
course as soon as
possible after
obtaining position
and attend two
training sessions each
year thereafter)

YES

Neb.

YES (must earn at
least eight hours of
judicial education
credits annually)

NO

Nev.

YES (must complete a
two-week long initial
training session and
must complete
thirteen hours of
continuing education
annually)

YES
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YES (justices of the
peace have jurisdiction
over all misdemeanors
punishable by
imprisonment not
exceeding six months
and/or fines not
exceeding $500;
preliminary hearings in
criminal cases; and
certain vehicle
oﬀenses)
YES (jurisdiction to
adjudicate nonfelony
proceedings, including
determining probable
cause or release on bail;
determining temporary
custody of juvenile;
determining
noncontested
proceedings relating to
decedents’ estates,
inheritance tax matters,
and guardianship or
conservatorship; and
entering orders for
hearings and trials)
YES (jurisdiction over
criminal, traﬃc, and
nontraﬃc
misdemeanors)

1384

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

N.M.

YES (must attend a
training program
within forty-five days
of initial appointment
and attend at least
one training program
annually)

YES

N.Y.

YES (must attend the
first available
certification course
after initial
appointment)

YES

N.C.

YES (must complete
courses in basic
training and annual
in-service training in
order to be eligible
for renomination and
must annually
complete at least
twelve hours of
training in civil and
criminal law)

YES

N.D.

YES (must attend
orientation within the
first three months of
initial appointment
and earn eighteen
hours of credit in
judicial education
classes every three
years)

NO
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YES (magistrate judge
jurisdiction includes
misdemeanors and
petty misdemeanors;
violations of county and
municipal ordinances
(including issuing
subpoenas and
warrants and punishing
contempt); and
conducting preliminary
examinations in
criminal actions)
YES (jurisdiction over
misdemeanors and
violations committed
within the jurisdiction
of town or village;
vehicle and traﬃc law
misdemeanors and
felony infractions;
arraignments and
preliminary hearings in
felony matters)
YES (jurisdiction to
hear certain
infractions,
misdemeanors, and
statutory oﬀenses;
conduct initial
proceedings; set
conditions of release
(noncapital oﬀenses);
issue arrest, search
warrants, and
subpoenas)
YES (jurisdiction over
violations of municipal
ordinances)

2022]

JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.

Okla.

YES (must complete at
least twelve hours of
continuing education
annually)

NO

Or.

YES (must complete
an orientation course
within the first twelve
months of
appointment and
annually complete
thirty hours of
continuing education)
YES (must complete
an initial forty-hour
course on civil and
criminal law and
annually complete at
least thirty-two hours
of continuing
education courses
including a course
related to children
and child abuse)

NO

Pa.

YES
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YES (jurisdiction over
traﬃc oﬀenses
(including prescribing
bail or arrests in
misdemeanor violations
of traﬃc ordinances);
issue arrest warrants;
make arraignments; set
terms of sentence; and
punish contempt)
YES (justice courts have
concurrent jurisdiction
with circuit court over
criminal and traﬃc
oﬀenses committed or
triable within the
jurisdiction (except
felony trials))
YES (issue warrants and
accept bail in
noncapital oﬀenses and
has jurisdiction to hear
certain DUI cases)

1386

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

S.C.

YES (must attend an
initial training
program and pass
certification exam
within twelve months
of taking oﬃce; also
must attend a
continuing education
program along with
passing a
recertification exam
every eight years
thereafter)

YES

S.D.

YES (must complete
training program on
evidence-based
practices and attend
annual judicial
conferences
thereafter)

NO
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YES (exclusive
jurisdiction in all
criminal cases charging
oﬀenses committed
within magistrate’s
jurisdiction, in which
punishment does not
exceed thirty-day
imprisonment or fine
of $100; admit bail,
conduct bond hearings,
and determine
conditions of release;
issue arrest warrants;
examine treasons,
felonies, grand
larcenies, high crimes,
and misdemeanors)
YES (conducts
preliminary hearings;
concurrent jurisdiction
with circuit court to
issue summonses,
warrants of arrest, and
warrants for searches
and seizures; fix bonds
or take personal
recognizance; and
adjudicate matters
concerning petty
oﬀenses if the
punishment does not
exceed a fine of $500
and/or thirty-day
imprisonment)

2022]

JUDGING WITHOUT A J.D.

Tenn.

YES (must attend
three hours of
training or continuing
education courses
annually)

NO

Tex.

YES (county judges
must earn thirty credit
hours of judicial
education in the first
twelve months of
appointment and
must attend sixteen
hours of continuing
education training
annually thereafter)
YES (must attend
orientation program
upon taking oﬃce
and obtain
certification in several
areas via continuing
education course)
YES (must complete
minimum initial
training standards as
established by state’s
committee within nine
months of
appointment and
obtain at least twenty
hours of continuing
legal education
annually)

YES

Utah

Va.
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YES (jurisdiction over
the laws and
ordinances of the
municipality; and in
municipalities with a
population greater
than 150,000,
jurisdiction also
extends to additional
enumerated
misdemeanors and
other oﬀenses)
YES (justice courts can
issue arrest and search
warrants and can hear
minor misdemeanor
oﬀenses)

NO

YES (jurisdiction over
Class B and C
misdemeanors;
violations of ordinances
and other infractions)

YES

YES (can issue search
warrants, process of
arrest, warrants and
subpoenas; may also
admit bail; issue
temporary detention
orders; and conduct
probable cause and bail
hearings and issue
warrants for federal
criminal cases)

1388

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

W.
Va.

YES (must attend
annual course on
principles of law and
procedure; and must
attend any additional
judicial education
courses as required by
the Supreme Court of
Appeals)

YES

Wis.

YES (must attend
orientation program
immediately following
appointment and
must earn at least four
credits each year
through judicial
education programs)

NO

Wyo.

YES (must annually
complete at least
fifteen hours of
continuing legal
education)

YES
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YES (jurisdiction over
all misdemeanor
oﬀenses; conduct
preliminary
examinations on
warrants charging
felonies and probation
violations; issue arrest
warrants in all criminal
matters, and warrants
for search and seizure
(in cases not involving
capital oﬀenses); and
set and admit bail)
YES (oversee cases
concerning traﬃc
oﬀenses and ordinance
violations; issue
subpoenas, inspection
warrants and, in certain
cases, civil warrants;
issue summonses for
cases concerning
municipal ordinance
violations)
YES (jurisdiction to
issue warrants or
summonses; set bail;
arraign, try, and
sentence defendants in
misdemeanor cases
punishable by not more
than one year
imprisonment,
regardless of any fine
imposed)

